Children, Parents, and Nonparents: Protected Interests and Legal Standards by Andersen, Eric G.
BYU Law Review
Volume 1998 | Issue 3 Article 8
9-1-1998
Children, Parents, and Nonparents: Protected
Interests and Legal Standards
Eric G. Andersen
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Family Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Eric G. Andersen, Children, Parents, and Nonparents: Protected Interests and Legal Standards, 1998 BYU L. Rev. 935 (1998).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol1998/iss3/8
* Pr ofess or  of Law, University of Iowa. B.A. 1974, J.D. 1977, Brigham Young
Un iversit y. I am gra teful to the colleagues and friends who constru ctively criticized
pre limina ry d ra ft s of this  a rticle. Part icular tha nks a re due t o Catherin e Andersen,
Lynn  Wa rd le, B ru ce Hafen, Leslie Har ris, and Mike Ban dstra . Ann Walters pr ovided
valu able  resear ch assistan ce.
935
D :\ 1 9 9 8- 3\ F I N A L \ A N D -F I N . W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
Child ren , Pa ren t s , and  Nonparen t s :  
Pr otected Int erests a nd Legal Standa rds
Eric G. And ersen *
Table of Content s
I.   IN T R O D U C T I O N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936
II.  TH R E E  BA S I C  IN T E R E S T S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 939
A.  Th e Child’s Interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 939
B.  Th e Adult ’s Interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 941
1. Parents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942
2. Mothers and  fathers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943
3. Nonparen t s and  “paren ta l” au tonomy . . . . . . . . 945
C. Th e Social Interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946
III.  IN T E R E S T S , ST A N D AR D S , A N D  RE S U L T S . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948
A.  The Unf itness S tandard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949
B.  Th e Best-interests Sta nd ard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950
C.  An I nterm ediate Sta nd ard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952
IV.  TYP E S  O F  CH I L D -NO N P A R E N T  RE L AT IO N S H IP S . . . . . . . 954
A.  Grandparents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954
B.  Stepparents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 960
1. Traditional stepparents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 961
2. Presum ed fathers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966
C.  Prosp ecti ve A dopt iv e Paren ts  of V olu n ta ri ly  Placed
Infants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969
D.  Foster  an d  Prosp ecti ve A dopt iv e Paren ts  of A bu sed  an d
N eglect ed  Ch ildren . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975
E.  Parents’ Nonm arital Partn ers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 982
1. Opposite-sex partners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983
2. S am e-sex partners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989
V.  CO N C L U S I O N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000
D :\ 1 9 9 8- 3\ F I N A L \ A N D -F I N . W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
936 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1998
1. LE O TOLSTOY, ANN A KAR E N IN A 1 (Lou ise  & Aylm er  Ma ud e t ra ns ., Oxfor d
Un iv. Pr es s 1 990 ) (191 8).
I.  IN T R O D U C T I O N
 “Happy families are all alike; every unha ppy fam ily is un-
happy in its  own wa y,”1 wrot e Tolstoy. Un fortu na tely, a n in -
crea sin g nu mber  of un ha ppy families ar e alik e in  one  impor tan t
wa y: th ey experience wren ching str uggles between adults for
the oppor tun ity  to nu r tu re ch i ld ren  and  en joy  the ir  a ffect ion
and compan ionship. Those con te st s often  find the ir  way in to the
court s as families dissolve in rising num bers.
Us ua lly the contest ing adults ar e the child’s paren ts. In-
crea sin gly, however , nonp ar ent s see k lega l pr otection  for th eir
rela t ionships with  a child . They m ay p lay m an y roles in  th e
child’s life su ch a s gr an dpa re nt , st epp ar en t, p rosp ective  adop-
tive  par en t ,  or  a  parent’s  nonmari ta l  par tner .  What  makes
these stories different  ma y seem t o overwhelm t he one elemen t
th ey ha ve in comm on. Yet t ha t comm on elem ent  is im por t an t :
an  adu lt who is n ot a  pa ren t s eeks  a lega lly enforcea ble r ela-
t ionsh ip with  th e child against t he wishes of the par ent. In
v ir tua l ly every case, the n onpa ren t  has e st abli sh ed  an  em o-
t ion a l bon d w it h  the ch ild . Th a t  bon d gives t he a du lt  or  the
child  a psychological sta ke in continuin g the r elationship. Does
it  give  them  a  lega l s t ake in  doing so?
When  a cour t d ecides s uch  a ca se, one of its  most impor tan t
tasks is choosing th e proper lega l s t anda rd.  Th e t ypica l ch oice
is between the “best interests of the child” standa rd a nd one
req uir ing somet h ing  ak in  to pa ren ta l abandonmen t  or  un fi t -
ness. Many courts believe their choice is limited t o th ese two.
Other s apply an intermediate stan dard of some kind. For  exam-
ple, th ey may  requ ire  the nonparen t  to show “actua l  de t r iment”
to th e child  if the r elat ionsh ip wit h t he cla ima nt  is n ot m ain -
tained, bu t not  th at  th e pa ren t is  un fit u nd er conven tion al d efi-
n it ion s of abu se  or  negl ect . Some cou r t s r es olve  the is su e on  the
basis of jur isdict ion or  s tanding,  ru ling that  the  cour t  lacks
power to cons ider  the  nonparent ’s cla im or  tha t  the  nonparen t
ha s n o legally cognizable s ta ke in  th e re lat ionsh ip a t a ll.
J ud icial opinions often  begin th e an a lysis  wit h  a  choice of
stan dard,  wit hout  consider ing it s jus tificat ion. It  us ua lly ma kes
sense to do s o, of cou rse .  A cour t  may  be  bound  to a  pa r t icu la r
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2. The choice of legal standard depends on the law that a pplies i n  a  p a rt i cu la r
jur isd icti on.  On this question, as in so much of family law generally, the Stat es ten d
to develop law, bot h st at ut ory an d judge-m ade, p eculiar  t o t h e m selves. Som e of this
law is constitu tionally based, however, as in the r ule tha t par enta l  r ig h t s canno t  be
term inated  on less  th an  clear  an d convin cing evide nce. S ee San tosky v. Kram er, 455
U.S. 745 (1982). This  art icle’s purpose is not to ident ify and a nalyze the det ailed rules
of law in the different st ates, alt hough it will need to refer to some of them.
3. This  phra se was used t o refer to the constitut ional statu s of the parent al
s t anda rd by s t a t ute or pr ecedent. Ther e is no need t o reinvent
t h e wheel  every time a  disput e over access t o children  mu st be
resolved. Bu t  in  a da y when man y of the basic assum ptions of
fam ily law  ar e being quest ioned an d cha llenged , lookin g behin d
the st an da rd s is w ort hw hile . Un der lying t he stan dards 2 a r e
th ree  basic class es of inter ests:  th ose of the ch ild, th e ad ult
cla i m a n t(s) (whether  pa ren t s or  other  adu l t s),  and the  broader
society.  Th is  a r t icle  a rgu es  tha t  the in ter act ion  and com pe t it ion
among th ese th ree classes  of int ere st s pr oduces—or s hou ld
produce—the standa rds u s ed  t o resolve disputes over access to
and cus tody of ch ildr en . Alth ough  th er e is p lay in  th e lin ka ge
between  int er est s a nd  st an da rd s, t he  conne ction is  st ron g an d
often  di rect .
Examining the s t anda rd a pp lie d in  a  give n  kin d of ca se  can
teach  mu ch a bout  how t he comp etin g un der lying i nt e re st s
were,  a t  lea st  imp li ci t ly, weigh ed  and va lu ed  by t he cou r t  or
legisla tu re  tha t  chose the st an dar d. Knowing how th ose inter -
e st s a r e  accommodated is im port an t, for t hey r epr esen t ba sic
elem en ts  of social p olicy.
The non pa ren t ca ses ope n a  pa rt icular ly int ere st ing win dow
on th e conn ection bet w ee n  standards and  in te res t s  for  two rea -
sons. F ir s t , th ey avoid t he s elf-can celing effect of compet ing
paren ta l inter ests  th at , at lea st u nder  th e bla ck-let t er  la w of
most ju r isdict ion s,  a re le ga lly  equ iva len t  to e a ch  other . Com -
par ing the dissimilar interest s of parent  and n onparen t  can
reveal  i nt e res t ing cha ract er is t ics  of ea ch , pa r t icu la r ly t hose  of
the nonparent. Second, and m ore impor tan t ,  examin ing the
st an da rd s a pplied  to conte st s bet ween  pa ren t a nd  non pa ren t in
a  va r iet y of con tex t s p r ovides a  view of society’s in ter est  in t he
child-n onpa re nt  re lat ionsh ips in  th ose set tin gs.
Tha t view will show someth ing we alrea dy know: th at  ser i-
ous political an d ideological bat tles a re bein g fought  over  the
meaning  of “fami ly ,” and  the “momentum for  r e spect”3 th e inter
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interest  i n  St anley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
U.S. 77,  95 (1 949 ) (Fr an kfu rt er , J ., con cur ri ng )).
est s of certa in individua ls claiming family mem bersh ip should
en joy in  pu bli c pol icy a nd s ocial values . Not all of th ose batt les
a re equa lly visible. Those waged by s om e types of nonpar ents,
such  as prospective adoptive par ent s, or a pa ren t’s sam e-sex
pa r tner , ten d t o receive th e most  at ten tion .  Looking  a t  a  b road
range of settings in which pare n t s  a n d nonpa ren t s  compete
over th eir r elat ionsh ips wit h  a  ch i ld , r a the r  than  focus ing  on ly
on one or  two pol itica l flash point s, clar ifies society’s in ter est  in
fam ily form and  pu t s  it  i n per spect ive . I t  shows  that  exi st ing
law  cont inues  to prefer a nd pr ivilege child-parent  relationships,
pa r t icu lar ly in  the ma r ital fam ily, over those between  children
and oth er  ad ult s. Wh en  su ch fam ilies d issolve, a n a ffirm at ive
socia l int ere st  ma y be found  in child -nonp ar ent  rela tionships
th at  at tem pt t o repair  or replicate t hem .
This per spect ive, of cours e, can not  account  for th e en tir e
body of law governing contest s between  par ent s an d
n on p a r ents.  On e n eed n ot  look  fa r  to rea lize t ha t  the d ecis ion s
and stat utes in this ar ea are far from consisten t  with  one
anothe r . Some cour ts  are  del ibera te ly breaking with  t r ad it ion .
Any effor t , in clu ding t he on e m ade  her e, t o look  for  common,
under lying pr inciples  will be su bject t o th e crit icism t ha t it  fails
to account  for  a  sign ifica n t  par t of the cas es an d legislat ion. But
the effor t  is  wor thwh ile  nonet hele ss . Th e p ropos ed  framework
helps us  un der st an d t he gen era l dir ection in  wh ich  the  law has
been  t r ave ling a nd  th e choices it  faces in  th e ne ar  fut ur e. T h is
a r t icl e uses t he nonpa rent  cases to show how the conven t iona l
socia l interest in the family is reflected in  the la w, an d t o voice
support for th e values that un derlie that  interest.
Pa r t s II and III of this  ar ticle cons ider , in form al t er ms , th e
link  between legal standards  govern ing nonpa ren t s ’ cl a ims  to a
legally p rotect ed r e la t ionship  with  a child  an d t he u nd erlyin g
interests  at sta ke. Part II briefly examines the inter ests of
child, paren t, and society. Its pur pose is  not  to exp lore  them a t
len gth , bu t  simply t o ide n t ify th em and th eir principal featur es.
Pa r t  I I I then  sugges t s a  p lausible ba sis for d er iving t he
stan dards  typically used for adjudicating disputes in v olving
adu lt s and  ch i ld ren  from the under lying interests. Pa rt IV
consider s par t icular  k inds of con test s  be tween  paren t  and
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4. Many int eres ts en joy const itu tiona l prote ction. Ot her s ar e reflecte d in only
s t a tu tory or judge-ma de l aw . In  th is a rt icle I  do n ot focu s pr im ar ily on  th e
cons t i tu t iona l st at us  of th e in te re st s I d iscu ss.  Th at  st at us  is oft en  cru cial  to l ega l
analysis, of course. But for present pu rposes I am concerned with  identifying interests
tha t  en joy su bst an tia l cul tu ra l su ppor t, a s r eflect ed i n le gal  pr ote ction , cons tit ut iona l
or  no t .
nonparen t . In  ligh t  of the a pp roach  to st anda rd d er iva t ion
proposed in the preceding part,  it  consider s wha t  the va r ious
stan dards  actua lly appl ied by the cou rt s in  th ose cases  imp ly
about  the con ten t  and w eight  of th e u n derlying interests,
pa r t icu l ar ly the  socia l i nt e res t .
 II.  TH R E E  BA S I C  IN T E R E S T S
The law  governing child-adu lt rela tionsh ips is driven by
bas ic individua l and  social int erest s. An inter est, a s I us e th e
t e rm, is a n eed or desire wh ich, if met , might m ak e one mor e
sat isfied or bett er  off.  Our  cu l tu re recognizes  some in te res t s  a s
wor thy of res pe ct  in  la w. A t ypica l ma nifesta tion of th at  respect
is th e gra nt ing of a r ight . An interest  can be r espected oth er
than  by crea tin g a r ight , however . It ca n be  given weigh t in  th e
creat ion of lega l s t anda rds  or  ru les  gu id in g t he d iscret ion  of a
decision-ma ker .4
Thr ee classes of interests shape  t h e legal r elat ionsh ip
between  a  ch ild and  an  ad ult . The fir st  is t he ch ild’s in ter est  in
being  in  th e car e of an a du lt wh o will provide t he b est  possible
protect ion , nurt ure, and upbringing. The second is the interest
of an  adu lt  who seeks the  cus tody or  compan ionsh ip  of th e
child. The int e res t s  of two or  more ad ult s m ay conflict wit h  one
anothe r , of course, as when paren t and n onparent pu rsue
inconsi sten t goa ls . Th e t h ir d i s s ociet y’s in ter es t  in  the for m
and fun ction of th e fam ily, pa r t icu la r ly  as a  ch i ld -rea r ing
inst i tu t ion . Consider h ow  t hese t hr ee int ere st s sh ap e th e law
govern ing t he r elat ionsh ips be tw een  childr en a nd  ad ult s.
D :\ 1 9 9 8- 3\ F I N A L \ A N D -F I N . W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
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5. Leslie  Joan  Harr is, R econs id erin g th e Crit eria  for L egal F ath erh ood , 1996
UTAH  L. RE V. 461, 461.
 A.  Th e Child’s Interest
The phrase “inter es t s of t he ch ild ” or “bes t  in ter es t s of t he
child” is comm onplace in th e law. It  app ea rs in  the le gis la t ion
and case law dea ling with childr en in va rious lega l  settings,
such  as a doption, child protective services, and custody
disput es between  divor cin g paren t s.  It s d ecept ive ly s mooth
sur face covers  somet hin g quit e complex for, as  typ ically us ed, it
re fers  not  to one  per son’s (i.e., a ch ild’s) int er est s, bu t t o a lega l
stan dard.  In unpa ck ing tha t  s t anda rd one  finds  the very
collect ion  of compet ing  goa l s and  in te res t s  di scussed  in  th i s
ar ticle.
As used here, the “child’s in ter es t” den otes  som et h in g m uch
more limited and s t ra igh t forwa rd: a  child ’s s t ake in  crea t in g or
main ta in ing a  re la t ionsh ip  with  an  adu l t . E ven n ar rowed  in
tha t  wa y, t h e concept can  be difficult, of cour se. It m ay be
defined eith er  in t er ms  of the  child’s own des ire s or b y th e
views of adu lt s  a ssuming som e respons ibility for th e child. The
la tt e r ap pr oach cre at es t he h aza rd  th at  wha t we  call th e
interest  of the ch ild is, in  rea lity, th e self-inter est  of an a du lt
spokesperson . Given  human bein gs’ len gt hy proces s of
cognit ive, emotional, an d mora l developmen t, however,
req uir ing ad ult s t o spea k for ch ildr en  is, t o a  degree,
un avoidable. Wh en  children a re  very you ng it  is t he  only wa y a
child’s interests can be usefully defined.
Viewed from th e persp ective of those n ot  involved in  a
part icular child’s life, one can  assu me gener al  agreement  abou t
the child’s in ter est  in r elat ionsh ips wit h a du lts , at lea st  a t  a
fair ly h igh  level of a bs t ract ion . Th e ch ild  needs  “a close,  s table
re la t ionsh ip with a n a dult  comm itted  to [her] we lfa r e.”5 Such  a
re la t ionsh ip pr ovides  the ba sis for  a  sa fe an d fru itfu l pa ssa ge to
adu lthood an d t he  capa city to exe rcise autonomy. She needs
love, pr otection , st abilit y, nu rt ur e, disciplin e, an d edu cat ion, all
modeled by t he beh avior  of t h e  a du l ts in her life. This is the
cont ent  of the “child’s interest” as u sed in this article. Most
adults, of cour se, fa ll s hor tSSsometimes grotesquely soSSin
D :\ 1 9 9 8- 3\ F I N A L \ A N D -F I N . W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
935] CHILDREN, PARENTS, AND  NONP ARENTS 941
6. S ee, e.g., Barbar a Ben ne tt  Woodhou se, “Ou t of C hi ld ren ’s N eeds , Ch ild ren ’s
Rights”: Th e Child’s Voice in Defining th e Family , 8 BYU  J . P U B . L. 321 (1 994 );
Gilbe r t A. Holme s, T he T ie th at  Bi nd s: T he C ons tit ut ion al R igh t of C hi ld ren  T o
Maint ain  Relationships w ith Parent-like Ind ividua ls, 53 MD . L. RE V. 358  (199 4).
7. S ee d is cuss ion  infra  Par t II.B.1.
8. S ee d is cuss ion  infra  Par t II.B.1.
mee tin g those needs . Bu t  tha t  is  t he inter est th at competes for
att ention in the sett ing of legal standards.
A conclusion rea ched by some children ’s advoca tes  i s tha t
the child’s interest should be repres ent ed not m erely by
gran t ing it we ight  in t he comp etit ion wit h  ot h e r inter ests , but
by ens hr inin g it a s a  righ t. 6 Tha t concept is explored in great er
det ail  as the competing rights of a d u lt s  and  the s t a t e a r e
considered.7 But  a pr elimina ry observat ion is in order h ere.
In  some sett ings, it ma y be e n t irely app ropria te t o encase a
child’s int ere st  in t he a rm or of legal righ ts . Tha t is  pa rt icular ly
t rue when  ser iou s ha rm , su ch a s ph ysical a bus e or n eglect, is
thr eatened. In t he context exa mined  her e, howeverSSthe
ongoing relationship between adult and childSSt ha t  move
sh ould  be  unde r taken  wit h  cau t ion . An  i n tu i tive r ea son  t o
speak in ter ms of children ’s righ t s  r a ther  t han  in t e res t s  is  t o
counte rba lance th e power  of the p ar ent al int er es t  which ,  a s
discussed  in t he ne xt s ection, h as  long been  cha ra cter ized in
t e rms of lega l r igh t s.  Th e bet ter  solu t ion  is t o exam ine ca refu lly
what  we meanSSor  shou ld meanSSby paren ta l  r igh t s.  The
purpose of t hose r igh t s  is  not  pr i m ar ily t o make it  ea sier  for
pa ren t s to get  wha t  they  want ,  notwithst anding the child’s
needs. It is, more fun dam ent ally, to protect th e child-parent
relationship  from forces ext e rna l t o t he  fami ly .8 The
cons t itu t iona l  st a tus  of pa ren ta l  r igh t s i s for  the  benefi t of bot h
paren t  and child. In  contests between  pa ren t  and  ch i ld , pa ren ta l
“rights” are far from absolut e. In  tha t  se t t in g, t he in ter es t s of
paren t  an d child ar e weighed aga ins t  each  other , ne ithe r
rout inely tr um ping th e other . One can  deba te whether  the
weigh ing is done properly, but  char acter izing the pa ren t’s
in te res t s a s r ight s does n ot pr ovide a s oun d ba sis for a rm ing
the chi ld  (or h er  advocat e) with  a s ta ble of potent ially
conflicting r ight s.
In  any case , t he focu s her e is on the child’s int erest , wheth er
or  not t hose i n te rest s a re m an ifeste d a s r ight s. Th is a na lysis is
concern ed with  a child ’s st ak e in m ain ta inin g a r elat ionsh ip
D :\ 1 9 9 8- 3\ F I N A L \ A N D -F I N . W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
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9. The Su pr em e Cou rt  cha ra cte ri zed  som e of it s  p rev ious ho ld ings in  S ta nl ey
v. Illinois, 405 U.S . 645, 651 (1972 ), a ca se affirming that  the int erest of an un wed
fathe r in his children is constitutionally protected:
It  is p la in  th at  th e in te re st  of a p ar en t i n t he  compa nions hip , care, cu stody,
a nd ma na gem en t of h is or  he r ch ildr en  “come[s] t o th is Cou rt  w it h  a
momentum for res pect  la ckin g wh en  ap pea l is  ma de t o libe rt ies  wh ich
derive  merely from shifting economic arr angemen ts.” Kov acs v . Coop er, 336
U.S. 77,  95 (1 949 ) (Fr an kfu rt er , J ., con cur ri ng ).
 . . . The rights to conceive and t o raise one’s children ha ve been
deemed  “essent ial,” Meyer v. Nebras k a,  262 U.S. 390, 399  (1923), “basic civil
r i gh t s of m an ,” S ki nn er v. O kl ah om a, 3 16  U.S . 5 35  (194 2) , a nd “[ r ] ig h t s far
more precious . . . tha n propert y right s,” Ma y v.  An der son , 345 U.S. 528,
533 (195 3). “It  is ca rd in al  wit h u s t ha t t he  cus tod y, ca re  a n d  n u r t u re of t he
child reside first  i n  th e pa re nt s, w hos e pr im ar y fun ction  an d fr eed om
include prep ar at ion for obligation s th e sta te can  neit her  sup ply nor h inder .”
Pri nce  v.  Massachusetts, 32 1 U .S.  158 , 16 6 (19 44).
Id . (al te ra ti on s in  or igin al ).
with  an adu lt who performs a  caregiving role. Its maint enance
is mu ch m ore a  ma tt er of nu rt ur ing, ed uca tin g, an d socializin g
the child , p r ot ect in g h er  from pr em ature exposu re t o the r igor s
of th e adu lt world, th an  ena bling her a ut onomous choices
during childhood.
B.  Th e Adult ’s Interest
The inevitable paradigm for  the  adu l t  in te res ted in  a
re la t ionsh ip with a  child is, of cour se, the pa rent . Law an d th e
broader  cu l tu re inevitably, an d proper ly, use th e par ent al  s take
in  a child’s life as th e baseline for  eva lu a t in g t he in ter es t s of
othe r  adu l ts .
1. Parents
 The p a r en t ’s in te re st  enjoys a  dist ingu ish ed lega l pedigree,
in clud ing impor tan t  a ffi rmat ions  from the  Supreme Cour t  and
oth er  fede ra l cou r t s , s t a t e cour t s , and  st a t e  legi sl a tu res.
Typically fr amed in t e rms of “r igh t s ,” i t  encompasses  the
custody and  companionsh ip of the ch ild,9 oppor tun it i es  t o
in fluence th e child ’s va lue s a nd  mor al d evelopm en t t hr ough
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10. Although  ruling a gainst  the pa rent  (an au nt a cting as gua rdian , to be
pr ecis e),  th e Cour t spok e positively of th is ele me nt  of t he  pa ren ta l  in t e re st  i n  Pri nce
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S . 158 (1944). Pri nce  a ff irmed  the aunt’s  conv icti on for
violatin g a s ta tu te  pr oh ibi ti ng  pa re nt s or  gu ar dia ns  from allowing their children to
sell publ ications in public places. The aun t an d niece were selling religious literat ure.
In  Wi scon sin  v. Y oder , 40 6 U .S.  205  (197 2), t he  Cou rt  ru led  in  fav or  of Am is h  p a r en t s
w h o viola te d com pu lsor y ed uca tion  law s by  wit hd ra win g th eir  chil dr en  from  sch ool
after  the eighth gra de. The opinion emph asize d the “tradit ional interest  of paren ts
with  res pe ct  to t he r el ig ious upb r in gi ng of t hei r  ch il dr en .” Id . at 214.
11. The pa re nt al  in te re st  in  au th ori zin g m edi cal  car e for  chi l dr en is  not
absolute, particularly when the child’s li fe  is  at st ak e. S ee, e.g., Jehovah’s Witnesses
v. King County H ospital, 278 F.  Supp. 488 (W.D. Wa sh. 1 967), aff ’d , 390 U.S. 598
(1968) (mem. ) (upholding s t a t e  st a tu t e  au thor i zing the  s t at e  gua rd iansh ip of children
for  th e pur pose of aut horizin g emer gency blood t ra nsfu sions). But  most  sta tes h ave
enacted  exemp tions  from t heir  child protective laws for parents who objected to
par t i cu la r form s of m edi cal  trea tmen t on religious grounds because federal  r egu la t ions
implemen t ing th e Ch ild Ab us e P re ven ti on a nd  Tr ea tm en t Act  of 1974, 42 U.S.C.
§ 5101  (1988  & Su pp.  V 1993 ), re qu ir ed t he m t o do s o as  a co nd it ion  o f r ece iv ing
federa l funds.
12. As one cour t  pu t  it :  “The p rim ar y purpose of the pa ren ta l right s doctr ine
appe a r s t o be to limit th e aut hority of the stat e to interfere in fam ily life as a mean s
of adva ncin g its own  int ere sts  or belie fs.” In re Sant oro, 578 N.W.2 d  369 , 376  (Minn .
C t . App.  1998 ); see als o Bru ce C. Ha fen, The Constitutional S tatus of Marriage,
Kinship, an d S exu al P riv acy— Ba lan cin g th e In di vid ua l an d S ocial  In terests, 81 MICH .
reli giou s t r a in ing ,10 and  impor t an t  educa t ion  and  hea l th  ca re
decisions.11
Characte r iz ing th e pa ren t’s, bu t n ot t he ch ild’s, int ere st  in
t e rms of r igh t s  migh t  sugges t  tha t  the law  t r ea t s  t he pa ren t ’s
interest  as inher en t ly s upe r ior  to tha t  of th e child. P recise ly
tha t  infer ence is s omet imes  dr awn , no doubt , by key a ctors  in
th e legal system .
A mu ch bet te r u nd er st an din g is  tha t pa ren ta l right s ha ve a
dua l pur pose. They do recognize and  protect t he pa ren t’s
persona l in teres t  in  the ca re  and compa nions hip  of the ch ild, in
incu lcat ing valu es a nd  per pet ua tin g tr ad ition . But  th ey ha ve
the fur ther  pu rpos e of promot in g t he welfa re of the fa mily as  an
inst i tu tion . Pa ren ts  ha ve a t ru st eesh ip n ot only for t heir
children  as  ind ividu als , but  for th e fam ily orga niza tion  its elf.
The ir  “rights” exist to shield family members (pa r t i cu lar ly
children) and t he r ela t ion sh ips t hey e n joy wi th  one  another
from the s omet im es  corrosive e ffect s of interference by the sta te
or  other  outsider s. Within t he fam ily, a pa ren t’s int e res t s  ar e
ent itled to weight ,  bu t  t hey a re  not  absolu te  or  necessa r ily
superior  to th ose of the child. They mu st a ccommodat e th e
interests  of other  family mem bers. 12 Nor ,  of course,  a re the
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L. RE V. 463 (1983). The San toro court  concluded t ha t t he pa ren ta l right s doctr ine did
no t permit p ater nal gra ndpar en ts , wh o h ad a dopted  th e childr en following th eir
parents’ death, to defeat the visitation petition of the mat ernal grandpar ents.
13. As stated in Professor Clark’s 19 68  t r ea t ise, “the cour ts h ave a dopted  a r ule
of thum b or presumpt ion that th e welfare of a child of ‘tender years’ is normally best
served by  pl acing h im  in  the c ustod y of h is  mot her .” H O M E R H. CLARK, J R ., TH E  LAW
OF  DOMESTIC RE L AT I ON S  I N  TH E  UNITED ST AT E S § 17. 4, a t 5 85 (1 968 ).
14. See sour ces cited in  H OMER H. CLARK, J R ., TH E  LA W  OF  DOMESTIC RELAT I O N S
IN  T H E  UNITED ST AT E S § 19. 4(a ), a t 7 99 n .20  (2d e d. 1 988 ).
15. The 1992 Census r eports th at, for all races, the tota l number  of children
l iv ing wi t h  one pa ren t is 17,578  (in th ousa nds ). Of that  tota l, the  nu mber  living with
mother  only w a s 15,396 a nd t he n um ber  living wit h fat her  only wa s 2,182. S ee
BURE AU  O F  T H E  CE N S U S, U.S. DE P ’T  O F  COM M E RCE , SE R I E S  NO . P20-468, MARITAL
ST A TU S AND LIVING ARRANGEMEN TS : MA RC H  1992, tb l. 5  (199 2).
16. To th e exte nt  th at  ar ra ngem ent  is a  m atter  of mut ual agr eement  between
paren ts—as it often is—it reflects acceptan ce of t he  ide a t ha t, for  one  re as on or
a n o th e r , mot he rs  ar e s up er ior  car egiv er s for  chi ldr en  un der  th e pa rt icu la r
cir cum stances. To the  exten t it  reflects fa th ers ’ refus al t o accept r espons ibility for
chi ldr en —wh ich  is all t oo often t ru e—it su ggest s th at , even in  th e face of economic
hardsh ip, mo ther s  more  of ten  than  fa the r s  wi ll  a ssume  the paren ta l  role  ra ther  than
leave  their children  to the care of someone else. To the exten t  d isp ropor t iona te
materna l custody is the r esult of judicial decrees following custody litigat ion, it
evidences eit he r m oth er s’ sup er ior p re pa ra tion  or a bilit ies  as  car egiv er s for  children ,
the covert opera tion of a matern al preference ru le, or some combin at ion of t he  tw o.
S ee generally ELEANOR E. MACO BY & ROBERT H. MNOOK I N , DIVI D I N G T H E  CHILD :
parent s’ int ere sts  un qua lified vis-a-vis th e world outside t he
fam ily. Those interests (or rights) are st r ong , bu t  they  must
ta ke a ccoun t of th e int er est s of th e la rge r s ociety.
2. Mothers and  fathers
 Speak ing of t he  “pa ren t a l i nt eres t” in  gender  neu t ra l t e rms
ass um es  t h a t  m ot h e r s’ a n d  fa t h e r s’ i n t er e s t s a r e
indist inguish able, or at  least  of equa l we igh t . Du r in g a  pe r iod
ending with  the  la s t  genera t ion  or so, th e law  was  quit e clear ly
ot h erwise.  Especially as to younger children, mothers ha d a
str onger cla im than  fa the rs under  the  materna l  prefe ren ce or
“tender  years” p resumpt ion .13
The modern  orth odoxy, as clearly reflected in  sta tu tes
govern ing custody upon divorce, repudiates the notion that, so
far  a s  t he law is concern ed, either  par ent  should h ave a
su per ior claim. 14 Nevertheless, despite its death  and burial as a
ma tt er  of black-letter  law, th e ma t e r na l  pre fe rence  pers is t s , a t
least as  an  emp irica l ma tt er. I t is  well k n ow n  tha t  many more
single-paren t  families ar e hea ded by women  than  by men ,15
a l though the causes for  tha t  phenomenon  a re  deba tab le .16 Some
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SOCIAL  & LEGAL DI L E M MA S  OF  CUSTODY (199 2).
17. S ee, e.g.,  Pu se y v. P us ey,  728  P. 2d  117  (Ut ah  198 6).
18. S ee generally MA RT H A A. F INE MAN , TH E  NEUTERE D MO T H E R, T H E  SEXU AL
F AMILY, AND OTHER TW E N TI E T H  CEN TU RY TR AG E D IE S  (199 5).
19. S ee d iscuss ion  infra  Par t IV.E.2.
have called for  the fu nct ion a l eq u iva len t  of the p refe ren ce
unde r  a n ominally gender -neut ra l, prima ry caregiver r ule,17 or
for  its official res tora tion on th e basis of a political agen da t h a t
emph asizes gender  differen ce.18
The ma ter na l preferen ce issue ra ises th e quest ion wheth er
the ma ter na l and  pat ern al roles ar e fungible. Argu men ts for
th eir  fun gibilit y ar e un der cut  by th e preference ’s  s tubborn
re fusa l to disa ppea r. Th e law ignores somet hing deeper  an d
m ore abid ing t ha n s imp le tr ad ition if, t o sat isfy an  egalit a r i an
ideology, i t  a ssumes tha t  mothers and  fa the rs shou ld or  can
rout inely rep lica te each  other ’s r ela t ion sh ip  wit h , a nd in flu en ce
on, their children. Th is issue is discussed furt her below.19
The gender-neutr al and gender -equal pr ovisions of modern
divor ce la w d o not  necess a r ily  ass ume t he fu ngib ili ty of
pa terna l and m ater na l r oles . Th ose  roles  can  be equa l ly
dese rving of legal respect, t hough ver y different in substa nce. If
so, whether th e mother or the fath er prevails in a contest
between  th em m ight involve a fact-s pecific inqu iry, t he  outcome
turn ing on  how the d iffe rences  in  thei r  roles  rela tes  to the
par t icu la r chi ld’s n eeds  or  st age of d evelopment . Pu t  tha t
ques tion  aside, h owever, for th e focus is not on contest s
between  pa ren t s.  As d iscuss ed  in  the followin g sect ion ,
nonparents’ inter ests  ar e usu ally lesser t ha n  those of parent s in
the eye s of th e law, som et im es  by a n  orde r  of ma gn it ude . If t ha t
is so,  then  in  the cont ext  of a  d ispu te between  paren t  and
nonparen t , differen ces in th e ma ter na l and  pat ern al roles
become r ela t ive ly u n im por tan t .
3. Nonparen t s and  “paren ta l” au tonomy
 Many adu lt s othe r  t han  pa ren t s  form deep, em ot ion a l bonds
with  a  ch ild. Do th ese a du lts  enjoy a “par ent al” int ere st  in
those r e la t ionsh ips? The cour t s  oft en  a ssume tha t  nonpa ren t s
have no su ch  in ter es t  of their  own , in  the s en se  tha t  the word
“interest ” is used here—something society recognizes and
affirm s legal ly. The op in ion s t hus oft en  frame t he ques t ion  as
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20. The cases in  which gr an dpar ent s seek  vis i t a tion or custody of a child often
make th is point . S ee d is cuss ion  infra  Pa rt  IV.A.
21. S ee dis cus sion  infra  Par ts IV.B-C.
whet her  mainta ining contact with t hese per sons  is  impor t an t  to
the child . As  illust ra ted  by t he ca se s d iscuss ed  in  Par t  IV,
however, they som e t im es  su ggest  tha t  cer t a in  adu lt s,  su ch  as
an  exte nd ed fa mily m em ber  (usu ally a  gra nd pa re nt ), a
s t eppa ren t , a foster pa ren t , or  a  p rospect ive  adop t ive pa ren t ,
may en joy  a p rot ect ed int e res t .
Such  an  in teres t  may  have  a t least  two possible grounds.
The fir st —wh ich  is  pa r t icu la r ly  applicable to the child’s
rela tives —is th at  th e nonpa ren t’s int erest  is der iva t ive  of th e
parent ’s, or  t ha t  it  is grounde d in  the s ame r es pe ct  for  the
biologica l and  mar it a l fami ly as is the parent ’s interest.20 The
second is tha t  th e non pa ren t comm enced  th e re lat ionsh ip in
good faith a nd in  a socially approved cont ext. If the pa ren t  (or
s t a t e a ct ing as  guar dian ) later s eeks t o term inat e th e
relationship, some  court s m ay give w eigh t  t o t he  nonpa ren t ’s
int er est  bas ed on  its  init ial le gitim acy.21
What ever th e grou nd  for th e non pa ren t’s per sona l in t ere st ,
if it exists a t a ll, it is u sua lly given less weigh t  t han  a  pa ren t ’s
interest. This is not to say tha t th e nonparent will always lose
in  a  d ispu te with  a  pa ren t . On  the fact s  of a  pa r t icu la r  case,  the
nonparen t  might prevail. But in the setting of legal standa rds,
as shown in  the  cases  d iscussed in  Par t  IV,  the pa ren ta l
interest  is usually weightier tha n the a nalogous interest of a
nonpa ren t .
C. The S ocial Int erest
The third in t erest  is less often  discussed or r ecognized as
separa te  from the pa ren t’s in ter est  in ju dicial opin ions, bu t it  is
d is t inct . It  is  socie ty’s in ter es t  in  the for m and fu nct ion  of the
fam ily. In  th is a rt icle I re fer t o it a s t he  “social in te re st .”
Society is  int er est ed in  th e fam ily becau se of wha t on ly th e
family—and no organ  of the  st a te—can  do successfu l ly .
Fam ilies requ ire an d tea ch individua ls to care for one anoth er,
t o pu t a not he r’s need s firs t, t o develop a  sen se of commu nit y.
These att ributes are profoundly impor t an t  to the  qua l ity  of our
cu l tu re . The  fam ily is societ y’s pr ima ry m eans of socializin g
children  and  of t each ing  them mora l  a n d cultural values. In a
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cu l tu re infa tu at ed wit h t he n otions of self-gra tifica t ion  and
un bridled  per sona l au tonomy, an d a cceptin g of posit ive med ia
por t raya ls of such vices as violence a n d  s u bsta nce abu se,
families have  more  to con te nd  wit h t ha n eve r b efore. Th e high
socia l cos t s  (not  to ment ion  the  pe rsona l  ones ) of th e fam ily’s
ina bility  to do so a re  st a rk ly pla yed ou t in  crim e, th e
consequ ences of children  giving birt h t o children , and —perha ps
least obvious bu t e nor mou sly t r agic—lifetimes  of missed
oppor tun it i es . Beleaguer ed th ough it is, th e family rem ains  by
far  th e best in stit ut ion for imp ar ting t o children  th e skil ls  and
values  essent ia l t o productive citizenship, wh ile helping th em
avoid or overcome the ma ny obstacles to that end.
Fam ilies have long t aken  a  va r iet y of for ms,  in  add it ion  to
the tr ad ition al m ar ita l fam ily consist ing of m ot h er ,  fa the r , and
children,  wit h p er ha ps e xte nd ed r ela tive s sha r ing the  fami ly
home. Recent decades h ave s een  a s ignifican t gr owth  in
nont rad it iona l domestic ar ra ngemen ts: families th at  ha ve never
had two pa ren ts , childr en living with  unmar r ied pa ren t s ,
children  l iv ing  wi th  one  paren t  and the  pa ren t ’s  nonparen t
pa r tner , and fos ter  families  in  wh ich  t he child lives  with
neith er  paren t. If these  va r ious  forms  a re not  equ a lly s uccessfu l
in  accomplish ing t he  fam ily’s im port an t ca re  giving, t ea chin g,
and socializing functions, t hen s ociety ha s a n in ter est  in
preferring and encoura ging those that work best.
The relative merits of different family forms, the sta nce th e
law  should ta k e  t owards  them , a nd inde ed  the ve ry con cep t  of
“fam ily” a re a t  the h ea r t  of an  im por tan t , on goin g polit ica l
debat e. As d iscussed  in P ar ts  III a nd  IV, tr ad itiona l fam ily law
repres en t s a collective judgment th at (among other t hings)
child-paren t  rela tion sh ips a re s ocially prefer red , pa rt icular ly in
a  mar it a l fami ly , an d sh ould be p rivileged  over compet ing child-
nonparen t  re la t ionsh ips . These judgmen ts a re, of cour se,
dem onst ra bly false in part icu la r  cases . But  the l aw has
assu med th at  th ey ar e t ru e often  enou gh t o just ify a
non ab solut e pr efere nce in  favor of th e t ra dit iona l fam ily.
A nu mber  of observers cha llenge th e assumpt ion  tha t  the
t rad it iona l fam ily, with it s th ree core relat ionships—hu sban d-
wife, mot her -child, an d fat her -child—shou ld be socially
preferred. Some  do so by em ph as izing t he declin e of t he
t rad it iona l fami ly  as  an  empir i ca l  ma t t e r , a rgu ing  tha t  w h at  i s
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22. S ee Holm es, supra  note  6, at  363 n.22 (“Given t ha t h ouseh olds consi st i ng
of a  h u s ba n d, wife, and t heir  childre n const itu te t he m inorit y of fam ilies with
children, it i s di fficult , if not  lud icrou s, to as sum e th at  th e tr adit ional fam ily
predominat es or should continue to receive preferential t reat men t.”).  In  add it ion  to
his  dange rous leap from “is” to “ought ,” Holmes overst ates  his factua l case by
categor ically excluding a ll bu t fa ctu all y an d le gal ly in ta ct fa mi lies  from  th e
“t rad i t iona l” cat egor y. An  im por ta n t  distinction should be made, however, between
families th at , after  beginn ing in t he pa tt ern  of two mar ried p ar ent s with  th eir
children, suffer s ome degr ee of dissolut ion (usu ally by  div or ce or  th e d ea th  of a
pa ren t ), an d fa mi lie s t ha t,  by t he  cho ice of t he adults  involved, never attempt  to
confor m to that  model. Families in the former  situat ion often r econstitute t hemselves
under  th e tr adit iona l pat ter n t hr ough  rem ar ria ge, a n d  in  any  even t  fa l l w ith in  the
poli cy umbr ell a  fa voring th e “traditiona l family” form. As discussed below,
subs t itu t iona l family forms such a s steppar ents, foster  a n d  p r e-adoptive families
attem pt  to r epl icat e t he  ben efit s of t he  nu clea r fa mi ly on  the basis of established
lega l an d s ocia l com mi tm en ts . Th ey ou gh t t o en joy m uch  of th e same socia l r es pect
as th e int act n uclear  family.
23. S ee generally F INE MAN , supra  note 18.
dictat es wha t  ough t  t o be.22 O ther s  make a  more  di r ect ,
ideolog ica l challenge to t he tra ditional family form. Mar th a
Fineman , for exa m ple,  reject s t he p roces s b y wh ich  the
t rad it iona l family , or  other  family  forms,  a re coll ect ively
approved. The process itself is premised on patr ia r ch y , she
says, an d for t ha t r eas on is  undeserving of respect. She a rgues
tha t  th e hu sba nd -wife bond m ay h ave  privat e significan ce to its
part icipants, bu t  tha t  it  shou ld not  be privileged above any
other in t imate  rela t ionsh ip bet ween  ad ult s. Th e social a nd
cu l tu ra l conce pt  of “family” should  cons is t  sole ly of t he
caregiver-dependen t  relat ionship, mea ning, typically, mother
and ch ild. In  her  view, fat her s gen era lly become per iph era l to
the mot her -child un it, wh ich is t he e ssen tia l social bu i ld ing
block deser ving of protection an d privilege.23
It  ma t t e r s who is right. If some family forms are  bet t e r  than
othe r s at helping children become good  adu lt s , and  a t  helping
a l l family  mem bers b ecom e good  citizen s, t hose  forms  des er ve
pr otection  an d a ffirma tion  with in t he lega l system. Th is a rt icle
does not  a t tempt  a broad-based discussion of the family. Its
more m ode st  goa l is  to conside r , a nd t o commen t  br iefl y on , on e
par t icu la r element  of the  fam ily: the child-adult r elationship. It
does so by con t r a s t ing ch i ld -pa ren t  r e la t ionsh ips , pa r t icula r ly
in  th e ma rit al fa mily, wit h comp etin g child-nonpar ent bonds.
The compar ison  i s inst ruct ive . I t  helps  revea l  the dep th  of the
tr ad itiona l fam ily’s pr ivileged st at us  in t he  law, and it suggests
some of th e rea sons for tha t pr ivilege.
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24. These int eres ts a re n ot th e imm ediat e sour ce of the st an dar ds ap plied in
most of the r elevan t decision s. On a  day-to-day b asis, cour ts find  th eir st an dar ds in
stat utes  an d ju dicia l pr eced en t. B ut  at  a d eep er  leve l th ese  int er est s a ccoun t  for t he
standa rds  found  in  much  of the  s ta tu tory  or  case  l aw.
25. In  past generations, w h e n  ch ildr en  wer e im por ta nt  sou rce s of la bor  or
income, paren ts also had a  direct economic stak e in child custody. That  i n t er e s t  st ill
exi st s in s ome  fam ilies , bu t in  mos t w est er n cu ltu re s ch ildr en  ar e n ow financ ia l
liabilities.
The socia l in te r es t  in  the fa mily i s bu t  one  ele men t  of th e
law  govern ing t he r elat ionsh ips be tw een  childr en a nd  ad ult s.
The child’s a nd a du lt s’ per son a l in ter es t s a re cr ucia l pa r t s of
the mix. The n e xt  p a r t of t h is  a r t icl e cons ider s  how these th ree
inter ests  work togeth er.
III.  IN T E R E S T S , ST A N D AR D S , A N D  RE S U L T S
The thr ee interests a r e—or s hould  be—t he source of t he
lega l sta nda rds  cour ts a pply in cont ests  between  adu lts over
legally enforceable rela t ionsh ips  wi th  ch i ld ren .24 Each interest
invites  th e decision -ma ker  to consid er  an d give we ight  to
cer ta in  kin ds of fact s. Th e child ’s in te re st  ma kes  re leva nt  th e
res our ces—ma ter ial,  em ot ion a l, or  cu l tu ra l—tha t  a  pa r t icu la r
adu lt  offers  or lack s. Cont inu ity of care m ay be p ar ticu lar ly
impor tan t  to t he ch ild. Th e ad ult s’ int ere st s pu t in  pla y th eir
oppor tun it i es to enjoy the child’s compan ionship and t o exercise
discr etion  in  rea r ing,  nur tur ing and  ed u ca t ing the child.25 The
socia l inter est in vites cons idera t ion  of th e import an ce to society
of family  form and fu nct ion .
Each  of thes e in ter es t s p ush es  in  a  pa r t icu la r  di rect ion . In  a
given sett ing, a cont est betwe en  pa re nt  an d gr an dpa re nt , for
exam ple, or a  par ent  an d st eppar ent , they combine to creat e a
lega l sta nda rd. Th ey are, in effect, “nett ed  ou t” aga ins t  each
othe r . The resu l t ing st anda rd i s a pp lie d t o the fa ct s of a s pecific
case. Given those facts, a grandpa r e n t  or  stepp ar ent  might  be
awa rded  visitation or custody over the par ent’s object ion ,
not with st an din g a social inter est favoring t he child-par ent
relationship. By gover n in g t he weigh t  give n  to cer ta in  kin ds  of
facts, th e st an da rd  affects , but  does n ot pr edet er min e, th e
re su l t.
The int erp lay of the  th ree  in te res t s  accounts  for  the
stan dards  ap plied in  th e two mos t  common set t ings  in  which  an
adu lt ’s r e la t ionsh ip  wit h  a  child  is  a t  st ake: a lle ga t ion s of
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26. The unfitnes s  s t a n da r d usua lly applies to attempt s by the sta te (as opposed
to a privat e person) to supervise or term inate t he conduct of the par ent . Some
stat utes  do give private parties sta nding to litigate pa r e n t a l un fi tnes s , however ,
especially  in t he form  of aban donm ent . S ee, e.g., IOWA CODE  AN N . § 600A (Wes t 1 996 ).
27. S ee, e.g., IOWA CO D E  AN N . § 232(2)(6) (West 1994) (defining “child in nee d
of as sis ta nce ”).
paren ta l un fitness a nd cust ody contest s following par ent al
divor ce or  separa t ion .  Afte r  expla in ing the  bas is  for  the
stan dards  ap plied in  those  two s et t in gs , t he d iscuss ion  tu rns  to
the der ivat ion of sta nd ar ds, in cludin g th e frequen t  appearance
of an  in termedia te  st andard , in  di spu tes  be tween  paren t s  and
nonparents.
A.  Th e Unfitn ess Stan dard
The unfit nes s s t anda rd l ies  a t  one end of t he s pe ct rum of
ru les for decisions about t he child-adult relationship. It
ass um es th e exist ence of at  leas t on e child-pa ren t r elat ion s h ip
and a t t em pt s t o de fin e t he cir cumst ances  unde r  wh ich  tha t
re la t ionsh ip is subject to disr up tion  by the  st a te  aga inst  the
will of t he  pa rent .  The unfitness standar d requires the child to
endure ser ious a ctu al or  th rea ten ed h ar m be fore th e st at e will
inter vene.26
All th ree int erest s ar e at wor k  in  the un fitness sta ndar d.
The sta te, un der t he parens patriae doctrine, represents t he
child ’s in ter es t  by in ter ven in g t o st op or  pr eve nt  harm. If t ha t
were  th e only interes t a t st ak e, the level of ha rm or  r i sk  to the
child tr iggering in ter vent ion would  be set  at  some m inim al
level. Un der  typ ical child p rot ective legisla tion , however , it is
clear ly not  su fficient  tha t  the ch ild  mer ely  wou ld  be b et t er  off if
in ter ven t ion  occur red . In ter ven t ion  is  condi t ion ed on proof of a
sp ecifi c, s er ious  r isk  or  ha rm.27 The law’s willingness to tolera te
subs tan t ia l ha rm  is explained by th e influence of th e other t wo
int er est s, wh ich cut  th e oth er  wa y.
The parent ’s interest ur ges restraint in intervention. Stat e
sup ervis ion of child  rea rin g is a p oten tia lly ma ssive in tr us ion
in to a  pa ren t ’s r ela t ion sh ip  wit h  a  child , even  if it  fa lls  sh or t  of
a  chan ge of custody. The par en t ’s  in t e res t  a ffect s  t he s t anda rd
by req uir ing a  grea ter  sh owing of har m be fore int erve nt ion is
permitted.
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28. S ee, e.g., J am es G. Dw yer, Par ent s’ Reli gion  an d C hi ld ren ’s W elfa re:
Debunk ing th e Doctr in e of Parents’ R ights, 82 CAL . L. RE V. 1371, 1376 (1994)
(“[J]udges would decide . . . conflicts [bet ween  par ent s an d th e lar ger com m unity over
child re ar in g] so lel y on  th e ba sis  of ch ild re n’s w elfa re  in te re st s.”).
Likewise, the  socia l int ere st  in t he ch ild-pa ren t r elat ionsh ip
cu t s a g ainst  inter vention. Tha t int erest  is not t o be confused
with  the sta te’s parens patriae role, which  looks  on ly to the
child’s inter est. Th e social int erest  in family form  recognizes
t ha t , as a general mat ter, child rearing is best accomplished by
pa ren t s rat her t han  stat e-owned or sponsored institut ions. It
also assumes  tha t  d is rup t ion  of existing families, even
s t rugg ling ones, ma y itself be har mful. For t hese r ea sons , the
socia l in ter es t  has a  br akin g effe ct  on  in ter ven t ion .
The combin ed  effect  of the par ental and social interest, each
work ing counter to the specific child’s immediate interest,
illum ina tes  th e un fitn ess s ta nd ar d. We take th e child’s interest
ser iously,  but  th e oth er  tw o int er est s a re  ent itle d t o weigh t  a s
well. We ar e concern ed wit h m ore t ha n w ha t w ill ad van ce the
welfare of this child in th is case.
Some ar gue th at  only the child’s int erest s should be t a ken
in to accoun t in  th is se tt ing. 28 Cu r ren t  la w emph at ica lly  reject s
tha t  posit ion. I t  a dopts th e un fitness st an dar d, which gives
weigh t  to int ere st s in  ad dit ion  to the  ch i ld ’s . When  the
unfi tnes s st an da rd  is a pplie d t o par ticu lar  facts , of cour se, t he
resul t m ay be eith er t o allow or to prohibit in ter vention. Tha t
de cis ion  requir es  fact  finding and the  exercise of judgmen t. Bu t
is i t  cl ea r  tha t  in ter vention is n ot justified simply because t he
child would be better  off if it occur red.
B.  Th e Best-Interests Sta nd ard
At  the other  en d of t he sp ect rum is  the “bes t  in ter es t s of t he
child” standa rd. The paradigm application is the custody
cont est  be tween  divor cin g or  s epa ra t ing pa ren t s . I t s name
sugges t s tha t  the best -int er est s st an da rd  re flects exclu sive
at ten tion  to the child’s interest . The decision m ak er decides
what re la t ionsh ip s  wi t h th e two par ent s, an d wha tever n ew
families each may have created, will best serve the child.
What has  become of th e other  inter ests ? Under
con tempora ry legal principles, the pa r e nts’ inter ests  cancel
each  other  ou t , effect ive ly d ropp in g t hem  bot h  from the
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29. As discussed above, that a ssump tion represen ts  a  re ject ion of t he  tr ad iti ona l
mate rna l pre feren ce. S ee d is cuss ion  supra  Par t II.B.2.
30. In  th ose ra re in sta nces in  which p ar ent s contes t ea ch oth er’s relat ionsh ip
with  a  chi ld  withou t a l so  seek ing to end th eir r elat ionsh ip with  each ot her , th e social
interest  may loom particularly large in the ana lysis, overshadowing the child’s
interest  as the basis for the decision. In one well known case, a stat e supr eme  cour t
ruled  tha t th e trial court sh ould not have adjudicated a  dispute between  paren ts over
wh ich  school th eir da ugh ter  shou ld at ten d, rea sonin g th at  th e family m u st be allowed
to function  au tonom ously in such  ma tt ers . S ee Kilgrow v. Kilgrow, 107 So. 2d 885
(Ala. 195 9).
31. An  interesting development in divorce law is recen t le g is la t ion  in  Louis iana
g iv ing couples the option to enter a “covenant  marr iage.” Covenant m arriages are
formed  as th e resu lt of a special declaration, followin g  p r em a r ital counseling. The
dis solu tion  of such a m ar ria ge is su bject to gr eat er lim i t ations tha n th ose imposed
by the t ypical no-fault regime. The spouse seek ing divorce mu s t  p r ov e t h a t th e other
has comm it te d a  cul pa ble  act  su ch a s a du lt er y, a  se ri ous  felon y, or  ph ysi ca l or sexu a l
domes tic ab us e. Ot he rw ise , se pa ra tion  wit hou t r econ cilia tion  or a ba nd onm en t for
prescribed per iods m ust  be pr oved. S ee LA. RE V. STAT . AN N . § 9:307 (West 1997). It
is as  yet  un clea r w he th er  th is l egis la ti on w ill h av e a  sig ni fican t effect  on  mar r iage
and d ivorce in  Lou is iana ,  or  i n  othe r  s t at e s  t ha t enact  s imi la r  s t a tu t es .
ana lysis. The a s sumpt ion  is  t ha t  t he two pa ren t s ’ i nt e res t s  ar e
equ ally w eigh ty. 29
Wha t  of the social interest in contests between paren ts? In
pr inciple  it  sh ould s till p lay a  role. If one a ccepts t he s epa ra tion
or  divorce of th e pa re nt s a s a  pr em ise, h owever , the social
interest  la rgely drops  out  of t h e  a na lys is . At  lea st  one  of th e
pa ren t s ha s chose n t o dism em ber  th e pa re nt -par en t a xis of t he
family. Through it s divorce law, th e sta te  has  pe rmit t ed tha t  t o
happen . The d is solu t ion  not  only severs th e par ent -paren t
part nership, but guara ntees t ha t  a t  l eas t  one , and  often  both ,
child-paren t  rela t ion sh ips w ill  be  disr upt ed  to a  gr ea ter  or
lesser  exten t . The s ta te has  thus chosen not  to asser t  the  socia l
interest.30
If the stat e chose to protect th at inter est,  it  would most
obviously do so by impeding the divor ce or  sepa ra t ion  it se lf,
thus mak ing i t  more  di ffi cu l t for  e it h e r  pa ren t ,  or  even  the
pa ren t s act ing joint ly, to pr ejud ice th e child’s r elat ionsh ip wit h
ei ther  of them. In fact, the now atrophied fault-based divor ce
system  creat ed impedim ent s to d is solu t ion , at  least  in contest ed
cases. With  th e wide spr ea d a dopt ion of no-fault  divorce, t he
s t a t e effect ively abd icat ed a ny r espon sibilit y for d eciding
whet her  a dissolution is t o occur .31 Although a  few observer s
have su ggest ed t ha t t he p res ence of childr en in  a fa mily sh ould
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32. S ee, e.g., Eliza beth  S. Scott , Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage and
Div orce , 76 VA. L. RE V. 9, 87-94 (1990); Ju dith T. Younger, Mar riage, Div orce, and th e
Family: A Cautiona ry Tale , 21 HOFSTRA L. RE V. 136 7 (19 93).
33. “In  the years following divorce, children experience two profound l o sses.  One
is th e los s of t he  in ta ct fa mi ly t oget he r w it h t he  sym bolic a nd  re al  pr ote ct ion it h a s
provided. The second is the loss of the pr esence of one par ent , u sua lly the  fa the r ,
from th eir d aily lives .” JUDITH  S. WA L LE R S T E IN  & SANDR A BLAKESLE E , SE C O N D
CH A N CE S : ME N , WOMEN AND CHIL DRE N A DE C AD E  AFTER DIVORCE 290  (198 9).
34. S ee In re Mar ria ge of Allen, 626 P .2d 16, 23 (Wash . Ct. App. 1981). Th is
case is discussed infra  Par t IV.B.
have a be ar ing on  th e a vaila bilit y of divorce,32 su ch pr oposals
have not become par t of the law. Meanwh ile , t he evid en ce
con t inues to mount  tha t  d is solu tion  exa ct s a  t er r ibl e t oll on
children,  not  on ly economica l ly , bu t  in  the loss of the child-
parent  relationship.33
With  the par ents’ interests negating one another, and t he
s t a t e su r render ing the  socia l in t e res t  t o t he  demand to
pr ivat ize the diss olut ion decision, t he ch ild’s in ter est  rem ain s
a lon e as t he ba sis for t he lega l st an da rd  in d et er min ing t he
child-ad ult  rela tion sh ip in t his  set tin g. Wh ateve r  one’s views  on
the res ur gent  in t e r est in fault-based divorce, there is an
in es capable  iron y in t he s ufferin g th e childr en e nd ur e in a
pr oceeding n omin ally d esign ed t o ser ve th eir  “best  int er est s.”
C.  An In termediat e Stan dard
When  pa ren t s con te st  cus tody with  nonpa ren t s , a  number  of
cour t s h ave a pp lie d a n  in ter med ia te s t anda rd of s ome
kind—one tha t  r equ i res  a  nonparen t  to show more  than  tha t
legally protecting a relationship with a child is in the child’s
best interests, but not tha t th e child otherwise will suffer h ar m
at  the le vel  of abu se  or  negl ect . Cou r t s s ometimes descr ibe  the
in te rmed ia t e s t a nda rd  in t erm s su ch a s t ha t t he ch ild will
su ffer  “actual detriment” if the relationship in question is not
protected.34
The court s h ave  not  alw ays  been  car eful a bout  jus tifyin g an
in te rmed ia t e st an da rd . The a ppr oach out lined  in t h i s a r t icl e
provides a rat ionale for such a sta ndar d in contest s between
pa ren t s and nonpar ents. An int e rmed ia t e  st anda rd r e su l ts  from
the interplay of the th ree basic interests.
The child’s int erest  properly exerts its  weight, as in t he two
conte xts  a l ready discussed. That interest  moves the stan dard
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35. Som e cour t s  r e ject  t he  nonpa ren t’s  claim  not  un der  an  ab us e a nd  ne glect
standa rd, but on the groun d t h a t th e claimant la cks stan ding to pursu e the m att er
or  th e cour t t o hea r t he m at ter . S ee, e.g.,  Wes t  v.  Supe r io r  C ou r t ,  69  C a l. Rptr. 2d
160 (Ct. App. 1997) (holding p arent’s  forme r sa me-sex p ar tn er la cked st an ding t o
pursue,  and cour t la cke d su bject  ma tt er  jur isd icti on t o cons ide r, cl aim  for cu st ody or
v is it i ng r igh ts  with child). As so constr ued, the governing st atu tes reflect a judgment
tha t  th e non par ent ’s claim is  not en tit led to weigh t a n d /o r  that n o social interest
would  be served by protecting the child-nonparen t relationship.
36. As one cour t  pu t  it ,  “[c]ust ody disputes a nd visitat ion disputes  should be
measu red  by th eir r espect ive sta nda rds . Visitat ion is a cons idera bly less weigh ty
mat ter  th an  out ri gh t cu st ody of a  chil d, a nd  does  not  deman d the en han ced
protect ions . . . that  att end cust ody awards .” Wolinski v. Browneller, 693 A.2d 30, 40
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997) (quoting Fair bank s v. McCarter , 622 A.2d 121, 126 (Md.
199 3)) (applying a lower sta ndar d to grandpa rent  seeking visitation ra ther  tha n
custody of ch ild ).
t oward the bes t -in ter es t s e nd of th e spect ru m. Th e compet ing
adults’ in ter es t s a lso sh a p e t he legal standar d. But because
th ey are n ot  equ iva len t  in  the eyes  of the la w, t hey d o not
sim ply eclip se  one a nother  as in  the p aren ta l d is solu t ion  or
sepa ra tion  cont ext. Inst ead, t he pa ren t’s int eres t  i s a  net
posit ive force , push ing  the st anda rd away from the  best -
interest  pos it ion . If t he n onpa ren t  has n o lega lly  cognizable
interest, t he  r esu lt i ng  st anda rd may move far toward the abuse
and negle ct t est . If, as  is som et ime s t he  case , the  nonpa ren t ’s
cla im  is  give n  in de pe nde nt  weigh t , t he in flu en ce of t he pa ren t ’s
interest ma y be weakened, though not negated.
The social interest  in the child-parent relationship also
pla ys a r ole. As in th e child p rot ective se tt ing, it  moves th e
s t anda rd towar d th e un fitness en d of th e spectru m. If t her e is
no socia l in teres t  in  the ch i ld -nonparen t  re la t ionsh ip  (and if t he
nonparen t  la cks a p ers ona l int ere st ), the n t he ca se is
fun ctiona lly equ ivale nt  to t hose  tr ad ition ally cover ed by t he
abu se  and n eglect  st anda rd,  wh ich  then  governs  the ma t t e r . As
i ll u st r a t ed by th e case s dis cuss ed in  Pa rt  IV,  a number  of cour t s
have applied just such a standa rd to parent-nonparent cases.35
Depen ding on  who the  nonparen t  i s,  however ,  society  may
have an  i n te rest  in s up port ing t ha t p ers on’s r elat ionsh ip wit h
the child. The “nonparents” in these  cases  encompass a  b road
range of individua ls. The law does not, a nd sh ould not, tr eat
th em all alike. Moreover, the standa rd ma y be affected by the
relief sought  by the n onpa ren t . At tem pt s t o wr es t  cust ody from
a pa ren t  a re ge ner a lly t r ea ted  di ffere nt ly than  demands for
visit at ion only. 36
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Th e next part of this article discusses some of these
relationships in de ta il. The p oint  is th at  th e legal sta nda rd u sed
to resolve the parent-nonpare n t  disput e is influenced by
whet her  society ha s a n in te re st  in t he  ma tt er , an d if so by t ha t
interest’s st ren gth . If it  is  relatively strong, it  pushes th e
st an da rd  back  towa rd s t he  “best  int er est s of th e child .”
The  st an da rd  us ed r evea ls som eth ing about  the  we igh t  tha t
has been given (or denied) to ea ch of the  th ree  int ere st s. Th at  is
so even if t he legis la tu re or  cour t  dev is ing the  st anda rd fa i ls  t o
re alize  it. The int erest  most often overlooked in t he a nalysis of
these cases is  the socia l in ter es t . Given  the broad a r ray of
nonpa ren t s seek ing a  legal r elat ionsh ip wit h a  child, it  is
espe cially impor t an t  for  s t an dard-makers to focus  on  the
im pl ica t ion s of their  choices. The n ext p ar t of th is a rt icle looks
a t  some of th e mor e common  child-non pa ren t r elat ions hip s in
th is  li gh t .
IV.  TYP E S  O F  CH I L D -NO N P A R E N T  RE L AT IO N S H IP S
In  parent -nonpar ent disputes, the nat ure of the child’s and
pa ren t ’s interests ar e relatively consta n t . The p r incipa l
varia bles in set ting th e legal s ta nd ar d a re t he s ocial int ere st  in
the non pa ren t’s r elat ionsh ip with  the ch i ld , and  the nonpa ren t ’s
personal interest,  if any. Those int e res t s  tu rn not  on  the  mer it s
of an individual case, such as whether a pa r t i cu la r  nonparen t
would  p rov ide impor t an t  nu r tu re, protect ion , or  em ot ion a l
con t inu ity . Su ch facts , crucia l to a fin al d ecision, come int o p lay
only wh en  th e r eleva nt  st an da rd  is a pplie d t o th em . The
s t anda rd it self is sign ificant ly affected by s ociety’s in ter est  in
encourag ing an d pr ivileging a n id ent ified cat egory of child -
nonparen t  re lat ionsh ip a s a  gene ra l ma tt er . It  i s a l so affected
by th e st at e’s willingnes s t o give  weigh t  to the p er son a l
interests  of those  in  t h e class  of nonparen t  to which  the
par t icu la r claiman t belongs. In th i s sect ion  I cons ider  a  number
of child-non pa ren t r elat ionsh ips in  light  of the in te r a ct ion  of
these interests.
A.  Grandparents
One is not  ins ide or  out side  a “tr ad ition al fa mily” in  the way
t h a t  one is  ins ide or ou ts ide a  city limit . Fa mily r elat ionsh ips,
whet her  ba se d on  consa ngu in it y or  a ffinity, are matt ers of
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37. “Ours is by  no m ea ns  a t ra dit ion  lim ite d t o r e spect  fo r  t he bonds  un it i ng the
members of the n uclea r  family. Th e tr adit ion of uncles, a un ts, cousin s, an d espe cially
g randpa ren t s shar ing a  househ old along wit h pa ren ts a nd ch ildren  ha s roots  equa lly
vener able  an d equ ally des ervin g of const itu t i on a l r ecog ni ti on .” Moor e v.  Cit y of E .
Cleveland,  431 U .S. 4 94, 5 04 (19 77) (pl ur ali ty op ini on) (foot n o te omi tt ed). As  one  cour t
pu t it ,  when grandparents a ssum e t he  car e of a ch ild, “t he  chil d si mp ly m oves  to a
different  location wit hin  th e exist ing fam ily s t r u ct u re.” In re Sant oro, 578 N.W.2d
369, 377  (Mi n n . C t . App. 1998) (rejecting equal protection challenge to statute
au thor i zing visita tion  rights for gran dparen ts again st th e wishes of other
g randpa ren t s who have adop t ed the child, but not a gainst t he wishes of unrelat ed
adopt ive parents).
38. A R T H U R  K O R N H A B E R  &  K E N N E T H  W O O D W A R D ,
GRANDPARENTS /GR AN D C H IL D RE N : TH E  VITAL CONNECTION  vii (1981). The rela tions hip
of many  grandparen ts to  grandchi ld ren  was c a pt u r e d ni cely  in  th e s ta te me nt  of a
faculty  colleague wh o, to his im men se deligh t,  had r ecently become a gra ndfather .
One of his stu dents declared t hat  he would never br in g ch ildren into this corrupt
world. Rep lied  th e fa cult y m em ber : “I un der st an d you r  feelings. B ut  wh at  ar e you
going to d o for g ra nd chi ldr en ?”
39. In  1995, 1,466,000 children wer e  b ei n g ra ise d by t he ir  gr an dpa re nt s wi th out
either  pare nt r esiding in th e home, up  from 1,359,000 in 1994 and 1,01 7,000 in 1993.
S ee BURE AU  O F  T H E  CE N S U S , U.S. DE P ’T  O F  COMMERCE , SE R I E S  NO . P20-484, MARITAL
ST A TU S AND LIVING AR R A N G E M E N T S  MA RC H  1995 (UPDATE ), tbl. 4 (1995 ). 
degree. The social interest is at its strongest at  t h e  cor e of th e
nuclea r  fam ily, in t he relationships between spouses, child and
pa ren t , and siblings. But important  bonds also exist with  fam ily
mem bers  fu r the r from the center—gran dparent s, aunts, uncles,
cousins, and  more  di st an t  r ela t ive s.  Th ough  se conda ry t o those
a t  th e nu clear  fam ily level, th e social int ere st  in exten ded
fam ily relationships is substant ial. Indeed, t h ey en joy some
mea su re of con st it u t ion a l protect ion .37
Exten ded family relationships con t r ibu te  to the  nur tu re and
socia liza t ion  of child re n. Th e r ole of gra nd par ent s is
pa r t icu lar ly imp ortant. One team  of researchers has concluded
tha t  “th e bond  bet ween  gra nd par ent s a nd  gra nd childr en is
second in em ot i ona l power  and in flu en ce on ly t o the
re la t ionsh ip bet ween  childr en  an d pa re nt s.”38 When  paren ts’
m a r riages  an d domest ic part ner ships  dissolve, gran dpa ren ts
p lay an  increas ingly importa nt  role in rea ring children ,
sometimes becoming the primar y care givers.39
Legislatu res  and cou r t s h ave increa singly ope ned  the d oor
to giving gra ndpa ren t s a legally protected r ole in a  child’s life,
even over t he  objections  of a pa re nt . This area  is h eavily
gover ned  by s t a tu te, a nd t he la w va r ies  wid ely  among
jurisdict ion s.  But  ce r ta in  common fea tu res  of the  law a re
consis ten t with  th e idea  of a social int ere st  in t he ch ild-
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40. S ee, e.g., N.M. STAT . AN N . § 40-9-2 (Michie 1978) (ma king “visita tion
privileges” ava il able t o g randpa ren t s unde r  va r ious circumstan ces, including a par ent’s
dea th , dissolution of parent s’ mar riage, an d adoption by a st eppar ent); 23 P A. CO N S.
STAT . AN N . § 5311 (1981 ) (au th oriz ing  ord er  of “rea son ab le p ar tia l cus tod y or
visi ta tion  righ ts” ava ilable to gra ndpa ren ts if th e par ent  is deceas ed, doing so wou ld
be in th e child’s bes t  in t e r ests , an d th e order  would n ot int erfer e with  th e sur viving
pa ren t ’s re lat ions hip  wit h t he  chil d); TE N N . CO D E  AN N . § 36-6 -302  (199 6) (a ut ho rizin g
“reasonable visitation rights” to gr an dpa re nt s wh en  in ch ild’s bes t in te re st s); cf. CO N N .
GE N . STAT . AN N . § 46b-59 (West 1995) (authorizing visitation right s to unspecified
t h ird pe rs on s, b ut  “sh al l n ot b e d ee me d t o h av e cr ea te d p ar en ta l r igh ts ”). A few
Stat es ma ke cu stody  ava ilable t o gra ndp ar ent s or ot her s. S ee, e.g., Pet e r s on  v.
Pe te r son , 399 N.W.2d 792 (Neb. 1987) (awar ding grandpa rent s custody of child where
fathe r was physically abusive a n d mother  men ta lly i ll  unde r  s t a tut e  in t e rp ret ed  to
all ow th ir d-p ar ty  cus tod y cla im s in  cas es  of pa re nt al  un fit ne ss  or  for f ei tu re  of  paren ta l
rights); Lively v. Lively, 853 P.2d  787 (Okla. Ct . App. 1993) (holding th a t  the  t r i a l
cour t  had jurisdiction to decide whether pat ernal gran dpar ents ,  who had been child’s
pr imary car egiv er s si nce  his  bir th , sh ould  be a wa rd ed cu st ody a fte r d ea th  of th eir  son
over th e m oth er ’s object ion  un de r a n “a bu se  of pa re nt al  au th or it y” st at ut e).
41. S ee Micha el Qu int al, Cou rt  Ord ered  Fam ili es: An  Ov erv iew  of Gr an dp aren t-
Vis ita tion  S ta tu tes , 29 SUFFOLK  U. L. RE V. 835 , 84 0 n .29  (199 5) (cit in g st at e s ta tu te s).
42. In  B abb  v. B egin es, 701 So. 2d 616 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997), for exam ple,
the appellate court order ed dismissal of a grandm other’s petit i on  for custody of her
g randdaugh te r , no twi ths tanding tha t  the  paren ts ’ mar r iage  h a d been deeply troubled,
and th e tr ial court  ha d found t he pa ren ts “were  not a cting in  the be st  int er est s” of
th eir  daughter . To hold otherwise, the court sa id, “would pe rmit  a  g randpa ren t  to
in t er f ere with an  intact family, and would be inconsistent with  a legislative policy to
pres erve  familie s wh en p ossible.” Id .  a t  618.  The  cour t  in  West  v. West, 689 N.E.2d
1215, 121 9-20  (Ill . App . Ct . 19 98),  re vie we d t he  hi st or y of t he Il lin ois  g randpa ren t
grandparen t  rela t ionsh ip. Th at  int ere st  ra nk s below t he s ocial
interest  in t he  child-pa re nt  re lat ionsh ip, bu t  it  still comma nds
respect .
The rela tive p ositions of g randpa ren t s and  pa ren t s a r e
reflected in  som e of t he m ore com mon ru les  govern ing t heir
compet ing claim s. F or exa mp le, i t  is  sign i fi can t  tha t  the
sta tu tes  typ ically give gra nd pa ren ts  th e possibilit y of only
visit ing r igh ts , not  cust ody.40 Th a t  lim it a t ion , wh ich  wou ld  not
ap ply if the child’s best in ter ests  were t he only consider at ion ,
sign als  a  rela t ive ly gr ea ter  res pe ct  for  the socia l and  paren ta l
interest  in  th e child-parent  relat ionship. Moreover, stat es often
den y g r a ndpa ren ts a ny legal claim to involvemen t in t he lives
of th eir gr an dchildr en u nt il th e child-pa ren t r elat ionsh ip it self
has b ee n  dis rupt ed , such  as b y dea th , d ivor ce, or  in formal
separa t ion .41 Un t il tha t  point , th e int act  ma rit al fa mily, wit h it s
power fully int er conne ctin g bu ndle of pers ona l an d social
interests , t rum ps t he comp etin g claims  of extend ed fam ily
members.42 If a  disr upt ion  occurs,  however , t he ch ild’s
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visi ta tion  stat ute, noting t hat , exc ep t  for a brief period during 1989-90, the statute
has permitt ed visitation only if the pa rent s’ mar riage ha s been  dis ru pt ed b y di vor ce
or  sep ar at ion,  un les s on e pa re nt  join s t he  gr an dpa re nt s’ pet iti on.
43. Most s ta tu tes  condi t ion  a  gr a n d p a ren t’s acce ss t o a ch ild on  som e k ind  of
dis ru pt ion  in  th e ch ild ’s imm ed ia te  fam ily,  su ch a s t he  de at h o f a  p a r en t ,  a
dis solu tion  of the p ar ent s’ marr iage, or  th eir s epa ra tion . S ee, e.g., Ridenou r v.
R idenour , 901 P .2d 770, 77 2 (N.M. Ct.  App . 1995) (holding tha t un der sta te sta tut e,
“g randpa ren t s ma y file a visita tion pe tit ion whe n one  of the following th res hold
requ i r emen t s ha s been  met : the  filing of a jud gmen t of dissolu tion  of mar ria ge, lega l
sepa ra t ion , o r  the ex is tence  of  a  paren t -chil d r ela tion sh ip p ur su an t t o th e U nifor m
P a r e n tage  Act; one or both paren ts are deceased; a child under six years resided wit h
a  g randpa ren t  at  l ea s t  t h ree  mon ths ; a  child ove r  s ix  yea r s  r es ided with  a
g randpa ren t at  least  six mon th s; or adopt ion pr oceedings a re in volved”); Cast agn o v.
Wholean , 684 A. 2d 1 181 (C onn . 199 6) (in te rp re tin g st at e st at ut e t o cond iti on
grandparent s’ ( and  othe r  nonpar en ts ’) ri gh t t o vis it at ion  up on d isr up ti on of t he  in ta ct
par ent -child rela tions hip by eve nt s su ch as  a pa ren t’s death  or pa ren ta l sepa ra ti on );
McIn tyre v. McInt yr e, 461 S.E.2d 745 (N.C. 1995) (interpreting stat e statut e
in terpr eted  to limit grandpa rent s’ right t o visitat ion to circumst ances in which th ere
is an  ongoing cust ody proceedin g or th e min or child is in  th e cust ody of a steppar en t
or  re lat ive); see also Quin ta l, supra  note 41, at  840 n.29.
44. S ee, e.g., Br own  v. E ar nh ar dt , 396  S.E .2d  358 , 360  (S.C . 199 0) (Th e cou r t
rejected the view tha t “the visitation rights  of grandpa rent s  s t and  on  the ir  own  and
shou ld be viewed separat ely from such rights a warded th e par ents .  . . . [T]h is Cou rt
does not  su bscr ibe t o th e vie w t ha t gr an dpa re nt s a re  en tit led  to con tend for
au tonomous vis it at ion  pr ivil ege s a bs en t a  sh owin g of ex cep ti on al  cir cum st an ces .”).
45. S ee, e.g., Simm ons v. Sim mons , 900 S.W.2d 682 (Ten n. 1995) (holdin g th at
the child’s adoption by s tepfa th er ga ve mot her  an d adopt ive fath er full co n st itu t iona l
pr ote ction  ag ai ns t cl ai ms  by n on pa re nt s in clu din g pa te rn al  gr an dp ar en ts ).
46. S ee, e.g.,  Olson v.  Olson, 534 N.W.2 d 5 47 (M inn. 1995); Rigler v. Treen , 660
A.2d 111  (Pa . Su pe r.  Ct . 19 95).
grandparen t s or  othe r  r el a tives may h ave a n  ope nin g t o a
legally protected r ole in t he child’s life, w het her  in  the for m of
out r igh t  cust ody or , m ore com monly,  vis it a t ion .43
The int ere st s u nd erlyin g th at  role ar e illumina ted by ask ing
whet her  th e gra nd pa re nt ’s r ight  is wh olly der ivat ive from his or
her  son  or  daughter (the child’s pa ren t). Some  st at es do so lim it
it,  so tha t  the gra nd pa ren t is  per mit ted  only to r eplace , i n some
mea sur e, a  mis s ing or  un fi t  pa ren t , bu t  not  to d isp lace one who
is functioning an d legally fit, even if divorced or sepa ra ted. 44
Und er  th is r ea sonin g, the t e rmina t ion  of a  pa ren t ’s  r igh t
neces sa rily elimin at es a ny claim  th at  per son’s pa ren ts  would
have to be allowed access to their grandchild.45 Other sta tes,
however, make cl ea r  t ha t  a  grandpa ren t  may,  in  some
circumstan ces, obtain a ccess  t o th e child, even over th e
object ion s of t he  grandpa ren t ’s  son  or  daugh te r .46 Un der  th is
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47. S ee, e.g., Snip es v. Carr , 526 So. 2d 591 (Ala. Civ. App. 1988) (allowing
pa te rna l grandpa rent s visitation over mot her’s objection following death of fath er an d
mothe r ’s r ema rr iage); Lingwa ll v. Hoene r, 483 N .E.2d 512, 51 6 (Ill. 1985) (permit tin g
grandpa ren t s in t hr ee sepa ra te cas es visit at ion righ ts  after  par ent  th rough  whom th ey
were related t o child lost parent al rights a s a resu lt of divorce and  a d op t ion by other
na tura l pa re nt ’s ne w s pou se ).
48. Grandpa ren t s wer e fou nd  to la ck a  cons tit ut iona lly  pro t ec t ed  in t e re st  i n  t he
ad option  of their  gra ndch ild in Mu llin s v.  Oregon ,  57 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 1995). Stat e
cour t s ha ve r ea che d a  sim ila r conclu sion  on th e bas is of sta te la w an d policy. S ee,
e.g., Ols on ,  534  N.W.2d  a t 549 (“[W]hat  is at  issu e in gr an dpar ent  visita tion ca ses is
‘t h e ri gh t of t he  chi ld t o . . . k no w h er  gr an dp ar en ts ,’ an d n ot t he  in te re st s of t he
grandpa ren ts.” (quotin g Robert s v. War d, 493 A.2d 47 8, 482 (N.H . 1985))). But see
L oc kh a r t  v.  Lo ck har t , 6 03  N.E .2 d 8 64 , 8 66  (Ind.  Ct . App . 1 99 2)  (r ec ogn iz in g b ot h  “th e
r igh t s of [th e] p ar en ts  to r ai se  th eir  chi ldr en  as  th ey s ee  fit  an d [t he ] ri gh ts  of th e
g randpa ren t s to par ticipat e in t he lives  of their  gra ndch ildr e n ”) ; King v. King, 828
S.W.2d 630, 632 (Ky. 1992) (noting,  in u pholdin g constit ut ional va lidity  o f g randpa ren t
visi ta tion  s ta tu te , tha t  “[ t ]he  grandparen t  can  be  inv igora ted by exposure  to you th ,
can  gain  an  insigh t in to our  chan ging society, a nd can  avoid the l oneline ss wh ich is
so ofte n a  pa rt  of an  ag in g pa re nt ’s life”).
49. S ee, e.g., Sn ipes, 526 So. 2d at  592-93 (child ha d enjoyed a  regu lar  an d
con t inuous r e la t ionsh ip  with  g r and pa re nt ); Lingw all, 48 3 N .E .2d  at  516 -17 (“[T]h e
leng th and qua lity of the relationship between grandpa rents a nd child, the child’s
need  for con ti nu it y in  hi s r ela ti ons hi ps  wit h p eop le w ho m ay  ha ve p la yed  a s ign ifica nt
nu r tu r ing role in his life [are relevant  to whether  visit at ion  is appropriat e].”); Weddel
v. Wedde l, 553 N.E .2d 213, 21 4 (Ind . Ct. App. 1990) (The court found th at children
and ma ter na l gra ndpa ren ts “funct ioned a s an  exte nded  family and the children [had]
deep, loving rela tions hips w ith  th eir gr an dpar ent s which  th eir fat her  fe[lt was] in
th eir  b e st  interest s to maint ain. [The father] concede[d] that t he [grandpa rent s] ‘were
th eir  life’ whe n h is form er w ife was a live”); Spr adlin g v. Ha r ris, 7 78 P.2d 365, 368
(Kan. Ct . App.  1989 ) (find ing  th at  th e gr an dm oth er  ha d “see n or  spok en  to  [the
grandchild] every week since his birth, except th at t ime dur ing which her da ughter
refused  to allow conta ct”); Pointer v. Point er, 829 P.2d 1016, 1017-19 (Or. Ct. App.
1992) ( “Dur ing  the mar r i age , t he  gr a n d p a rents ha d cared for the [grandchild]
exten sively an d, when  moth er wa s awa y for long per iods, th ey car ed for him  da ily. ”).
view, a  pa ren t ’s dea th  or loss of right s would  not  neces sa rily
e limina te  the  grandpa ren t s’ cl a im.47
Grant ing a gra ndpa ren t ’s  cla im in  such  cases  shows  that
the gra nd pa ren t d oes not  sim ply “inher it” th e pa ren t’s lega lly
protected  inter est. Ot her  inter ests  ar e at  work as  well. They
migh t  include th e gran dpa ren t’s pers on a l int ere st  in
main ta in ing a  re la t ionsh ip  with  t h e  ch ild, the child’s own
interest  in access to t he gr an dpa ren t, or t he s ocial int ere st  in
the child-grandpar ent relationship. State r ecognition of the first
of these—the grandpa r ent s’ own inter est—is quest ionable.48
The second, in  sh ar p contr as t—t he ch ild’s per sona l int ere st  in
main ta in i ng an  exist ing bon d wit h gr an dpa ren ts —is obvious ly
impor t an t , a  poin t  em ph asized  by ju dicia l s t a tem en ts t o t h a t
effect .4 9  A few st a tu tes  go so far  as t o condi t ion  the
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50. See sta tu tes  cited in  Quin ta l, supra note 41, at  847-48 n.54.
51. Cam pbell  v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635, 642 -43 (U ta h C t. Ap p. 19 95) (footn ote
omitted) (st at ing  th at  th is s ocial  int er est  ne ver th ele ss d oes n ot  a u t o m a tically override
the chil d’s bes t in te re st s t o th e con t ra ry ); see also Hern don v. Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d 203,
209 (Mo. 1 993 ) (en  ba nc).
52. A few state sta tut es do apparen tly open th e door  to o ther  nonpa ren t
c la iman t s gene rally. S ee, e.g., CO N N . GE N . STAT . AN N . § 46b-59 (West 1995)
(au tho ri zing cour t  t o g ran t  vi si t a t ion  r ight s t o “any  per son ” if in be st  int er est  of
chi ld);  N.C. GE N . STAT . § 50-1 3.2  (199 7) (“An or de r fo r cu st ody o f a  m i n or  c hild
enter ed pursua nt to th is section shall awar d the custody of such child to such person,
agen cy, organ ization  or ins tit ut ion as  will b es t  p ro m ote  th e in te re st  an d we lfar e of
the chi ld. ”).
53. The New Mexico Cou rt  of Appea ls e nu me ra te d t he  ra ng e of in te re st s it  took
in to account  in rejectin g a con st itu tion al ch all en ge t o its  Gr an dpa re nt  Visit at ion
Privileges Act (GVA): “In the presen t case, a pplication  of the GVA is an  appr opria te
me thod by wh ich  to  ba l ance the competing int erests of Child, Grandpar ents, Mother ,
and th e Sta te, wh ile prom otin g Child’s best in ter ests  as pa ra moun t.” Ridenour  v.
R idenour , 901  P. 2d  770 , 77 6 (N .M.  Ct . App . 19 95).
54. S ee Quin ta l, supra  no te 41 , a t  836 n .6 (ci t ing  s ta te s t a t u t es ).  Whe the r  the
s t anda rd i s based  on  the  ch i ld ’s  bes t  inter ests  or gra nt s a pa ren ta l prefer ence, it
proper ly changes  if  the  grandpa ren ts already  ha ve been  ma de th e forma l custodia ns
or  guardians of the child. In such cases, courts r equ ir e a  pa re nt  see kin g a ch an ge of
custody to  mee t  a  h igh  burden .  A cour t  in  a  s ta te genera l ly  gran t ing paren ta l
pr efer en ce explained:
Once a  cour t  h a s  p r operly tra nsferred cust ody from a pa rent  to a nonpar ent,
it  does no good to apply the [p a r e n t a l preference] doctrine t o weaken th e
grandparen t s’ visi t a t ion  r igh t s on  the ch ild ’s p r ior  res iden ce
with  them.50
The social int erest in  th e child-gra nd pa ren t r elat ionsh ip is
r e levan t  t oo.  As  one  cour t  pu t  it ,  “g randparen t s a r e mem bers  of
the exte nd ed fa mily w hom  society r ecognizes a s pla ying a n
impor tan t  role in  the lives  of t h eir  gr andch ild ren , wh ich
r ecogn it ion  has been given added meaning in this Stat e by t he
Legislatu re’s policy judgm en t  un derlying [the gr an dpa ren t
vis it a t ion  st at ut e].”51 Perha ps the clea res t  evide nce of t ha t
socia l int ere st  lies in  t h e fact  tha t  mos t  s t a tu tes  govern ing
nonparents’ access to children over a parent’s objection apply
only to gran dpa ren ts or pr ivilege a gra ndpa ren t’s claim over
tha t  of other nonparents. 5 2  T h e i m pl ica t ion  i s tha t
grandpar ents, as  a cla ss, a nd  th e child -gra ndparent  bond as a
category of relationships, are par ticularly valued.
Given the  complex mesh of interests,53 not  tr eat ed u niform ly
among the sta tes, it  is not surprising th at  th e su bst an tive
stan dards  applied by th e cour ts va ry. The st at ut es th emselves
gener ally say t ha t t he child’s-best-inter ests  sta nda rd governs
grandpar ents’ access to a child.5 4  Yet, it  is  evide n t  from the
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subs tan t ia l change r equ ir em ent  for modification. T he pr oceeding th at  gave
the nonpar ent cust ody will have en ab led  the paren t  to exerc ise  the  paren ta l
preference, and achieved the goal that leads us t o t r ea t  pa ren t -nonpa ren t
cases different ly from other  cust ody cases. Having once protected the
pa ren t ’s right to custody, at the risk of sacrificing the child’s best interests,
we sh oul d n ot t he n s acr ifice t he  chi ld’s n eed  for s ta bili ty  in  it s ca r e  a nd
l iv ing arr angemen ts more r eadily than  in a par ent-paren t case.
C.R.B. v. C.C ., 959  P.2 d 37 5, 38 0 (Ala sk a 1 998) (r efu sin g to ch an ge cu st ody fr om
materna l gr an dpa re nt s t o fat he r); see also F re shour  v . Wes t , 962  S.W.2d 840, 842-43
(Ark . Ct . App . 1 99 8)  (a pp ly in g “m ater ial cha nge in  circum sta nces” sta nda rd in
re fus ing to change custody from mat ern al grandm other, who had been na med child’s
lega l gu ar dia n,  to fa th er ).
55. S ee, e.g.,  Carlson v. Carlson ,  55 8 P .2d 836, 837 (Wash Ct. App. 1976)
(concluding,  no twi ths tanding a  s ta tu tory  bes t -in te res t  s tandard for  nonpa ren t
visi ta tion  righ ts , th at  “[i]n th e a bse nce  of a t hr esh old s itu at ion [s uch  as  dis solu tion ,
sepa ra t ion , ab us e or  ab an don me nt ] affe cti ng  th e in te re st s of t he  chi ld with  r ega rd  to
the continuit y of the fam ily unit, th e welfare of the child will seldom , if ever, be
served by a  jud icia lly im pose d ove rr idin g of pa re nt al d iscr et ion t o  de t er m ine whet her
a  third per son, distinct from the basic family unit, sha ll be permitted th e privilege
of vis it at ion  wit h t he  chi ld”).
s t ructu re of t he  st a tu t e s and  the con di t ions  they  impose , a s
discussed above, that th e child’s i nt e res t s  ar e not  t he  on ly force
a t  work . Moreover, a pa rt  from a  st at ut e’s form al r equirements,
cour t s ma y inter pret  or apply it in  such a  way as  moves t he
s t anda rd actually applied away from th e best-interests
stan dard.  A cour t, for exa mp le, migh t d eploy a  nons t a tu tory
pr esu mp tion  th at  a child’s best in ter ests  ar e un likely to be
served  by manda t ing  grandpare n t al access where the child’s
imm edia te  family  has n ot  unde rgon e dis solution or other
change in statu s.55 While it  nominally preserves the best-
interest  t e st ,  the effect of such a presum ption is to employ a
s t anda rd quite d ifferen t in fact. Th e sta nda rd a ctua lly applied
re cognizes  that  the social and personal interests in a  child’s
rela t ionship with a grandpa rent or other relative are less
weighty tha n those atta ched to the child-parent bond.
Alth ough  the law in t his  ar ea is  complex a nd  evolving, it
shows both  the  pr imacy  of the  ch i ld -paren t  r e la t ionsh ip  and the
second ar y, yet s till im port an t, r ole of gra ndparen ts in  th e eyes
of the la w. T ha t  im por tance is  du e t o the ch ild ’s p er son a l
interest  in m ain ta inin g gra nd pa ren ta l rela tion sh ips, es pecially
dur ing tim es of up he ava l in t he  imm edia te  fam ily, an d  t o t he
social in te re st  in t he  exte nd ed fa mily.
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56. S ee Mar y Ann M ason  & David  W. Sim on, The Ambiguous Stepparent:
Federal Leg isl at ion  in  S earch  of a M odel , 29 FAM . L.Q. 445  (199 5).
57. I u se the t er m “stepparen t” in the tr aditional sense t o refer to a nonpar ent
who has m arr ied a child’s paren t. A child’s rela t ionsh ip with  a  paren t ’s  nonmar i ta l
part ner  is discussed infra  Par t  IV.E .
58. Som e steppar ents pr efer not to adopt th eir  spous e’s childr en. Ot her s would
quickly  do so but  for th e oth er pa ren t’s protecte d int eres t in  his or  her  rela tions hip
with  the child.
59. This  descr ip t ion  assumes  tha t  the s tepparen t ’s  spouse  has  a t  leas t  p r imary
physica l care of th e child. Alth ough joint  legal cus tody is in creas ingly com mo n ,  t rue
joint  ph ysica l cus tod y, in  th e se ns e t ha t t he  chil d is  equ all y in te gr at ed i nt o t he n ow
sepa ra t e hou seh olds  of both  pa re nt s, is  not  th e n orm .
60. Lou i si ana does recognize dual paternity for purposes of ch i ld  suppor t  and
legitim acy. S ee Smith  v. Cole, 553 So. 2d 847 (La. 1989). The  L ou i si a n a Cour t  o f
Appeals  ha s n ote d t ha t “t he  rig ht s a nd  obliga tion s wh ich e volve fr om t he  legal fict ion
of dua l pat ern ity are n ot well defined and per haps  the wh ole concept sh ould be
recon sider ed.” Sm it h v . Di son , 66 2 S o. 2d  90,  94 (L a.  Ct . App . 19 90).
B.  S tep pa ren ts
The n ame “st eppa ren t” evokes a  broa d r an ge of images  in
our  cu l tu re, r an ging from  th e evil pa ren t-figur e of clas sic fairy
ta les to the  k ind ly  man  or  woman who cheer fu lly  pr ovid es  for
the needy child ren  of a  new sp ouse . Th is  a r t icle  con siders two
sepa ra t e categories of stepp ar e nt , r ecogn izing t he va r iet y of
rela t ion sh ips cover ed  by e ach . Th e fir st  is  the t r adi t ion a l
steppar en t  who ma rr ies, knowing th at  th e other  spouse h as
children  from a  p r ior  re la t ionsh ip . The second , often  not
cons idered a  st ep pa ren t  a t  a ll,  is  the m an wh ose  wife  conceives
or  give s b ir th  to a  child  fa ther ed  by a nother .  Su ch  men  a re
often  legally presum ed to be th e  fa t h ers of children  born un der
those ci r cums tances.  The  mar ri age  of t he  nonpa ren t  to the
paren t  makes  it  se nsible  to conside r  thes e t wo ca tegories
togethe r .
1. Traditional stepparents
 T radi t iona l s t epparen t s  p lay  an  increasingly impor tan t  role
in  the li ves  of the n a t ion ’s children. 56 The  st epp ar en t’s ma rr iage
to the  ch i ld ’s  pa ren t 57 forms  a  new mar it a l family.  Absent  an
ad option  by the st eppar ent ,58 howeve r, t he  child is  not  fully a
pa r t of it un der t he law. On ly one legal child-paren t
re la t ionsh ip exists wit hin a  househ old with two pa ren t
figures.59 Desp it e occa siona l suggest ion s t o the con t ra ry , the
law allows a child only one legal mother  an d one legal fath er. 60
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61. David  Cham ber s, S tepp aren ts,  Bi ologic P aren ts,  an d t he L aw ’s Per cepti ons
of “Fam ily ” Af ter  Div orce, in  DIVORC E  RE F O R M  AT  T H E  CROSSROADS 102, 104 (Stephen
D. Su ga rm an  & H er ma  Hi ll K ay  ed s.,  199 0).
62. S ee i d .
63. Id . at 107.
64. S ee cita tion s in  Br yce Le vin e, N ote , Divorce and the Modern Fami ly:
Prov id ing In Loco Parentis S te pp a re n ts St andin g to Sue for Custody of Th eir
S tep chi ld ren  in a Dis solution  Proceeding, H OFSTRA L. RE V. 315, 319  n. 22 (1 996 ).
65. S ee, e.g.,  Shoe m a k er  v. S ho em ak er , 56 3 S o. 2d  103 2 (Ala . Ci v. Ap p. 1 990 );
Honaker  v. B ur ns ide , 38 8 S .E .2d  322  (W. Va . 19 89).
As David  Cha mbe rs  ha s poin ted  out , th ere  exist s n o “sin gle
pa ra digm  or  model of a pp ropr ia te r es pon sibil it ies ” for
s tepparents. 61 A child of divorced paren ts, for example, can be
expected to have qu it e di ffer en t  rela t ion sh ips w it h  the s pou se  of
her  cus tod ia l  pa ren t , he r  “res iden t ia l s t epparen t” with  whom
she lives d ay-t o-d a y, than  with  the  spouse of he r  noncus tod ia l
pa ren t . Moreover, child-steppa r en t  r e la t ionsh ips  may  va ry
widely,  depe nding u pon  su ch th in gs  as t he s t age of t he ch ild’s
life  when  the  st eppa ren t  ent er s t he  scen e (e.g., infa ncy a s
opposed to late adolescence) and  whe ther  the  noncus tod ia l
paren t  seeks to main ta in a r elationsh ip with h er. 62 It  is
ther efor e im pos sible  to gen er a lize s a fely  abou t  the n a ture of
child -steppa ren t  relationships. It  is true, however, that  “[m]ost
children  living with  a cust odial mother  become m uch bet t er  off
economically up on t he ir m oth er ’s r em ar ria ge.”63 Un doub te dly,
many st ep pa ren t s a lso pr ovid e cr ucia l em ot iona l  suppor t  and
nu rt ur e. As  long  as public poli cy  both  favor s  t he nu r tu re of
children  with in  the mar i t a l fam ily, yet permits its easy
d issolu t ion , society  has an  i n te r est in  encour agin g th e crea tion
of st eppa ren t r elat ionsh ips, wit h  t h e child-a du lt b ondin g th at
often  follows. Tha t will be tru e especially when t he
noncus tod ia l par ent  chooses t o play little or  no role in  the
child’s life. It is cons ist ent  with  tha t  int ere st  to give su bst an tia l
weigh t  to t he cont inu at ion of tha t r elat ionsh ip wh en a  court  is
called  up on t o reor gan ize a b len ded  fam ily legally.
Nevertheless, a  s t epparen t  usua lly has a we ak er le gal claim
to a  re la t i on s h ip w it h  a  child  than  doe s a  pa ren t . A n umber  of
ju r isdict ion s open t he door to visitat ion rights  for st eppar ent s
following  ma rr iage dissolution, eith er by st at ut e,64 or by t he
exercise of in her en t  judicia l d iscret ion .65 But  claims  for pr ima ry
cus tod ia l right s ar e more difficult. Th ey are often ba rr ed on
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66. S ee, e.g., Olver a v. Su per ior Cour t, 815  P.2d  925, 928 -29 (Ariz. Ct. App.
199 1); Mor ro w v.  Mor ro w, 3 45 A. 2d  561 , 56 2-63  (Con n.  197 9).
67. S ee, e.g.,  Schu h v. Rober son, 788 S.W.2d  740, 741 (Ark. 1990); Lar son v.
La r son , 384 S.E.2d 193, 194 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989); Bennet t v. Jeffreys, 356 N.E .2d 277,
282 (N. Y. 19 76).
68. S ee Levin e, supra  note 64, at  315.
69. S ee, e.g., Gor ma n v.  Gor ma n,  400  So. 2 d 7 5 (F la . Di st . Ct . App . 19 81);
Hi cke nb ott om v. Hicke nbot tom , 477 N.W .2d 8 (Neb . 1981). A Delaware stat ute
recen tly  uphe ld  by tha t  s t a t e’s  suprem e court  aga inst  a const itu tiona l challen ge
applies the best -interests st anda rd to contests between  a steppa rent  a n d noncus tod ia l
b ir th  pa re nt  wh en  th e cu st odia l bir th  pa re nt  die s or  becom es disa bled an d th e child
has been  living wit h t he s tep par ent . S ee Tailor  v. Becker , 708 A.2d 626 (Del . 19 98).
The court r ecognized the blended family of birth par ent an d s t e pp a r e n t a s  w ith in  the
concept of fam il y t ha t  is  “de ep ly  rooted  in  th is  Nat ion’s h is tor y a nd t radi t ion ,” id .  a t
629 (qu oti ng  Mich ae l H . v. G er al d D ., 4 91 U .S.  110 , 12 4 (1989), a nd Moore  v. City
of E. C leve lan d, 43 1 U .S. 4 94, 5 03 (19 77)), a nd  ap pr oved  of p rot ect ing the  “s t rong
familia l bond  tha t  may  have  deve loped  be tween  a  s tepparen t  and ch ild.” Ta ilor , 708
A.2d at 629.
grounds  of l ack  of ju r i sd ict ion  or  s t and ing ,66 or  subjected  to the
full r igors  of the  unfi tness  st andard , a s  applied to the child’s
b ir th  pa ren t .67
Routinely putting a stepparent ’s interests  on  pa r  wi th those
of a p ar ent  would be  un wise. P ar ticu lar ly when  the
noncus tod ia l pa ren t  main ta in s a  close, p a ren ta l bon d, giving
anyth ing like equal weight  to th e stepp ar ent ’s int erest  would
invit e loya lt y conflict s a nd con fusion . Moreover , some
s teppa ren t s neve r  in t end to en te r  a  t r adi t iona l  ch i ld -paren t
re la t ionsh ip with t heir s tepchildr en. Th ey a ss ume n o obliga t ion
of fin ancia l or  emot iona l su ppor t a nd  all m emb ers  of their
blended fam ilies see them  as n o more th an  th e par ent ’s spouse.
But  some t imes s t ep p a re n t s form a  bond  wi th  the ch i ld  tha t
is ind ist ingu ish able  from t ha t wit h a  birt h  p a r ent , especia lly
when  no m ean ingful r elat ionsh ip wit h t he  noncus tod ia l  pa ren t
exists. The child’s interest in maint aining that bond upon
mar i t a l dissolut ion, some tim es in  th e form of a cus todia l
re lat ionsh ip, m ay be  pa rt icula rly comp ellin g.
Recogn izing tha t  in ter es t , a n  in crea sing n umber  of cour t s
gra n t  st an din g to st eppa ren ts  an d a djud icat e th eir cla ims
un der  s t andards  le ss onerous  than  t he un fitness t est. Th ey
make th is move when t he st eppar ent  ha s ass um ed a genu ine in
loco parentis relationship with the child.6 8  Some cour ts  sim ply
equa te the steppar ent’s with the birth par ent’s interests,
moving  di rect ly to the best-interests standa rd.69 Ot he rs  enga ge
in  a  more n uanced  ana lys is , t akin g ca refu l a ccoun t  of the
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70. 626 P. 2d  16 (W as h.  Ct . App . 19 81).
71. S ee id . at 19 n.2.
72. Id . at 19.
73. Id .
interests  involved , ar rivin g at  a  poin t  more  demanding than the
best interests sta ndar d, but  less onerous tha n the u nfitness
stan dard.  Such  an  approach  reflects  not  only the  st rength  of the
child’s in teres t  in  main ta in ing  the re la t ionsh ip  with  the
st epp ar en t, bu t s ociety’s a ffirm at ion of its le gitim acy.
An i ll u st r a t ive ca se is In  re M ar riage of A ll en .70 Joshua ,  the
child of J oe and Dan a Allen, was bor n p rofound ly dea f. His
pa ren t s soon divorced, and J oshua  ended u p in  th e cus tody of
Dana’s mothe r . Joe then  me t  a n d  m a rr ied  Jeann ie , who had
custody of he r  t hree ch ildren from a  prior m ar riage. When  he
was thr ee years old, Joshua  came  to live wit h J oe, J ea nn ie, an d
her  children. J oe adopted J ean nie’s children . But sh e never
adopted  J osh ua , be cause Da na  would not relin quish  her
paren ta l r i gh t s.7 1  It a ppea rs  th at  Dan a p layed  no role in
Joshua ’s  li fe , however .
Alth ough  she did n ot adopt J oshua , Jea nn ie took a great
interest  in h im, a ctively looking for wa ys t o help h im d eal wit h
h i s disa bilit y. Un like Joe, whose att itude t oward J oshua  was
“ap at het ic an d fat alis tic,”72 J eannie be lieved  the boy’s fu ture
was bright . She ar r a n ged for J oshua  to learn  sign lan guage.
She and  the othe r  t hree children became fluent in its use. She
saw to it th at  J oshua  received specia l tu tor ing, in cur rin g
subs tan t ia l pe r son a l debt  to pa y for  it.  As  a  resu lt ,  Joshua
ent ered school only slightly behin d schedu le and  soon r eached
“a  level of intellect ua l deve lopmen t  equ iva len t  to tha t  of
he ar ing ch ildr en  his  age.”73
J oe and J ea nnie b ega n  diss olu t ion  proceedings when Joshua
was six years old. She sought custody  of a ll four children . The
t r i a l cour t  rejected Joe’s a rgu men t  tha t  it  la cked  ju r isdict ion  to
consider , and th at J eannie lacked standin g t o seek, Joshua’s
cust ody. Th e cou r t  then a warded J eannie the custody of J osh ua
(and the other children), applying the best-interests st andar d.
Joe appea led  the deci sion  as  to Joshua .
The cour t  of appea l s fi r st  decided tha t  the  t r ia l  cour t  had
pr operly  exe rcised  ju r isdict ion  over  Jeann ie’s  cla im to Joshua’s
custody. I t  in t e rpre t ed  s t at e sta tu tes  as gr an ting judicial power
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74. Id . at  20 (quotin g WA S H . RE V. CODE  § 26. 09. 020 (1)(d) (1997)) (emp ha sis
ad de d).
75. S ee i d . at 21.
76. Id . 
77. Id . at 23.
78. Id .
79. Id .
80. Id . at  22 (q uo ti ng  St at e v.  Koom e, 5 30 P .2d  260 , 26 4 (Wa sh . 19 75)).
81. Id . at 23.
t o decide  the cu st ody of “any ch ild  dependent u pon either or
both  spouses.”74 I t  a lso found tha t , under  s t a te l aw,  a  st epparen t
int end ing to assume responsibility for a child (as J eann ie
clear ly had) had sta nding to seek custody as  a  person  s tand ing
in loco parentis .75
The cour t  t hen  cons idered wha t  legal s tan dard a pplied. It
agreed  with  Joe tha t  the  t r ia l  cour t  e r red  in  us ing  the bes t -
interests  sta nda rd. “[B]etween  a  pa ren t  and  a  nonpa ren t ,
ap plicat ion of a  more  st r ingen t  ba l a ncing test is required to
jus t ify awarding cus tody to the  nonpa ren t .”76 The resu l t  in  the
case was defensible, however, if another sta ndar d were used,
one s t r iking “a middle groun d; to give custody to a n onpar ent
the re mus t  be  more  t h a n the ‘best interests of the child’
involved, but  less  th an  a s howin g of unfit ne ss.”77 The cour t
described the s t anda rd a s r equ ir in g a  sh owin g of “act ua l
det r imen t” t o t he child.78 “Pr ecisely wha t m ight out weigh
paren ta l right s mu st be det erm ined on a case-by-case bas is. But
unfitness of the  pa re nt  nee d n ot be s hown .”79 The cour t  had
litt le trouble concluding that, although Joe was not unfit as a
pa ren t , Joshua  wou ld su ffe r  an  actua l det r imen t  if h e d id  not
re ma in in  J ea nn ie’s cus tody.
In  its  a n a lysis in  su ppor t of an  int er me dia te  st an da rd , th e
cour t  iden t ifie d t he t h ree  in ter es t s d iscussed in t his a rt icle.
Quot ing from an  ear l ie r decision , State v. Koome,  t he court  said:
“[i] par ent al pr erogatives a re en titled t o considera ble lega l
deference, [bu t ] they a re  not  absolute an d must  yield to
[ii] fundamenta l  r igh t s of the child or [iii] impor t an t  in t e res t s  of
th e St at e.”80
The court  emp ha sized t ha t “th e psych ological re lat ionsh ip
between  Jeann ie , he r  fami ly  and  Joshua  is  equ ivalen t  t o t ha t  of
a  na tu ra l fami ly  en t it y .”81 T h ere fore , “the  reason  for  defe r r ing
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82. Id .
83. S ee id . at 21.
t o pa ren ta l r ight s—the goal of preser ving families—would be
ill-ser ved by m ain ta inin g pa re nt al cu st ody.”82
This  sta tem ent  invites close att ent ion. By th e cou r t ’s own
accoun t , “preserving families” is a  r ea son , t hough  not  the on ly
one, for deferring to parental rights. As made cle a r  in  t he
quot at ion from Koom e,  “parent al prerogatives” and th e socia l
impor tance of th e family are two s ep a r ate int erest s, to be
balan ced aga ins t t he in ter est s of the  child. P res ervin g a fam ily
un i t of wh ich  Joshua  had  become  a par t wa s  a  va l id  reason  for
judicia l action not only beca u se it  would serve Joshua’s
interests, but because it  protected a  socially va lua ble
inst i tu t ion .
The cour t  over s t ates,  or overs imp lifies, th e case  whe n it
says that  granting custody to Jeann ie would preserve Joshua’s
fam ily un it , of course . Th e fa mily  wa s b ein g dis solved  a lon g on e
of its a xes by J ean nie’s divorce from J oe. The cus tody a war d did
pr eser ve an  existing psychological child-parent  relationship,
however, rep res en t in g a nother  cr it ica l a xis  of J os h u a ’s fam ily,
as  he p erceived  it.
It  properly m ade a  di fference  to the  cour t  tha t  Jeann ie  was
Joshua’s st eppa ren t, a nd  th us  neit h e r  fu l ly  a pa ren t  nor  a
complet e str an ger in t he legal sen se. That  poin t i s a t  t he hea r t
of t he  court ’s a na lysis on  jur isdict ion a nd  st an din g. The
deployment  of th ose concepts is often used  to s igna l the  absence
of a  socia l in ter es t  in  som e ca tegor ies  of chi ld-adu l t
relationships. J ean nie’s rela tionsh ip with J oshua , however,
enjoyed an  affirm at ive social int ere st . She  ha d m ad e legal a nd
mora l commi tmen t s i n he r  mar r iage  to Joshua ’s  fa the r . In the
s t a t e of Wash ingt on ,  those comm itm ent s m ad e he r lega lly
liable for J oshua ’s sup port du ring t he m ar riage. 83
Had th e court  weigh ed on ly th e fat he r’s int er est , th e boy’s
in te res t , an d th e social int erest  in th e child-birt h pa ren t
relationship, it  would properly h ave a r r ived a t  the  t r adi t iona l
unfitness sta nda rd for depr iving th e fath er of cust ody. By
giving weigh t t o an  ad dit iona l factor, s ociety’s in ter est  in
Jeann ie’s re la t ionsh ip  with  J o sh u a ,  the cour t  p roduced an
int e rmed ia t e st anda rd.  App lying t ha t  st anda rd t o the fa ct s of
th i s ca se—in  which  not  on ly Jeann ie ’s  ex t raord ina ry
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84. T h e i ss u e wou ld h ave  bee n d iffer en t, of cou rs e, h ad  J osh ua ’s bir th  mot he r
sough t to enforce a legal relationship with him. Assum i n g s h e was n ot found t o have
aban doned him, th e court would have been r equired  to fa cto r  her  i n t ere s t s i n to i t s
an alysis  in crea tin g a lega l sta nda rd. Th at  an alysis would  be complicat ed by th e
int rod uct ion  o f a n ot h e r  a du l t ’s  in t e r es t s  in t o t h e  m ix, interes ts wh ich would h ave
competed directly with those of Jeann ie.
85. 491 U. S. 1 10 (1 989 ).
86. The Court also considered w h e th er th e child had a constitut ionally protected
l ibe r ty in te re st  in  ma in ta in in g r ela ti on sh ips  wit h b oth  he r b ir th  fat h er an d her
presum ed f athe r . See id.  at 130-32.
as su mp tion  of respons ibility for th e boy’s well-being, but  J oe’s
ina bility t o pr ovid e for  h is  sp ecia l n eeds  were s a lie n t—the
scales were t ipped in favor of cust ody for J ean nie.84
2. Presum ed fathers
 A cat egory of cases  re lat ed t o, but  dist inct  from, t h e classic
d ispu te between a parent a nd step par ent  ar ises un der
pa tern it y presumpt ion stat utes. Such legislation creates a
pr esu mp tionSSeither  conclus ive or r ebu tt ableSStha t  the
h u s ba n d of a  woman who conce ives  or  bears  a  ch i ld  dur ing  t he
mar r iage is th e child’s fath er. If the p resu mpt ion is conclusive,
it  const itu tes  a s ubs ta nt ive ru le of law. Other wise it ma y be
cha ract e r ized as  a r ule of eviden ce. In eit he r event , it  reflects,
am ong oth er t hin gs, a clea r a ffirma tion  of th e pu blic int ere st  in
th e m ar ita l fam ily.
The Un ited  St at es Su pr eme  Cour t gr ap pled w ith  t he
cons t itu t iona l implications of an irr ebut ta ble presumpt ion  of
pa tern ity in Michael H. v. Gerald  D.85 A sh arply d ivide d Cour t
up held  th e ap plicat ion of the s ta tu te in  circumst ances where
the re was  no doubt  abou t  th e child ’s pa te rn ity, a nd , du rin g a
brief pe r iod of in form al sep ara t ion  from  her  husband,  the
moth er  an d child had  coha bited with  th e fa t h e r . Rough ly
spe ak ing,  the issue was framed as a contest  between  the
compet ing substan tive rights e n joyed by the  fa the r  and
hu sba nd , an d t he  st at e’s in te re st  in t he  ma rit al fa mily. 86
I am  less in ter est ed h ere  in t he cons tit ut iona l imp lica t ions
of th e case t ha n in  not ing t he m ix of int ere st s t ha t lies  beh ind
pa tern ity presumpt ion stat utes. The facts assumed by these
sta tu tes  di ffer  sign ifica n t ly from those  in  typ ica l  st epparen t
families. Most im port an t, t he ch ild is bor n in to a n exis tin g
mar i t a l fami ly , r a the r  than  experien cin g t he los s or  abs en ce of
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87. In  Michael  H ., for exam ple, t he  ch i ld  and  her  fa ther  d id  deve lop an
emot iona l bond  with  one  anothe r .
88. F o r example , i n  In re Melissa G., 261 Cal. Rptr. 894 (Ct . App. 1989), t he
Californ ia  Court  of Appea ls found t he st at ut e uph eld in Michael  H . i n a pp li cab le  where
the mother h ad divorced her hu sband shortly after th e child’s b ir th  and  mar r ied  the
child’s father. Th e court said th e conclusive statu tory rule d i d n o t  gove rn  if t he
mother  an d pre sum ed fat her  did not  int end t o rais e th e child joint ly.
her  fa the r , fol lowed  by  her  mother ’s  mar r iage to anot h e r  m a n.
She is un likely to have est ablished  an  emotional bond wit h h er
birt h  fa the r , or  he  wi th  her .  Her  mother ’s  husband did not
ent er  the  mar r iage on  t he understa nding that  it  would include
a  ch ild of an other  ma n, a child for whom he m ight decline to
as sume full par e nta l re spon sibilit y. In deed , th e hu sba nd  migh t
not  even be aw a r e  t h at  he lack s a  genet ic rela tion sh ip wit h t he
child. The  facts  in a  spe cific case  migh t n ot  conform to th i s
pa t t ern , of cour se,87 bu t  they  app ea r  t o be the  pi ctu re
envisioned by the statu tes.
The stat utes ma y also a s s u me  a  ce r t a in  k ind  of con te st : a
dispu t e bet ween  th e child ’s bir th  fat he r, on  th e one h an d, a nd
her  mothe r  a n d the m other ’s h usb and,  on  the ot her . On  su ch
facts, the relevant interests combine to support  pla cing a steep
bur den  in t he w ay of th e bir th  fat her ’s claim . The ch ild’s
interest  like ly  ca l ls  for  he r  to r ema in  in  an  und is tu rbed
re la t ionsh ip with  the  mother  and husband , with  both  of whom
she has an  emotional, child-par e n t  bond . The b ir th  fa the r ’s
i n terest  is  en t it led  to no m ore weight  than  tha t  of th e birt h
mothe r . Bu t  the p res umpt ion  cannot  be  accounted  for  wit hout
refe ren ce to th e social in te re st  in p re ser ving a n  exist ing m ar ita l
fam ily. When both  spouses  seek  to preserve that r elationship,
and doing so will ma in ta in th e emotional, economic, and oth er
adva nt ages  of the  mar it a l  family, t he  s ta te  has a  ser ious  s take
in  preven ting it s disru ption. Tha t st ak e, together wi th  the
individual in t erests of the players in these unha ppy dramas,
combine  to jus tify a legal standa rd tilted steeply against th e
b ir th  fa the r ’s  cl a im.
Presum ptions, of cour se, especially conclus ive ones , ar e
blun t  inst ru men ts. When  th e a ct u a l facts vary from those
ass um ed by the statut es, the basis for the presumpti on  may
weak en  or  d isappear . In  s u ch  cases, some court s find ways to
avoid  the a pp lica t ion  of eve n  a  conclu sive p res umpt ion .88 Even
if th e pr esu mp tion  of pat er nit y is r ebu tt ed, h owever , th e
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89. 686 A.2d  117 9 (N .H . 19 96).
90. Id . at 1184.
91. Id . at 1183.
under lying fact s  may suppor t  a  s t andard more  sol ici tous  of the
mothe r ’s husba nd t ha n a  requ iremen t t ha t h e prove the
unfi tness  of t he  bi r th  fa the r .
Bodwell v . Brooks89 illu st ra tes  the  con test  between  the
moth er  an d h er  hu sba nd  on t he  one h an d, a n d  t he b iologica l
fa the r on  the oth er . The  child w as  conceived du rin g th e spouses’
separa t ion , bor n  sh or t ly a ft er  their  divor ce, fol lowi ng wh ich
th ey mar r ied  each  othe r  aga in.  The  mothe r ’s  husband sough t  t o
inter vene in a custody claim  brought  by the child’s fath er
against  t he  mothe r . The fa ther’s patern ity claim was conceded.
Rever sin g the  t ri a l cou r t ’s  judgmen t , t he  New Hampsh i re
Supr em e Cour t  found  tha t  the  t r ia l  cou r t  had  ju r isd ict ion  to
h ear  th e case  an d t ha t t he h us ban d h ad  st an din g to int ervene .
Alth ough  the  mar r ied  coup le ’s  concession  had  rebu t ted  the
presumpt ion  of the h usb and’s pa ter n it y, t he cou r t  ru led  tha t  he
should be  give n  the op por tun it y t o contes t  cust ody. Th e cou r t
was not entirely clear about the sub s t a n tive stan dar d to be
app lied on remand, saying only that t he child’s best interests
wer e t o be th e “prim ar y guid e.”90
It  i s s igni fi can t  t ha t  t he moth e r  a n d he r  husband  were
ma rr ied an d not divorcing at t ime of t h e  cus tody con test ,  and
tha t  th ey jointly r esisted  the father’s claim. The social interest
in  both  the  mother -ch i ld  and  husband-wife  rela t ionsh ip
together  sh ould m ove th e st an da rd  towa rd  th e best -int er e st s
pos it ion . As the court  said, noting that  steppar ent s ma y be
gran ted custody upon divorce from a child’s par e n t , “it wou ld
make little sen se to perm it st eppar ent s to seek cust ody only in
the even t of divorce p roceedin gs, wh ile wit hh olding s uch  righ ts
when  the tr aditional unita ry family still  exists.”9 1  In  th is
set tin g, as in  th e mor e  t r a di t ion a l child-steppar en t
relationship, the social interest in t he mar ital family plays a
powerful, sta nda rd-set ting r ole.
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92. Ex rel  B.G .C. , 49 6 N .W.2 d 2 39 (I owa  199 2).
93. In  re Doe , 63 8 N .E .2d  181  (Ill . 19 94).
94. Som e wou ld a rgue t h a t , especially if the prospective adoptive parents are
of a differ ent  ra cial or et hn ic backgr oun d th an  th e child, s he has an extra inter est
in  re ma in in g con ne cted with her  birth pa rent s. That n otion is centr al to key
prov is ions of the Indian  Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1901-61 (1994). It is hot ly
debated  in t ha t a nd ot her  conte xts. See generally Sym posiu m, Defining Family:
Ad opti on  La w a nd  Poli cy, 2 DUKE  J . GENDER L. & P OL’Y 99-1 87 (1 995 ).
95. When  th e focus is on t he child ’s int eres t, pu blic sym pat hy is often  tilte d in
favor  of the pr ospective a doptive pa ren ts. Th e child u sua lly ha s  n o bond  a t  a ll  wi th
the birth parent s who, because of their circumstances or poor choices in life, ma y be
unappea l ing a s  pa ren t s . Indeed , t hey may  never  have had the child in  the i r  ca re  a t
all.  The adopt ive par ent s, who u sua lly have  ha d phys ical care  of the child s ince birt h ,
a re often a ttr active candidates for paren thood. They have invested t ime,  money,  and
hopes in pr epar at ion for th e child. Th e longer  th e child st ays wit h the a doptive
parents,  the more th e adoptive parents emph asize the severe and long-las t ing ha rm
the child might suffer by being taken from th em.
C.  P rospect iv e Ad opt iv e Paren ts  of V olu n ta ri ly  Placed  In fa n ts
Con test s bet ween  bir th  pa re nt s a nd  pr ospect ive ad optive
pa ren t s can be pa rt icularly wren ching. In ad dition to dispu tes
like  t he n otor iou s “Ba by J es sica”92 and “Baby Richard”93 cases
tha t  ca tch  and  r ide the  wave of media  a t t en t ion ,  simila r  bu t
lesser-known dram as u ndoubt edly are pla yed out all t oo often
in county courthouses across the land.
The specifics vary w idely, bu t a  common  pa tt ern  is t ha t t he
child, bor n  ou t  of wed lock , i s t aken  immedia te ly a ft e r  bi r th  in to
the care of prospective adoptive parents, who sometim e later
commen ce pr oceedings t o ter min at e th e bir th  pa ren t s’ r i gh t s
and  to adop t  the child. These proceedings take t ime , and  be fore
th ey ar e complet ed, one of th e bir th  par ent s ha s a cha nge of
hea r t or (in t he case  of a birt h fa th er) dis covers t he ch ild’s
exi st en ce and  whereabou t s . An  a t tempt  to st op th e ad option
process follows. I t is  often  pu rs ue d wit h fier ce int en sit y.
Consider how the three interests play out in th ese cases.
At  one level the child’s int erest  is clea r  enough . She has  an
interest  in bon din g wi t h  t h e set of parent s most qualified to
n ur tu re and r ea r  her . Th a t  in ter es t  is  diss er ved  if, m onths or
even years  later , a judge decides th at  th ose w h o a ct ua l ly  have
her  in  their  care a re n ot  en t it led  to do s o.94
As th ese ca ses  ar e som et ime s por tr aye d in  th e m edia , th e
child’s int er est  is n ot only comp ellin g,95 but  cat egorica lly
tru mps  an y comp etin g int ere st . Any su ggest ion th at  th e child’s
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96. Fa i lu re to ma int ain  a ny  int er est  in t he  chil d or  to p rov ide  for h er  su ppor t,
a  stor y commonly t old about  un wed fat her s, ma y provide s uch a  basis . The S u p re m e
Cou rt  uphe ld  a  s t a te ’s  r igh t  t o  ter mi na te  an  un wed  fat he r’s r igh ts  in  su ch
c ir cumstances in  Quilloin v.  Wolcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978). Facts such a s these m ay
pu t the case under  the category of cases discussed infra  Par t IV.D.
97. In  re Baby Gir l B., 618 A.2d 1, 8 (Conn. 1992) (alt era tion in  origina l)
(qu oti ng In re Ju venile Appeal, 436 A.2d 290, 294 (Conn. 1980)). The qu o t ed
s t a t emen t  described the prospective adoptive paren ts’ position under st ate law. The
cour t  also rejected their claim th at r efusing to permit t hem t o intervene d e n ie d  t h em
constit ut ionally  prot ected  due  process . See id .
98. Pr ospective  adop t ive pa ren t s,  who had legitim at ely ta ken  a child in to th eir
h om e with a r easonable expectation th at a  perma nen t  child-pa ren t r elat ionsh ip would
resu lt , were  found t o have a n in depen dent , constit u tiona l int er est  en tit led  to s ome
weigh t in t he de cision whet her  to re move the ch ild. S ee Th ele n v . Ca th olic S oc.
Ser vs., 691 F. Su pp. 1179, 1185 (E .D. Wis. 1988) (holding t ha t a lth ough p rospect ive
adopt ive par ent s acqu ire “a limit ed, but  not wh olly insignificant , constit ut ionally
protected liberty interest  in their family unit dur ing the initial six-month per iod that
a  child is pla ced in t heir  home ” prior to complet ing t he a doption u nder  Wisconsin
law, a prerem oval hearing is not constitut ionally required). In S ilf ies v . Web st er,  713
A.2d 639  (Pa . Su per . Ct . 199 8), t he  cour t con clu ded  th at  pr osp ect ive adopt ive  pa ren t s
had sta ndin g to see k cus tody a gain st a  ma ter na l gra ndp ar ent , where t he birth  mother
was un involved in  th e child’s care an d her  righ ts we re be ing t erm ina t e d . W it h  the
interest  shou l d not govern is char acter ized as t rea ting h er a s
“proper ty.”
T h e b ir t h  p aren t s’ in teres t s a re , in  pr inciple ,
st ra ight forwar d. Un til a  legal ba sis  for  t e rmina t ing the ir  r ight s
exists  and  is  acted  upon ,96 th ey can  claim the  t radi t iona l
pr otection  of the law, constitutional or otherwise. But unless
th ey were t he victims of duress  or deceit, at leas t one bir th
paren t  (usually th e moth er) did set t he critical tr ain of events
in  mot ion  by p la cin g t he ch ild  for adopt ion . Such  a  volunta ry
act , even if retr acted before it ripen s int o term inat ion, gives
l eg it imacy  to the  oppos ing int e res t s  it  he lps  crea t e.
Do th e prospective adoptive par en t s  have  an  independen t ,
p a r ent l ike int ere st  in a  rela tion sh ip wit h t he ch ild? The la w is
unclea r . One view, probably th e predomin an t one, is th at  th ey
do not, at  least  un til th e bi r th  p a r ents’ rights are term inated.
Un t il then , t h e ir  cla im  is  ba se d en t ir ely  on t he in ter es t s of t he
child  and mu st sta nd or fall on tha t basis. As one court put  it ,
“[o]nly i f a  ground  for  t e rmina t ion  exi st s  may the  su i tability
and ci r cums tances of adop t ive pa ren t s , i n an  appropr ia t e
pr oceeding,  be consid er ed.”97 Once  the b ir th  pa ren t s ’ r igh t s  a re
t e rmina ted,  however , some  cour t s  a r e more  wi ll ing to r ecognize
the indepen dent  inter est of prospective adoptive par ent s, even
before t he a doption is complet ed.98
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grandmother ’s consent, th e prospective adoptive parents  ha d enjoyed cont inu ing,
overn ight  visitation with th e child for a lengthy per iod of time. The court emph asized
the natu re of the claimants’ position as follows:
[P]rospect ive ad opt ive p ar en ts , un lik e fost er  pa re nt s, h ave  an  exp ect at ion of
perman en t  cust ody which, t hough  it m ay be cont ingen t u pon t he a gency’s
u l t ima te approval, is neverth eless genuin e an d rea sona ble. Becau se of this
exp ect at ion  of perma nency, prospective adoptive paren t s a r e  encouraged  to
form  em otion al b ond s wi th  th e ch ild fr om the first  day of th e pla cemen t . .
. . In  ligh t of t he  exp ect at ion  o f p e r m a n ent  cust ody th at  at ten ds an  adopt ive
pla cemen t , an  ag en cy’s decis ion  to r em ove a  chi ld con st it ut es  a d ir ect  a n d
subs tan t ia l inju ry t o prosp ective a doptive  par ent s. 
Id . at  645 (alte ra tion in  origina l) (quoting I n  R e Mitch , 524 Pa . 621,  623 (Supe r . C t .
198 9)).  
99. Under  Iowa law, for example, subject  t o cer ta in e xcep tion s, “[t]h e a dopt ion
of a minor person shall not be decreed until  that person has l ived wit h t he  ad opt ion
petitioner  for a m inim um  res iden ce per iod of one hu ndr ed eigh ty da ys.” IOWA CO D E
AN N . § 600 .10  (Wes t 1 996 ).
The soci a l in ter es t  in  thes e ca se s i s com plex. At  the ch ild’s
b ir th , society ha s it s  usu al interest in protecting the child’s
re la t ionsh ip with  he r b ir th  pa ren t s . When  bi r th  pa ren t s
re cognize tha t  they cannot  p rov ide for  a  ch ild adequ at ely,
society als o ha s a n in ter est  in en coura ging a nd  facilita tin g
ad option  by qualified adoptive paren t s.  The  ch i ld -paren t
relationships a t  bot h  the be gin n in g a nd t he end of t he
volunta ry adop t ion  p rocess  a re socially valu ed. Th e ha rd  pa rt  is
mov ing from one  to the  othe r .
The greatest  challenge to the forma tion of legal standards  in
th i s set t ing i s t h a t  the personal interests of the child and
pr ospect ive a doptive par ent s can cha nge ra pidly, while the
sta te’s ma chin er y for findin g an d exp re ssin g its  int er est , an d
for  applying the proper standa rd, creeps alon g. When  th e child
en te r s th e ph ysical car e of those w ho would  ad opt, bon din g
often  occurs  a lmos t  ins tan t ly . At  the  same t ime , the  bir th
parent s’ em ot ion a l st ak e in t heir  rela tion sh ip wit h t he ch ild
con t inues to en du re . Meanwh ile, the ad minist ra tive an d
judicia l bur ea ucr acy t ha t t er min at es t he  bir th  pa re nt s’ righ ts
and investigates the adoptive parent s’ fitn ess is , even in
un cont ested  cases, often deliberat ely slow.99 When d isput es
ar ise, the p roces s of r es olving t hem , wi th  it s r equ ir em en ts of
n ot ice, pr ep ara t ion  for a rgu men t , a nd p rodu ct ion  of car efu l
judicia l opin ion s i s,  in  rela t ion  to a  you ng child’s sens e of time,
posit ively glacial.
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100. S ee, e.g., IOWA CO D E  AN N . § 600A. 9(2) (Wes t 1 996) (a ppe al or  mot ion t o
vaca te t e rmina t ion  o f b ir th  pa ren t ’s  r igh t s m u st be made within t hirty-day period,
wh ich  cann ot be wa ived or e xten ded). 
101. The applicable statut e gave the DeBoers, the pr ospective adoptive paren t s,
s t and ing to pr ove aba ndon men t by Da n Sch midt , th e birt h  fa t h e r . S ee IOWA CODE
AN N . § 600A.8 (3) (Wes t 1 996).  In  th is Ar ticl e, I  tr ea t a ba nd onm en t a s a  form  of
unfitness. Under t he facts of the case, the court appa re nt ly cons ide red  th is  t he
exclusive  basis on which the DeBoers might h ave prevailed.
102. The cla im  of Cara  Clausen  Schm idt, t he bir th  moth er, wa s consider ed in a
sepa ra t e proceeding. After voluntar ily consenting t o the ter min a t ion  of her  paren ta l
rights, she sought to retract that  consent on a variety of sta t u tory and  common law
grounds.
Even  the sh ort  per iod of tim e some tim es given  birt h  pa ren t s
to con te st  a  t e rmina t ion  of t he ir  r ight s100 can r esult  in su fficient
bondin g with  adopt ive  pa ren t s tha t  b reak ing  the re la t ionsh ip
seems  ha rsh . The alt ern at ive of man dat ory foster  care u n t il
disput es a re r esolved is  un ap pea ling if, a s m an y believe, t he
child needs to bond with p ar ent  figur es dur ing th at  time.
Pr ospect ive adop t ive  pa ren t s a re n ot  obliviou s t o the effect s
of delay on  th e child’s in ter est . By dr awin g out t he p roceedin g
th ey weight  th e sca les in  favor of th eir  kee pin g th e child . T h is
techn ique ma y be effective, at  leas t in  th e court  of public
opinion, notwithst anding its obviousness as a “bootstrap.”
Discoverin g wha t st an da rd  best  re pr esen ts  th is compl ex an d
sh ift ing pat ter n of interes ts r equires  aimin g at a  moving tar get.
Not  su rp ris ingly, t he  st an da rd s a ctu ally a pplie d by the s ta tes
vary substan tially between jurisdict ions. Cour ts  dea ling wit h
th i s issu e will som etimes  select one of th e sta nda rds  at  either
end of th e sp ect rum—unfit nes s or  best  in ter es t s.  Th ey focu s on
the specifics of th e case  before t hem  an d a re u nd ers ta nd ably
r e luctan t  to devise complex schemes dealing with all possible
cases.
In  th e notorious Baby Jes sica case, for example, the Iowa
Supreme Cour t  found  tha t  Iowa’s  s t a tu tes  requ ired a  showing
of un fi tness  (abandonmen t ) t o de fea t  t he fa the r ’s  cl a im to
custody.101 Dan  Schmidt ,  the birth  fath er, sa id he h ad believed
the b ir th  mothe r ’s  st a t emen t t ha t a noth er m an  was t he fat her
of the ch ild . Upon  bein g t old  the t ru th  sh or tly aft er  th e ba by’s
birt h , he pr omptly sought  custody of his da ught er. 102 On  one
side of th e s ca le w er e t he bi r th  fa ther’s pa ren ta l in teres t  and
the social inter est in t he child-birt h pa rent  relat ionship. On th e
other was  th e child’s in ter est  in m ai n t a inin g her  rela tion sh ip
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103. A starkly contra sting case is In r e C.C.R.S ., 892 P.2d 2 46 (Colo. 1995), in
wh ich  the  Co lo rado  Supreme Cour t  a pp li ed  the  bes t -in t ere s t s s t anda rd when  a b ir th
mother  changed  he r  mind  abou t pr oceed ing  wit h a n a dopt ion b efor e t er mi na tion
occurred. With  l it t l e exp lana t ion it dismissed the line of constitu tional cases
es t abl ish ing a paren tal right as r elevant only to the termina tion of par e n t a l rights,
no t loss  of cus tod y (he re  th e cou rt  gr an te d on ly cu st ody t o the prospe ctive ad optive
parents), an d as d ealin g, in an y event , only with  procedu ra l p r ot e ct ions ra ther  than
subs ta nt ive paren tal right s. The court appa rent ly concluded tha t th ere is  no
su b s t ant ive weight  to be given  even t o the  child-birt h pa ren t r elat ionsh ip, leavin g th e
child’s int ere st a lone a s th e bas is of the  govern ing st an dar d. In  my view , C.C.R .S . is
an  outlier unlikely to be followed elsewhere.
104. The st at ut ory  sch em e de scr ibed  he re  re flect s m odifica tion s in  r e sponse  to the
Baby J ess ica ca se.  Th e Iow a cou rt s h ave  not  yet  ha d occa sion  to cons ide r  t he  many
quest ions it  raises.
with  the  pe rsons ra i sing her . Un der  th e st an da rd  ap plied  by th e
cour t , t he  de  facto fam ily rela t ion sh ip  bet ween  the DeBoer s (t he
ad optive  family) and J es sica , wh ich  by  t h e t im e t he cou r t
decided the case had  lasted virt ua lly all of th e child’s two years
of life, count ed for n oth ing. 103
In  re spon se t o such  case s, w h et her ar ising in their  own
ju r isdict ion s or elsewher e, sta te legislatu res  som et im es  de velop
ela bor a te an d fine -tu ne d a dopt ion r egim es. T h e legal standa rd
govern ing cont ests  between bir th  pa ren t  and  adopt ive pa ren t
changes as t he p rocess m oves  forw ard.  At t he be gin n in g of the
process, t he  bi r th  pa ren t s ’ i nt e res t s ar e often e mp ha sized, wit h
the ba la nce s h ift in g t owa rd t he a dop t ive  pa ren t s la ter  on .
In  Iowa , for  example, the legislat ur e rea cted to th e Baby
J es sica  case  by re visin g an  a lr eady  complex s t a tu tory
scheme. 104 A b ir th  pa ren t  may  not  give con se n t  to the
t e rmina t ion  of her  r i gh t s ear lier th an  sevent y-two hours a fter
t he baby’s birt h. Sh e is ent itled to ret ra ct th at  consen t du r i ng
the first n inety -six hours  after  signing it. This r ule gives
ca tegor ica l pr eferen ce to th e bir th  p a r en t ’s  in te res t s  in  a  way
ana logou s to de cis ion s b ase d on  st an din g. Ther eaft er, a nd  un til
the pet ition t o ter min at e is gr an ted , revocat ion is poss ible for
“good cause, ” mov ing the  st anda rd in the  di r ect ion  of t he best-
interests  t e st .  Tha t  an  in t e rmed ia t e s t and ar d is in ten ded is
made  clear from an  explicit bala ncing of inter ests  in  the
sta tu te:
I n  de te rm in in g w h et h er  good  cau se , oth er  th an  fra u d, coe rcion
or  mis rep r esen ta t ion ,  exi s t s  for  r evoca t ion , t he  j u ven ile cou rt
s h a ll give  pa ra m ou n t con s i d e r a t i on  t o  t h e  be s t  in t e r e s t s o f t h e
child  a n d  d u e  c on s i d er a t i on  t o t h e in te re st s of t h e p ar en ts  of
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105. S ee IOWA CO D E  AN N . § 600 A.4(4 ) (Wes t 1 996 ).
106. An  a ppeal of, or a reques t to vacate, an  order ter minat ing a birth  paren t ’s
r igh t s must  be made with in 30 days, which perio d “s h all not  be wa ived or e xten ded.”
S ee IOWA CO D E  AN N . § 600A.9(2) (Wes t 1 996 ). Th e ou tcom e of t he  Ba by J es sica  cas e
proba bly would n ot be different  unde r th e sta tut ory scheme n ow in place in Iowa,
including th e pr ovisi ons  en act ed foll owin g (an d a ppa re nt ly in  re spon se t o) that  case .
The birth fath er’s rights wer e never ter minat ed, by consent or other wise, so th e tim e
l imi t s for contest ing t erm ina tion wou ld not a pply to h im.
107. In  Iowa , lega l ri gh ts  to p rov ide  car e for  th e ch ild follow ing  te rm ina tion  of
the birt h pa ren ts’ right s ar e held  by a cour t-app ointed  gua rd i a n. S ee IOWA CO D E  AN N .
§ 600A.9(1)(b) (West 1996). In p ra ctice, th e gua rdia n is  u s u ally a n a dop ti on a gen cy
or  som eon e se lect ed b y th e pe rs on w ho h elp ed a rr an ge t he  ad opt ion.
108. Loss of cus tody in these cases may be voluntary at  the outset,  as the
pa ren t s agr ee t o tr an sfer  car e of t he ir  chil d t o a fos te r fa mi ly a nd  to a ccept
reh abilita tive  ser vices. Such  volunt ar y ar ra ngem ent s eas ily m ay become involu nt ar y,
however , if the paren ts decline to participate furt her a nd th e stat e co m m e n ce s  a  child
prot ective  proceedin g.
t h e ch ild  a n d  of a n y  pe r son  s t a n din g  in  t h e  pla ce  of t h e
pa ren t s .105
Once the petition is granted, an d even before t he a dopt ion is
fina l, the adoptive parent s’ interests, and th e social in ter est  in
th eir  r e la t ionsh ip  wi th the  ch i ld , move the sta ndar d, as a
pract i ca l mat te r , fa r t her  in t he d irect ion of the n ewly formin g
fam ily. Afte r  a  th ir t y-day per iod, contest s by th e birth  par ent s
a re no lon ger possible.106 Any cha llenge is  left t o th e un likely
init iat ive of the sta te or other inter media ry  tha t  ar ranged  the
adopt ion .107
In  volunt a ry adopt ion case s, a  sh rin kin g social int ere st  in
the child-birt h p ar ent  rela tion sh ip compet es wit h a  growin g
socia l interest in the bond between child and adopt ive parent s.
The int erp lay of th e int ere st s in  th e t wo fa m ilies h elps e xpla in
why th e legal sta nda rd it self  is  un s table th roughout  the
process. A ca re fu l  s t a tu tory s ch e m e wil l t ake  accoun t  of th e
changing in teres t s and  requ ire  the s t anda rd  to sh ift  th roughout
the adoption process. The social interest is  s t rong  a t  both  the
begin n ing and t he end of t he s tory be cause  ea ch  focuse s on  a
tra ditional child-parent relationship.
D.  F ost er a nd  Prosp ecti ve A dopt iv e Paren ts  of A bu sed  an d
N eglect ed  Ch ildren
Parent s may los e cust ody not on ly th rou gh volun ta ry
p lacement  for adopt ion, but  involun ta rily beca us e th ey fail t o
ca re for  t he ir  ch i ld ren  p roper ly.108 They  then  may come  in to
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109. S ta t e l aw in  th is  a r ea  has  been  d r iv en  b y t he Adoption Assis ta nce an d Child
Welfare Act of 19 80, w hich  re qu ir es t he  st at es t o us e r eason able effort s to a chieve
these  goals as  a condit ion of receiving feder al f un d s. 42 U.S.C. §§ 671(a)(15), 672(a)(1)
(199 4).
110.
Orpha nages  lar gely disappear ed long a go in th e Un ited S ta tes, a nd t her e is
n o sign ifican t in st itu tion  tod ay for  chil dr en  wit hou t s ur vivin g pa re nt s or
children who ha ve been  rem oved from their homes because of neglect,  abuse
or  dependency, or volunt arily relinquished t emporar ily by thei r par en ts.
Ins tead ther e is a great  reliance on foster p a r ents wh o care for such children
with  st at e a ppr oval  an d com pen sa tion .
SA M U E L M. DAVIS E T AL ., CH I L DR E N  I N  TH E  LEGAL SY ST E M 640  (2d e d. 1 997 ).
conflict with  foster  or  adop t ive pa ren t s  who seek  to main ta in  or
crea t e a  legal r elat ionsh ip with  a  ch i ld . Termina t ion  of pa ren ta l
r igh t s and  a  subsequen t  adop t ion  (as op pos ed  to mer e los s of
custody) may  be  in  the cards. But  th e issu es r ais ed a re q uit e
differen t  from those  in volved in  t he volu n ta ry pl acem en t  of an
in fan t , not  l ea s t  because  the s t a te is  a  major  player  from the
begin nin g.
The st ory be gin s w it h  a  cont e st  b et ween  the  st a te  and the
birt h  par ent s un der  the un fitness  st an da rd . The s ta te’s policy is
to use “reasona ble efforts” to avoid th e need  t o rem ove childre n
from the ir  hom es a t a ll, an d t o ret ur n t hem  th ere  quickly if
re mova l occurs. 109 Most children removed from their homes are
placed in foster car e.110
Ide ally,  the fos ter  pa ren t s p rovid e a  necess a ry r es pi t e of
comfor t  an d st ability, prepa ring t he child to ret ur n h ome.
Mean while, the  pa ren ts , with s ervices offered by the s ta te a nd
un der  the  th rea t  of los ing  thei r  ch i ld ren  permanent ly , pu t  thei r
lives in order . All too often, of cour se, th e rea l diverges
dramat ica l ly from the id ea l. Many t h in gs  go wrong. Of interest
her e a r e th e implications of a cont est bet ween t he foster
pa ren t s and birt h p ar ent s over t heir  rela tion sh ips wit h t he
child.
The fos t er  pa ren t s’ rela tion sh ip wit h t he ch ild origin at es in
a  con t ract .  They agree wit h t he st at e, in ret ur n for a fee, t o ca re
for  a  ch i ld  whom the s t a te ha s rem oved from h er pa ren ts. Th e
basis for the ir  cus tody,  and the ter ms on  wh ich  they e xer cise or
lose it, is th eir agr eemen t  wit h t he  st at e. Th e ver y na tu re  of th e
foster  car e ar ra ngem ent , however —a delibe ra te r eplicat ion  of
the child-paren t r elat ion sh ip—in evi tably  lea ds  to close
em ot ion a l bonds between child and fos t er  pa ren t  in  man y cases.
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111. Whether  t o  te rmina te  the b ir th  pa ren t s ’ r ig h t s o r  t o a l lo w t h e m  a
con t inu ing , noncustodial relationsh ip is another  question, of course.
112. A case illustrat ive of the i ssues raised here is Sallie T.  v.  Milwaukee County
Departmen t of H ealt h &  Hu m an  S erv ices , 570 N.W.2d 46 (Wis. Ct. App. 1 997). A
foster  mother r esisted relinquishing the custody of a child wh o h ad  been  in  he r  ca re
for  several years after it was deter mined tha t the birt h mother  had q ualified to ha ve
the chil d r et ur ne d t o he r. T he  fost er  mot he r p ointed to  language  in  the  gove rn ing
s t a tu t e appa ren tly  r equ ir ing the  use o f t he  bes t -in t ere s t s st an da rd . Alth ough  th e cou rt
was not clear about the precise standa rd used, it emph a s iz ed  t ha t  t he  r eference  to
the child’s best int eres ts “mu st be  ha rm onized wit h t he Ch ildren ’s  Code’s  pu rpose  to
pres erve  ‘the  un it y of t he family .’” Id . at 51. It th erefore rejected the foster moth er’s
claim  th at , by demon str at ing “tha t t he foste r pa ren ts we re be tt er pa ren ts,” she s hould
preva il. Id . at 53.
That bon d b ecom es  an  im por tan t  ele men t  in  de cis ion s abou t  the
child’s futu re.
Take a s imp le case fir st . Supp ose  tha t  an  abu se d or
neglected child is  pr oper ly r e m oved  from her  pa ren t s and
placed in a  fos t er  home . Assume th at  th e foster  pa re nt s, t hou gh
becoming  emot iona l ly  a t t ached to the child, r ema in lega lly
pas sive. Th ey a re p rep ared  to ret u rn  her  to h e r  par ent s when
required, or  t o ca re  for  he r  as  long a s  t he s t a t e a sks them to.
They ar e willing and a ble to adopt. If the bir th  par ent s seek t he
re tu rn of t he ir  ch i ld , any con te st  i s between  them and  the s t a t e.
If the birth par ents never qualify to have the child retur ned,
th ey ha ve no va lid claim  to cus tody.
Bu t  s u ppos e t he b ir th  pa ren t s m ake h ones t  effor t s t o follow
the “perm an ency plan” appr oved by th e juvenile cour t. They
imp rove in significant ways. Afte r t he child ha s been in foster
ca re for, sa y, a year , the st at e decide s t ha t t he  pa re nt s h ave
progressed  to th e point  th at  th e child could be  ret ur ned  with
reason a b le safety from the abuse or neglect th at r equired the
rem oval. Notwiths tand ing  the birth parent s’ progress, however,
it  may we ll be clea r  tha t  the ch ild  wou ld  be m uch bet t er  off
remain in g with  the foster par ents, that  the child desires to do
so, an d t ha t t he fost er p ar ent s would  be willing  to see  tha t
happen .
Should th e child  be r et ur ne d? At t his  point , the  lega l
s t anda rd becomes crucia l.  Under  the  best -in te res t  s tanda rd the
child would rem ain wit h t he foster  parent s.111 Under  the
unfitness stan da rd the child returns to the birth pa rents.
Under  an  inter media te st an dar d, th e decision m ight go eit h er
wa y.112
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113. The applicable law is the stat ute defining th e su b s t an t ive unfitness grounds
under  wh ich t he  st at e ca n p lace  a ch ild ou t of h er  hom e , t o ge t h er  w ith  the
fr a m e work of procedural requ irement s governing the r emoval and foster placement
process. For  an  example  of  the unf itness  standard,  developed to deal with numerous,
specific kinds of abuse, neglect, or abandonm ent, see I OWA CO D E  AN N . § 232.2(6)
(West  1994) (defining “child  in  need of assistance”). The procedural requ irement s
su r round ing th e rem oval of a child from h er pa ren ts a re illu str at ed by I OWA CODE
AN N . §§ 23 2.9 5-10 4 (We st  199 6).
114. Doing so ca us es  it s ow n k in d of h a r m ,  h owever . I f t he  pa ren t  is  mak ing
progress, th e st at e is  un lik ely t o mov e a ffirm at ively  tow ar d t er mi na tion  of t he  bi r th
parents’ ri gh ts  or  a p er ma ne nt  de pr iva ti on  of cu s tody.  The  s t a t e t he re fo re r ema ins
legally  committed to work for reun ification of paren t an d child , but  un ent hu siast ic
abou t  doin g so. “F ost er  car e dr ift” m ay r esu lt.  Th e m ore  comm on ca u se  of fost er  car e
dr ift  is u nd ou bt ed ly t he  fa i lu r e of the par ent to qualify for the child’s retur n, perhaps
due in par t to ina dequat e assist ance from th e sta te. But  t h e  s t a t e  a lso may  fa i l t o
t e rmina te pr im ar ily b eca us e s ta te  ag en cies  or j ud ges  ar e r elu cta nt  t o t ake  tha t  fina l
step. Meanwhile, the child languishes.
115. S ee 3 LEG AL RI G H TS  O F  CH I L DR E N  §  29 .06 , a t  67  (Donald  T.  Kramer ed., 2d
ed. 1994).  Som et im es fos te r p ar en ts  ar e pe rm itt ed t o int er ven e in  dep en den cy or
The prevailing norm, a t least  at  th e law’s  “b la ck  letter ”
level, is to apply the unfitness sta ndar d.1 1 3  The  use  of tha t
s t anda rd makes s e n se when  viewed in ter ms of the t hr ee
interests  involved. The child’s at ta chmen t t o the foster pa ren ts
is a key elemen t of the child’s in t ere st , but  th at  int ere st  is
coun te red by the bir th  par ent s’ inter est a nd t he social inter est ,
he re expressly em bodied in the governin g sta te a nd federa l
s t a t u t es, in r epa irin g an d m ain ta inin g th e child’s t ie wit h t he
birt h  pa ren t s . The fost er  pa ren t s a re s im ply a gen t s of th e sta te,
and un der  th e hyp oth etica l fa ct s discussed h ere, do not as sert
an independent interest .
One must  wonder, however, wh eth er  the s t a te’s ke y decis ion
ma ker s—child protective workers and judges—do not
somet im es cover t ly  move some  di st ance  toward the  best -
interests  end of the scale.114 If they do, they m ay indu lge an
imp licit a ss u m p tion that a  social interest in t he child’s
re la t ionsh ip with  the foster  pa re nt  exist s, a nd  possib ly th at  th e
foster  par ent s th emselves en joy an in depend ent  i nt ere st  i n
th eir  relat ionship with  th e child . Are these interests a
legitimate part  of the mix that  produces legal standar ds?
Those ques t ions ar e more likely to be brought  into th e open
when  th e foster  pa ren ts  affirm at ively seek  to m ain ta in a
re lat ionsh ip wit h t he  child. I n r ecent  year s, foste r p ar en ts  ha ve
gained  some procedura l rights in th at r espect by stat ut e or
ad min ist ra tive  regu la t ion .115 Such  r igh t s , of course,  can  be ad
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ne glect  proceed ings. S ee id. 
116. 431 U. S. 8 16 (1 977 ).
117.
The foster p ar ent -foster  child re lat ionsh ip involved in  th is litiga t ion is, o f
course, wh olly a  cre at ion of  t h e  S t at e.  New York l aw de fines  the
c ir cumstances un der w hich a  child ma y be pla ced in foster care, prescribes the
obliga tion s of the foster par ents, an d provides for th e re mov al of  th e child
from  th e fost er  hom e “in  [th e] di scr et ion ” of th e a gen cy wit h cu st ody of t he
child. The agency compensates t he foster paren ts, and r eserves in  i t s con t r act s
the aut hority t o decide as it sees fit whet her a nd whe n a child sh all be
retu rned  to his nat ura l family or placed elsewhere.
 . . . .
. . . [U]nder Ne w Yor k’s foster-care laws, an y case where th e foster
pa ren t s had  a s sumed  the emot iona l role of the ch ild’s na tu ra l par ent s would
r e p r esen t not a  tr ium ph of th e syst em, t o be constit ut ionally sa feguar ded
from  s ta te  in t rusion, but a  failure. The goal of foster car e, at least in  New
York , is n ot t o pr ovide  a p er ma ne nt  su bst itu te  for t he  na tu ra l or a dop tive
home, bu t t o pr epa re  th e ch ild for  his  re tu rn  to h is r ea l pa re nt s or
ju s t ed or eli m in a t ed by the legislat ur e or agency tha t crea ted
them, unless they a lso res t  on  a  const it u t ion a l fou nda t ion .
There is no clearly established basi s for  su ch  const it u t ion a l
p rotect ion , a lthough  one  impor t an t  S u pr eme C our t d ecision
refused to close the door completely on such claims.
In  S m it h  v.  Organiz at ion  of Foster Families for Equality
and Reform, 116 fos te r  pa ren t s  in  New York  cla imed  a  den ia l of
due pr ocess in  th e m an ne r in  wh ich t he  st at e decide d t o rem ove
foster  child ren  from thei r  ca r e. The Un ited St at es Sup rem e
Cou r t  r e ject ed the ir  cla im.  Jus t ice  Brennan’s  op in ion  for  the
Cou r t  decided tha t  any  cons t itu t iona l ly  protected  in teres t  the
foster  pa re nt s m ight  ha ve wa s a dequ at ely r esp ected  by th e
procedures  used. Th e opinion, however, carefu lly  refr a in ed  from
deciding whether such an  interest exists.
The concur rin g opinion s, es pecia lly th at  of Jus t i ce  Stewar t ,
app roached  the ma tter di fferen t ly . He  saw the fos t er  pa ren t ’s
role exclusive ly  as a  mat te r  of con t ract .  Fos te r  pa ren t s  cou ld
h a v e only those right s th e sta te h ad a greed t o give them . They
had un dert ak en t heir r ole as foster  par ent s on th at  bas is  and
could not claim any greater rights in the na me of due process.
S m ith  ra ises some bas ic quest ions about t he child-foster
paren t  relationship. Just ice St ewar t ’s a na lys is  is  by fa r  the
most analytically simple. Foster care is a  cr ea tu re of con t ract
and govern ed by cont ra ct alone. It is int ended  to be shor t -t e rm.
A bonding of child to foster pa ren t r epres ent s a failur e to be
avoided  r ath er tha n a success to be protected.117 Fr om th is per
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pla cemen t in a perman ent adoptive home by giving him temporary shel t er
in  a fam ily sett ing.
Id . at  856,  861-6 2 (St ewa rt , J ., con cur ri ng ) (alt er at ion  i n  or igin al ) (cit at ion s om it te d).
118. The opinion states:
[T]h e importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals involved and
to th e socie ty,  st em s fr om t he  e m otion al a tt ach me nt s t ha t d er ive fr om t he
in ti ma cy of daily associat ion, an d from t he r ole it  pla ys i n “p ro mo t[i ng ] a
w a y of life ” th rou gh  th e in st ru cti on of ch ildr en , a s we ll a s fr om t he  fact  of
blood  rela tions hip. N o one would se rious ly dispu te t ha t a  deeply lovin g and
in te r dependen t re la ti ons hi p be tw een  an  ad ul t a nd  a ch ild i n h is or  he r ca re
may exist e ven in  th e abs ence of blood relat ionsh ip. At leas t wh ere a  child
has been placed in foster ca r e as  an  in fan t ,  has  never  known h is na tura l
parents,  and  has  r ema ined  con tin uo us ly for s eve ra l ye ar s in  th e ca re  of th e
s a m e foster pa rent s, it is natu ral th at t he fo st e r  fami ly  shou ld  hold the
s a m e place in  th e emot ional life of the fost er ch ild, a n d  fu l fi ll  t h e s a m e
socializing funct ions ,  as a  na tura l  fami ly . For  th is  reason , we cannot dismiss
the foster fa mily a s a m ere collection of un rela ted in dividua ls.
Id . at  844 (alt era tion  in or igina l) (citation s an d footnot es om itt ed). Some scholar ly
commenta ry on S m it h ha s de velop ed t his  th em e, s ug ges tin g th at  a clos e, em otion al
rela tions hip  with  a child may, by its elf, be adequ at e to crea te a  prot ected in ter est in
a  non par ent . S ee Devel opm ent s in  th e Law: The Constitu tion and  the Fam ily, 93
H ARV. L. RE V. 115 6, 1 280 , 12 83 (1 980 ) (identify ing  “psych ologica l su ppor t a nd
invo lvemen t” as  an  at tr ibu te  th at , “alon e or  in com bin at ion” wit h  o ther  factors “may
cons t it u t e th e e ss en ce of a  con st it ut ion al ly p ro te cte d r ela ti on sh ip”).
119. Ju stice  Bren na n’s opinion took pa ins t o mak e clea r  th at  th e rela tions hip
between  child and foster pa rent  should not  be equat e d  wi t h  tha t  between  ch ild and
pa ren t . S ee 431 U.S. at 845-47.
120. Such  a h olding would, in  a sen se, re pres ent  th e inver se of the  Court ’s ru ling
in  Leh r v.  Rob erts on , 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (holdin g th at  a bir th  fa t h e r  n ot  mar r i ed  to
child’s m other is not constitu tionally entitled to notice of proceeding to termina te h is
paren ta l ri gh ts  in  ab se nce  of an  em oti on al  re la ti on sh ip w it h ch ild ).
spective, th e only int ere st s in  pla y a re  those  tha t  p roduce  the
un fitness s t a ndard: the child’s interest pitted against th e
pa ren t ’s i nt e rest  a n d th e social in te re st  in m ain ta inin g th e
child-parent relationship.
Jus t i ce Br en nan’s op in ion  for  the Cour t  h ints  at , but does
not  develop, a  differen t view: fost er  pa ren t s,  by vi r tue of t he
em ot ion a l bonds  th ey form wit h t he children  in th eir care,
acqu ir e an  indepen den t in te re st  in m ain ta inin g th at
relationship.118
A hold in g t o tha t  effect , wh ich  S m ith  i s not ,119 would be
rem ar ka ble. Con side r  the im pl ica t ion s if an  ad ult  who form ally
disavows a p ar ent like in ter est  beyond t he lim its  agr eed wit h
the stat e, nevertheless acquires such an interest a s a
conse qu en ce of forming an  emot iona l  bond  wi th  the ch i ld.120
Such  bonds ar e for med  between  child ren  and n onpa ren t s n ot
only in the settings mentioned in this ar t icle, bu t  in  many
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121. S m it h add resses only procedural,  not substantive, rights. But th ese
procedura l r i gh t s  p rot ect  impor t an t  subst an t ive  r ights  of  bi r th  pa ren t s  unde r  a
familia r  line of cases. See cases cited supra  in notes 10-11. One should not be
surpr ised t o find substan tive rights a ccompan ying any constitut ionally-based
procedura l rights of foster parent s.
122. In  a  sense  the st ate i n t ends such bonding to occur, since a close child-parent
rela tions hip  is a t t he  he ar t of t he  tr ad it ion al  fam ily t ha t fos te r ca re seeks  to
replicate.
othe r s. I f tha t  bond  has  independen t  const itut ional significan ce,
the legal s ta nd ar ds gover n ing con tes t s b et ween  thes e p er son s
and p aren t s m igh t  look  ver y d iffer en t  than  they d o.121
Yet  Ju stice Brennan ’s S m ith  opin ion  may supp or t  an
impor t an t , bu t  much more m odest  pr in cipl e: t ha t  there is  an
a ffi rmat ive socia l i nt e res t , i n  t h e Court ’s view, in the child-
foster  pa ren t  r e la t ionsh ip . Such  an interest,  while less power fu l
than  tha t  in t he  child-pa re nt  re lat ionsh ip, wou ld m ove th e lega l
s t anda rd away from unfit nes s in  the d ir ect ion  of th e child’s best
interests.
The ar gumen t is t ha t, by choos ing  fos te r  r a the r  than
ins tit u t iona l care for abused and neglected children, the state
must  know th at  bon ding bet ween  child a nd  foster  pa ren t is
lik ely  to occur .122 We kn ow now, if we didn ’t in  th e ea rly  days of
foster  care, th at  bonding between  child  and  fos te r  pa ren t  can
occur  quickly, especially for younger  children.  We know tha t  the
r e habil it a t ion  of birth  par ent s with  deficiencies serious en ough
to req uir e re mova l of th eir ch ildr en t ak es t ime  under t he best of
c ir c u m s t a n c es .  Giv en  t h e r ock -h a r d a ccr et ion s  of
in tergenera t iona l child abuse a nd n eglect a gainst  which mea ger
socia l resources cont end, r eha bilitat ion may n ever su cceed.
While  those  e ffor t s  gr ind for w a rd, the bond between child and
fos t er  pa ren t  grows.
An affirm at ive social int ere st  in a  contin uin g rela tionsh ip
between  children a nd foste r p ar en ts  would  affect t he  legal
s t anda rd th at  govern s cont ests  between  th em a nd birt h
parent s. No ma tt er w ha t p osition t he s ta te t ook in a n
individual case, the legal st an dar d itself would be moved som e
dis tance from un fitness toward th e best-interest s  end of the
spect rum when  the  ch i ld -fos te r  pa ren t  r ela t ionsh ip  came  in to
bein g. An in ter med ia te s t anda rd of s ome kind migh t  become
the norm . As a pra ctical mat ter , par ent s would find it ha rder  to
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123. S ee Mar sha  Gar rison , Why Terminate Parental Rights, 35 STAN . L. RE V. 423,
474-79 (1983).  Ga rr ison ’s pr oposa l is fa r d iffer en t t ha n a  volu nt ar ily “open  ad opt ion”
in  which, with the a doptive parent s’ consent, the birt h par ent s  m aintain  some degree
of contact with t he child.
124.
Loya lty conflicts , som et im es  flipp in g fr om on e pa re nt  to t he  oth er  an d ba ck
aga in , ar e a com mon  exper ience for ch ildre n of divorce. Ma ny  ch ildren
concept ua lize div or ce a s a  figh t b et we en  tw o te am s, w it h t he  mo re  pow er ful
side winning the  home tu r f,  and will root for different tea ms at  different
times. Even  when ch ildren  are en couraged not to tak e sides, they often feel
tha t  th ey mu st. H owever , wh e n  t hey do take sides to feel more protected,
rega in  cus tody  of the ir  ch i ld ren  than  to re ta in  cus tody in  the
first pla ce.
An in termedia te  st andard  should be employed  wit h  cau t ion
for  at  least  two rea sons. Firs t, child protective worker s  en joy
br oad discr etion  un der  th e inevit ably va gue s ta nd ar ds d efinin g
abuse an d neglect. In some pla ces and a t some t imes, children
may be rem oved too quickly. Second, an in ter m ed ia t e  st anda rd
migh t  i nduce  some  fos t er  pa ren t s  t o ent er in to t heir  ser vice
with  th e int en t of ad optin g or  w in n ing perma nent  custody. If
the tr ut h be  told, h owever , a n  in te rmedia te  st andard  may
represen t  the current st a t e of the law as practiced,
notwithstan ding the law on the books. Once a child begins to
bon d an d th rive wit h  foster  par ent s, ret ur ning h er t o her
pa ren t s is h ar d t o do. The a ct of rem oval, often  und ert ak en in
hast e, may have momentous consequences.
One pr opos a l for  de a lin g wi th  th is  pr oble m is  to aba ndon
our  assumpt ion  tha t  a  ch i ld  has only one set of parent s. Marsha
Garrison su ggest s p er manen t ly d ep r iving t he b ir th  pa ren t s of
custody wh en  re qu ire d, bu t  a llowing t hem  to r eta in visit ing
rights. The r e su l ting set of relationships would be analogous to
tha t  experienced by children whose par en t s  d ivorce  and
remar ry.123
Curren t  social policy does not  conside r  mult ip le s et s of
pa ren t s for  a  ch i ld  a s a  p refe r r ed  s t at e  of affairs , nor  shou ld i t .
We tolera te , a s  an u navoida ble cost of our  divorce p olicy,
multiple moth er- or fath er-figur es in different  fam ilies when
divorcing  or  s epa ra t ing pa ren t s  do noth ing to ju s t ify  a
t e rmina t ion  of the ir r ight s. A sim ilar  ap pr oach m ay m ak e sense
in  some  fos t er  ca re situations, par ticular ly those involving older
children.  Bu t  the loya lt y con flict s a nd a n xieties creat ed by
compet ing set s  of pa re n t s a r e  we ll  kn ow n .1 2 4  S u ch
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they  also feel desp air  becau se th ey ar e betr ayin g one pa ren t over  t h e  ot h er .
If t h e y d o n ot take sides, they feel isolated and disloyal to both parents.
The re i s  no solu t ion  to the i r  di lemma.
WALLERSTEIN  & BL AK E S L E E, supra  note 33,  at  13. The  sugges t ion  to permit  more than
one  lega l m oth er  wa s m ad e, a nd  re ject ed,  in t he  ges ta tion al s ur rog acy ca se of
John son v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 781 n.8 (Cal.  1993). Such a solution would do
no th ing to ease the pressure on the child torn between competing parent figures.
125. I do not mean  to suggest th at foster par ents  should no t  pl ay an  impor t an t
role  in assisting t he sta te in deter mining wha t th e child’s interes ts ar e. Although t hey
often  feel excluded from th e process, foster par ents  can be  an  inva luab le s our ce of
infor ma tion  on tha t subject. Given the import ance of foster c a r e, a r egime of bas ic
procedura l prot ections, cr eat ed by st at ut e or ad min istr at ive regu lat ions, against
a rb it r a ry disrupt ions of foster fam ilies is also appropriat e.
arr angements,  t hough somet imes n ecessar y, should not be t he
goal for children pla ced in foster  care.
The social int erest  in family form  favors perm an ency for  a
child. By definit ion, foster  car e is intended to be t empora ry.
Ra ther  than  flir t  wit h  the n ot ion  of t r ea t in g t he fos ter  family  on
a  p a r  wi t h birth or adoptive families,125 the  law should  take
s er iously its  st at ed objective of eith er r etu rn ing foste r ch ild r en
to their parent s or finding adopt ive  placements  with  no
u n necessary dela y. A str ong, poten tia l social int ere st  exist s  in
both  permanent  solu t ions .
If th e sta te decides th at  th e child can not be r etu rn ed to her
birt h  parent s, and t ha t t he birt h pa ren ts’ right s mu st be
t er m inat ed, th e fra mew ork ch an ges. To rea ch t ha t p oint
pr oper ly, the or igina l r em ova l on  gr ounds  of unfitness will h ave
been  jud icially vin dicat ed a nd  re ha bilit at ion pr oven
unsuccessfu l. The social int ere st  in a  child’s r elat ionsh ip wit h
her  birth parent s under t hose circumstances is essent ia lly
nu llified, and  the b ir th  pa ren t s ’ persona l  in teres t s found
unwor thy of fur ther  lega l protect ion . The ch i ld ’s  and  the sta te’s
interests  coincide in  findin g a  new perm an ent  home.
Pr ospect ive ad optive p ar ent s (who m ay we ll be th ose pr eviously
se rving as  fos te r  pa ren t s ) a re  chos e n on  the basis of the child’s
best interests a lon e. As discussed in Part  IV.C., as the child is
placed and th e adoption process proceeds, a social in ter est  in
the new family grows.
E.  Parents’ Nonm arital Partn ers
With  th e increas ing frequency  of nonmar i t a l cohab ita t ion ,
many child r en  i n evitably will live with one parent and a
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126. This  case is obviously distin ct from on e of nonm ar ita l cohabit at ion by th e
child’s pa ren t s.  In  tha t  s et t i ng each  adu lt  has  an  independen t  pa ren t a l  in t e r es t . The
s t a t e has a social interest in preserving both child-parent r elationships, e ve n  t h ough
it  prefers a marital bond between the adult partn ers.
127. 507 N. W.2 d 4 00 (I owa  199 3).
128. S ee id . at 401-02.
129. Id . at 402.
nonparen t  adult—the parent ’s nonmarita l partner. What is th e
lega l significan ce of emotional bonds th at  might  be form ed
between  the  ch i ld  and the  nonpa ren t?126 Consider  f irst  the
common sett ing in which t he pa ren t and p ar tne r  a re of the
opposit e sex.
1. Opposite-sex partners
 Some court s ca t e gor i ca lly r efu se  to recogn ize  the cla im  of a
pare n t ’s un ma rr ied coha bita nt , even w her e a close bond  with
the child has bee n  est ab lish ed. Ash  v.  Koteck i127 i s an
illus tr at ive case.  J ames , an  unmar r ied,  twen ty-five-year -old
man , agreed t o allow Andr ea , a  se ven teen-yea r -old  you ng
woman ha ving t rou ble wit h h er  fam ily, t o live with him. She
became p regnan t , and  a lthough  she and  James  had begun  a
sexua l relationsh ip some t ime after  her  ar rival, he su rm ised
correctly tha t he was not the father of her child.
Nevertheless, J am es wa s fully s up port ive of And re a. H e
took her  to the  hosp ita l  and was  p resent  a t  th e bi r th . He
welcomed  the baby into his home. He acted as a  fa t h e r  to the
litt le girl, ba th ing a nd  feeding h er, ch an ging h er d iap er s,
buying her  toys a nd  clothin g, an d pa ying for h er d an ce lessons
and preschool tuition. This emotional and fi n a ncia l supp or t
con t inued for s eve ra l years,  in clu ding a  pe r iod of t ime a fter
Andrea  moved  out  of his h ouse . Ja mes volunt ar ily paid  child
suppor t  aft er  Andr ea  left. H e a lso su ppor te d And re a d ire ctly,
helping h er bu y groceries a nd pa y rent .128
Andrea  event ua lly ma rr ied someone else an d refused  to give
James fur t h e r  a ccess to the child, who was then  five years old.
“[G]et on wit h you r life,” she  ur ged h im, a nd  “ha ve a fa mily a nd
childr en  of your  own.”129
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130. He also sought a declara tion of paternity. That  possibi li ty apparen t ly was
foreclosed when  Andrea  es t ab li shed  the pat ern ity of the  child’s birth fa th er in  a
sepa ra t e proceed ing in  an oth er s ta te. See id .
131. S ee id . at 402-05.
132. Id . at 404.
133. Under  the court’s analysis, Jam es’s lack of a legally cognizable rela t ionsh ip
was a sufficient ground for the decision. Perhaps t he court was influenced b y t h e fact
tha t  th e child n ow did ha ve a form al st epfat her  in a ddition  to a ju dicially id en ti fied
b ir th  fat he r. B eca us e m ult iple  pa re nt s is  not  a s ocial ly pr efer re d fa mi ly for m,  Jam es’s
rela tions hip  with the child was, from a public policy perspective, extraneous.
134. S ee 507 N .W.2d  at  404; see also not e 152, infra .
James sought visitation rights with the child,130 su ccessfully
urg ing the  t r ia l  cour t  to accept  an  “equ i tabl e p a r ent ” doctr ine.
The stat e supreme court  reversed. It noted that  sta t e sta tu tes
provided for visitat ion by gran dparent s against the wishes of a
paren t  in  ce r ta in  ci rcumstances , bu t  that  su ch  a  r igh t  was
given to no other nonparent. It  inferred from this st a t u t or y
scheme a legislative intent not to grant such  r ig hts , an d it
found no common  law au thor i ty  to do s o. Th e t r ia l cou r t
the refore was  withou t  power  to order  the visita t ion it  did.131
The “s tandard” app lied  in  Ash  is effectively th e sam e as
de cis ion s made on  l ack  of s t and ing gr oun ds. A claim an t in
Ja mes’s position could not prevail under an y circumstances.
The cour t ’s  op in ion  s t r es sed  tha t  J ames ’s  r el a tionsh ip  wi th
the child  fell  out side  any of t hose  commonly gr an ted  som e for m
of legitim acy:
H e is  not  t he ch i ld’s  biological  fa ther .  He is  n ot  her  adopt ive
fa t h e r . He  i s  no t  he r  s t ep fa the r .  He  i s  no t  he r  fos t e r  p a re n t. H e
neve r  m ar rie d t he  child ’s m oth er . He  is  me re ly  a  m a n  w h o
l i ve d  w it h —a n d  c a r e d  f or — h e r  m o t h e r ,  a n d  w h o,
un der sta nd ably,  beca m e  s m it t en  w it h  fa t h e rh ood  a ft e r t h e
child ’s bir th .132
The court ’s emp h a sis on t he lega l rela tion sh ips J am es did
not have suggests tha t his claim failed, at least in part,  because
of the  absence  of a  social int ere st  in h is r elat ionsh ip wit h t he
child, and  because he  lacked any cogn iza ble  pe rson a l int ere st  in
the relationship.13 3  The cour t a lso based its d ecision on its  view
tha t  the jud icia ry ought  not  l ead  ou t  in  a ffi rming  non t rad it iona l
domestic relationships.134
Ot her  jurisdictions h ave recognized an “equitable pa ren t”
doct r ine or  som et h in g like it . Somet im es  those  doct r ines  a re
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135. If th e  m ot her is ma rried to th e equitable par ent, of course, then  a
pr esu mp tion  of pater nit y st at ut e migh t come  int o play. S ee d is cuss ion  supra Par t
IV.B.2.
136.
[W]e  adopt th e doct ri ne  of “equ it ab le  pa ren t” and  find tha t  a  husband  who  is
no t th e biological fathe r of a child born or conceived during th e mar riage ma y
be considered the n atur al father of that child where (1) the hu sband an d th e
child mut ua lly acknowledge a relationship a s father  and child, or the m other
of t he  ch i ld  has cooperated in th e development of such a relationsh ip over a
per iod of tim e pr ior t o the filing of the complaint for divorce, (2) the h usban d
desi r es t o  ha ve th e righ ts a fforded  to a pa ren t, an d (3) the h usba nd is w illing
t o t a ke on the responsibility of paying child support. We hold th a t  t he
h u s b a nd may be considered the “equ itable par ent” under t hes e
circumsta nces. . . .
Atk ins on  v. At ki ns on , 40 8 N .W.2 d 5 16,  519  (Mich . Ct . App . 19 87).
The Michigan  Court  of Appea ls recen tly r e fused to  ex tend  the  equ it ab le  pa ren t
doctrin e to  cases in  wh ich  the n on pa re nt  clai ma nt  ha d coh ab ite d wit h, b ut  wa s n ot
mar ried to, th e child’s par ent . S ee Van v. Zah orik,  575 N.W.2d 566 (Mich. Ct. App.
1997 ). Th e c ou r t  ba sed  it s de cision  on  bo th  “pu bl ic  po li cy and j udi cia l r es t r a in t .” Id .
a t  569. The court’s policy concern wa s tha t gra ntin g equit a ble  paren t  s ta tus  to an
unm arr ied cohab it an t  migh t  “encou rage format ion of such relat ionships and wea ken
ma rr iage  as t h e fou nda t ion  of our  fa mil y-ba sed  soci et y. ” Id . at 570, (quoting Carnes
v. Seldon , 311 N.W .2d 747, 753 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) and Hewitt  v. Hewitt, 394
N.E.2d  120 4, 12 07 (I ll. 1 979 ). In  ad dit ion , it  concl u d e d t h a t  t he  legi sl a tu re,  not  t he
jud iciar y, was th e proper forum for “making social policy[,] . . . especially . . . when
the deter mina tion or res olution [of a case] requ i r es placing a premiu m on one societal
interest  at t he expens e of another .” 575 N.W.2d at 569.
137. The Oregon  st a tu t e  provides  in  pa r t :
(1) Any per son, inclu ding bu t n ot limit ed to a  rela t e d  or  n o n -related foster
pa ren t , steppa rent  or relat ive by blood or mar riage wh o has est abli sh ed
emot iona l ties creating a child-par e n t re lat ions hip  or a n on goin g pe rs ona l
rela tions hip  with  a  ch ild , o r  any lega l  grand p a ren t m ay p et iti on . .  . for
int er ven tion  with  the  cour t  having jurisdiction over th e custody, placement,
gua rdia nsh ip or war dsh ip of tha t child , . . . ma y pe tit ion t he  cour t for  th e
coun ty for an  order  providin g for relie f . . . .
 . . . .
(5) As used in  th is  s ec t ion :
(a)  “Ch ild-pa ren t  r el a t ionsh ip” means  a  r el a t ionsh ip tha t  exists or  did
exi st , i n  who le  or  i n  pa r t ,  wi thin t he six m on th s p re ced in g t he  filin g of a n
act ion  un der t his s ection, a nd in  which r ela t i on s h ip  a  per son  hav ing
qu it e res t r ict ive , r equ ir in g a  conve n t ion a l lega l bon d,  su ch  as
s tepparen t  st at us , in add it ion  to p roof of an  in ten t  to act  the
pa r t of the p aren t . In  Mich igan, equ i table pa ren t  s t a tus
appea r s lim it ed  to pe r s on s who not only established an
em ot ion a l bon d w it h  the ch ild, but were mar ried to the child’s
paren t 135 and  a re wil lin g t o pr ovid e for  the ch ild ’s s upp or t .136 In
other places  the p oss ibi lit y of a  br oade r  ca tegor y of
ps ych ologica l parent  is recognized. Statu tes in  Or egon 137 and
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physica l custody of a child or r esidin g in t he sa me h ouseh old as t he child
supplied, or otherwise made available to the child, food, clothing, shelter
and inciden ta l necess ar ies  and pr ovided the child with necessary care,
edu cat ion  and discipline, and which relationship continued on a  day-to-day
basis, through int eraction, companionship, interplay and m u t u a l ity , tha t
fulfilled the child’s psychological needs for a parent  as well as the child’s
physica l ne eds . How ever, a r elationsh ip between a  child and a  person wh o
is the non-related foster parent  of the child is no t  a ch ild-pa ren t
rela tions hip  unde r  t hi s s ect ion  un less the r elationship continued over a
per iod exceeding 18 months.
OR . RE V. STAT . § 109 .11 9 (19 97).
138. The Wisconsin statute provides:
Up on  pe t it ion  by a  g randparen t ,  grea tgra nd pa re nt , st epp ar en t or  per son
who ha s ma int ain ed a r elat ionsh ip simila r t o a par ent -child rela tions hip
with  th e child, th e court  ma y gra nt  rea sona ble visita tion r ight s to  tha t
per son  if the p ar ent s ha ve notice of th e hea rin g an d if t h e  co u r t  determ ines
tha t  visitation is in the best int erest of the child.
WIS . STAT . § 767 .24 5(1) (1 993 ).
139. S ee Hru by v. Hruby, 748 P.2d 57, 66-67 (Or . 198 7); accord  Oregon  ex. rel.
Juv . Dept . v. Lau ffenber ger, 7 77 P.2 d 954 (Or . 1989).  Al though  the  sta tu te  has  been
revised since t he de cisions in Hruby  and L auf fen berg er, th e Ore gon court s contin ue
to interpret  it as grant ing procedur a l  r a t h er  th an  sub sta nt ive righ ts. See In  re
Mar ria ge of Sor en son , 906  P.2 d 83 8, 84 2 (Or . Ct . App.  1995 ); cf.  Ellison v. Ramos, No.
97-1417, 1998 WL 436057 , at *6-*7 (N.C. App. Aug. 4, 1998) (holding t ha t  t h e f athe r ’s
cons t i tu t iona l custody preference over his former  nonm arita l partn er was overcome,
so tha t th e best-interest s stan dard a pplied, if the pa rtn er ca n  prove he acted
“inconsi st en t [ly] with the constitutionally protected status of a nat ura l paren t” by
re linqu i sh ing the custody of the child to others, including the pa r t n e r , t h en  sending
the child, who was diabetic, to live with his elderly parents who failed to prov id e  h er
with  pr ope r h ea lt h ca re ).
140. S ee Ho lt zm an  v. K no tt , 53 3 N .W.2 d 4 19,  425 -30 (W is.  199 5).
Wisconsin 138 for exam ple, seem t o gran t  r igh t s  to anyone  who
has esta blished a paren t-like relationship with a child.
The door  to nonpa ren t  r ight s i s not  open  as  wide  as the  face
of th ese sta tu tes would su ggest. The Or egon  s t a tu t e appea r s t o
invit e nonparents  to seek th e full  panoply of parent al rights.
The Supreme Cour t  of Oregon  has m a de clear , howeve r, t ha t
the law gr an ts  only st an din g t o t he  non pa re nt . The  legal
s t anda rd for  g ran t ing  substan t ive  r igh t s i s near  the unfitness
end of t he  sca l e.  The  nonpa ren t  mu s t  show a  “compell ing
re as on” for d epr iving t he  pa re nt  of cus tody. 139
The Wisconsin  law does refer to a “best interest” standa rd,
bu t the stat e supr eme  court  ha s in ter pr ete d it  as  ap plying on ly
when  an  act ion  “affect in g m ar r ia ge” (pr in cipa lly  divor ce or
separa t ion), already exists.140 Nonparen t s must  th ere fore wa it
un t il a  mar r ied paren t  ope ns t he d oor  pr oced ura lly  before
brin ging a  cla im . Mor eove r , t he n onpa ren t  is  res t r ict ed to
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141. S ee id .  at 431. Under this case, which is discussed a nd criticized in  th e
following  section, t he Wiscons in cour ts m ay a llow visitat ion, t hough  no t custody , t o
nonpa ren t s on  the  bas is  of  nonst a tu tory  au thor i ty.
142. The importan ce of a ma rriage is evi de n t  in  In  re M arr iag e of Ga lla gh er, 539
N.W.2d 479 (Iowa 1 995), a  case decided by the Iowa Supreme Cour t just t wo years
a f ter  Ash  v . Koteck i.  In  Gal lag her , a ca se l ike  th ose d iscu sse d in  Pa rt  IV.B.2  ab ove,
a  hu sba nd  filed  for d ivor ce and sough t cus tody of the  child, conceived an d born  dur ing
the ma rr ia ge,  wh o h e be lie ved  wa s h is d au gh te r.  On ly a fte r a pr etrial home stu dy
recommended  tha t th e husba nd be given custody did the wife rev e a l th at  th e child
had been father ed by  another  man .  The  Iowa Supreme Cour t  reversed  the t r i a l
cour t ’s  g r a n t  of summ ary judgment a gainst the fath er. It distinguished Ash  on  the
basis  t ha t  t he  fa the r  in  Gal lag her  “was no s tr anger ,  or  even  a  mere s t epfathe r . The
fact s h ere d emon str at e how differen t it  is whe n a  child is born  int o a ma rr iage , even
th ough  (unknown to the  fa the r ) i t  is  conceived out side it .” Id . at 480. The court ru led
tha t  equ itab le  pare n t h oo d m ay be e st ab lish ed w he re  th e cla im an t is  ma rr ied  to t he
mother , reasonably believes he is the child’s father, establishes a par en t a l
relationship, an d sh ows th at  judicial r ecognition  o f t h a t  relationship is in the child’s
best int ere st. See id . at 4 81. Note  th at  th e la s t  th ree of th ese r equir emen ts could
easil y be satisfied by a parent’s nonmarital part ner, so the fact of the mar riage is a
crucia l factor in the court’s equitable parent  doctrine.
143. S ee J ohn son v. J ohn son, 28 6 N.W.2d  886 (Mich. Ct . App. 1980) (holding t ha t
a  man  who marr ied a  woman knowing she  was p r e gn a n t  with wha t might  be another
man’s chi ld,  an d w ho  act ed  th e p ar t of a  fat h e r  d u r in g  t he mar riage, was estopped
to deny pat ernit y and escap e child support  obli ga t i on  u pon divorce several years
l a t er ) ; M.H.B. v. H.T.B., 489 A.2d 775 (N.J. 1985) (holding tha t a h usban d who
repe at edly stat ed and dem onstra ted th at h e intended t o fill the role of fa the r  in  t he
life  of a child res ult ing from  his wife’s extra ma rit al a ffair e s topped  to deny an
obliga tion  to pay ch ild sup port  after  divorce) (affirming Appel la te  Div is ion  by an
equa lly div ide d cou rt ).
144. Stepchildren  often a re not a dopted for t h e sole re ason  th at  th e non cust odial
pa ren t declines to relinquish his or her parenta l rights.
visit a t ion  un der  th is st at ut e, cust ody being d ealt  with  in ot h er
provisions.141
The cla im s of a  par ent ’s nonm ar ital pa rt ner  should be
judged under a st andar d granting st r on g  defe ren ce both  to
pa ren t s an d t o th e ma rit al fa mily. Th e social int ere st  in t he
s tepparen t  r e la t ionsh ip  is  la ckin g in  nonmar it a l coh abit a t ion .
Notwiths tand ing the h igh  in ciden ce of d ivor ce, th e re remains
great  significan ce in t he p res ence—or a bsen ce—of a m ar ita l
commi tment  between the adults.142 Even  i f tha t  commi tment
does not formally include suppor t  by one  spouse of t he  othe r ’s
ch ild ren —and under  some fact s it  does143—commi tmen t  t o a
paren t  genera lly ent ails  commit men t t o a m inor  child. 144 By
con t ra s t , nonmar it a l coh abit a t ion  sign a ls  a  gr ea ter  lik eli hood
tha t  the r ela t ion sh ip  wil l fa ll a pa r t . F ocu s in g sp ecifi ca lly  on
d a t a on u nm ar ried  cohabit an ts  in Ca na da , Pr ofessors Wu  an d
Balakrishna n, two empirical researchers, recently observed:
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145. Zheng Wu & T.R. Bala kr ishn an , Dissolution of Premarital Cohabitation in
Ca n a d a, 32 DE M O GR AP H Y 521, 526 (1995). The high su rvival rate for ma rriages
reported  by t he se  au th or s m ay  be d ue  in  pa rt  to t he ir  focus  on  th e d ur at ion  of first
marr iages. Pro ject ions  based  on  U.S . s ta t i st i cs  re levan t  t o  all m a rriages indicate a
somewhat lower survival rat e, but one t h a t  s t ill dwarfs the longevity of unm arr ied
coha bit at ion.  In  con t r as t  t o the dissolu tion  per cent ages  of 75-67% after  five year s, an d
88-85% after ten year s for unm arried cohabit at ion reflected in  the  work of Wu an d
Ba lak r i shnan , “[a]t 1985 divorce rate s, 18 percent [of marr iages] will en d in  div orce
befor e the 5th  ann iversary [and] 32 percent before the 10t h . . . .” Ja mes A. Weed,
Du r a tion  of Marr iage Tables: A 1985 Update 5 (Oct. 1988) (unpublished paper
present ed at  th e October  1988 an nu al m eetin g of the Sou th ern  Demogr aph ic
Associa tion , San Antonio, Texas; on file with the BY U  L a w  Review ). Mor eove r,  once
a  ma r r iage survives its first ten  years, th e likelihood of divorce diminishes
subs ta nt ially. Id . at 4-5.
146. S ee id . at 527, 528.
147. Id . at  529  (cit at ion s om it te d).
T h e ephem era l  na tu r e  o f cohab i t ing  r e l a t ionsh ips  i s  appa ren t
. . . .  F or  w om e n , fe w er  t h a n  on e-t h i r d  of a l l c oh a b i t a t io n
r e l a t i on s h i p s  ha ve sur vived for  f ive ye a r s .  F or  m e n , t h e
corr esp ond ing  figu re  is 2 5%. Aft er  10 y ea rs , on ly 12 % of t h e
coha bit at ion  r e l a t ionsh ips  ha v e  s u rv ived  for  wom en,  an d  15%
for  m e n . M a r it a l u n ion s  a r e  m u c h  m or e  st a b le  t h a n  coh a b it in g
u n ion s . F o r  e x a m p l e , i n  a  l if e t a b l e  a n a l y si s  of  t h e  d a t a  on
9 ,478 first  m ar ria ges  collected  in t h e  [ F a m i l y  a n d  F r i e n d s
Su rvey]  . . . , we fou n d  t h a t  a b o u t 9 0% of m ar ita l u n ion s
su rv ived  for  10  yea r s . 145
If th e female pa rt ner  brought  a child fath ered by an other  ma n
in to th e re lat ionsh ipSSth e sit ua tion  of part icular interest
he reSSthe likelihood that th e cohabitation would end by
sepa ra t ion  increased, and the likelihood that  it  would lead to
mar riage decreased.146
Drawing on bot h U .S.- an d Ca na dia n-ba sed r esea rch , Wu
and Balakrishnan  concluded tha t “ample evidence exists to
s u gg est  th at  prem ar ital cohabita tion actu ally leads t o less
st able  mar r iages . Em pir ically we a lso kn ow th at  cohabit ing
unions a re le ss stable than m arital un ions. Together these
re su l ts su ppor t t he a rgu men t t ha t coha bitin g un ions a re fr agile
and t rans ie n t  . . . .”147 This  conclusion is  consist ent  with  th e
Unit ed Sta tes-bas ed findings of Larr y L. Bumpas an d Ja mes A.
Sweet:
Cohabi t a t ion  livin g a rr an gem en ts  do n ot la st  long : with in a
few  yea rs  m ost coh ab it in g cou ple s h av e ei th er  m ar rie d or
s e p a r a t e d . M o r e  will e n d in  m ar ria ge t h an  in  sep ar at ion .
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148. La r r y L. Bum pas  & J am es A. Swee t, N ati ona l E sti m ates  of Coh abi tat ion ,
26 DE M O GR AP H Y 615 , 62 4 (19 89).
149. Wil li am G. Axinn  & J enn ifer S. B arber , Living A rrangement s and F am ily
Form ati on  At tit ud es in  Ea rly  Ad ul th ood , 59 J.  MA RR I AG E  & F AM . 595 , 60 8 (19 97).
150. In  Baehr v. Lewin , 852 P.2d 4 4 (Haw. 19 93), the  Sup rem e Cour t of Haw aii
U n i on s  form ed  by  cohabit a t i on  a r e  a l s o l es s  li k el y t o  st a y
toge the r  t ha n  u n ions  form ed  by  ma r r i age .  Th i s  i s  pa r t icu l a r ly
so w h ile  t h e coh a b it in g coup le is  n ot  m a r r ie d , b u t  it  is  a ls o t r u e
when  cohab i t a t ion  i s  fo llowed  by  ma r r i age . 148
The negat ive effect  of in t imate , nonmar i t a l cohab ita t ion  on  the
part icipants’ at tit ud es t owar d m ar ria ge an d childb ear ing is
report ed in a  r ecent st udy by William Axinn and J ennifer S.
Bar ber. They  found  tha t , i n con t r a s t  t o non int imate
cohabit a t ion  ar ra nge me nt s, su ch a s m er ely s h a r ing  an
apa r tmen t , intim at e coha bitat ion “significan tly redu ces young
people’s fertility preferen ces and s ignifican tly increas es th eir
tolerance of divor ce. .  . . The m ore m onths of exposu re to
cohabit a t ion  young people exper ienced , th e less  ent hu sia st ic
th ey were towa r d m ar r ia ge a nd ch ild bear in g. . .  . Coh abit a t ion
increas ed young people’s acceptan ce of divorce, bu t oth er
ind epen den t livin g exper ien ces did  not .”149
The empir ical ba sis for t he  social in te re st  favorin g th e
mar i t a l fam ily over un ma rr ied coha bita tion  is becomin g
incr eas ingly clear . St at ut es or ju dicial p r eceden ts  gra nt ing
r igh t s t o a  pa ren t ’s nonmar i t a l pa r tner  shou ld do no more  than
a llow  sta n d in g, as in Or egon. Custody or visitat ion should be
available only upon a showing approaching unfitness.
2. S am e-sex partners
 The absen ce of a mutua l comm itm ent  of ma rr iage between  a
paren t  an d pa rt ner  un der min es t he s ocial int e r es t  in  the
nonparen t ’s r e la t ionsh ip wit h t he  child. S omet ime s, h owever , a
lega l im pe dimen t  makes  mar r ia ge impos sible . H ow d oes  su ch
an impediment bear on the social interest?
The mos t  com m on  im pe dimen t  is  undou bt ed ly a  pr ior ,
un dissolved ma rr iage . Ot he rs  inclu de a ge, consangu ini ty,
m enta l capacity, and gender. Each of these obstacles has been
the su bject  of lit iga t ion  and s chola r ly com m e n t ary. The
proh ibit ion  on  same-sex mar r iage , however ,  now an  impor tan t
i ssue in th e Ha waii cour ts a nd legislat ur e,150 ha s  become high ly
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ruled  tha t rest ricting mar riage to persons of the opposite gender was sex
dis crim ina tion  under t he stat e constitut ion and could b e  ju s t ified only under  the
“strict  scru tin y” stan dar d. Th us, t h e  r e st r iction must further  “compelling state
in t ere s t s and [be] narr owly drawn to avoid unnecessary a br idgments  of  const i tu t iona l
right s.” Id .  at 74. On remand, the trial court ruled that prohibition against same
gender  mar riage failed that  tes t . S ee Baeh r v. Miike, CIV. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL
694235 (Ha w. Ci r. C t. D ec. 3, 1 996).  An a ppe al fr om t ha t r ulin g was pendin g when
t h is ar ticle wen t t o press . Mean while, t he legis lat ur e app roved for su bmiss ion  t o  th e
ele ctor at e an a mendm ent t o the sta te constitut ion rest r i ct ing  ma rr iag e t o per son s of
the opposit e gen der . S ee Pr oposing a  Constitut ional Amendment  Relating to Marr iage,
H .B. No. 117, 1997 Haw. Sess. Laws 1246-47.   The legislatur e also ena cted a  law
making available to “reciprocal beneficiaries”SSwhich can include, but is not li mited
to , sam e-sex couples in ten ding a  ma rr iage-like r elat ionsh ipSSma ny of the lega l
benef it s give n  t o ma rr ied pe rson s. S ee An Act Relating to Un mar ried Couples, H.B.
No. 118 , 1997 Haw. Sess .  Laws  1211.  Same-sex  marr iage  li t iga t ion  is  pending in  a t
least two oth er s ta tes , Alask a a nd Ver mon t. S ee Bra use  v. Bur eau  of Vital  Statistics,
No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 8874 3 (Alaska  Sup er.  F eb. 27, 1998); Bak er v.
Vermon t , No. S100 9-97 (Vt. Su per . Ct. De c. 19, 1997), ap pea l d ocket ed , No. 98 -32 (Vt .
Jan . 15,  199 8).
151. A grea t dea l ha s been  writ ten  on th e sam e-sex m ar ria ge issue. For an alyses
consistent  with  th e social interest  as discussed in th is article, see David O. Coolidge,
S am e-S ex Ma rri age? Baehr  v. Miike and  the Mean ing of Marr iage,  38 S. TE X. L. RE V.
1 (1997); Lynn  D. War dle, A Critical Analysis of Const itu tion al C lai m s for  S am e-S ex
Marr iage, 19 96  BYU  L. RE V. 1.
152. S ee, e.g., West v. Super ior Court, 69 Cal. Rptr . 2d 160 (Ct. App. 1997);
Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 215, 219 (Ct. App. 1991); Curia le v.
Reagan , 272 Cal. Rptr. 520, 522 (Ct. App. 1990); Titchenal  v. Dexter, 693 A.2d 682,
684-86, 698-90 (Vt. 1997). But see J .A.L . v. E .P .H ., 6 82 A. 2d  131 4 (P a .  Supe r . C t .
1996) (ho ld ing  tha t  mothe r ’s  fo rmer  same-sex pa r tne r had  s t and ing to seek  par t i a l
cus tod y).
visible as a  political an d social issu e. This subject  is  caught  up
in  th e br oade r w eb of ques tion s r ega rd ing th e legal statu s of
sam e-sex part nerships  and  the socia l st at us  of homosexua lity in
gener al.  These m at ter s ra nge far be y on d  t h e scope of this
a r t icle,151 bu t  I beli eve  the a pp roach  taken  her e s hed s s ome
light  on th e spe cific que st ion of child-nonparent r elationships in
th is se tt ing.
Cour t s a r e  somet imes a sked  to ru le on  the le ga l s t a tus of a
child’s relat ionship with  th e par ent ’s sam e-sex part ner  when
the pa re nt  an d pa rt ne r s epa ra te . In  most  of the se ca ses , th e
cour t s ha ve ru led  a ga ins t t he  non pa re nt ’s claim . The y ha ve
often  conclude d t ha t  the s t a te le gis la tu re h as p reclu de d,  or
failed to pr ovide,  judici a l au thor i ty  to g ran t  t he r e li ef
requested, an d t he y ha ve em ph as ized t he  legis la t u r e’s r ole in
m a k i n g complex m ora l an d social p olicy.152 A s ta tu tory  bar
deny ing th e parent ’s partn er a legally protected role in child’s
life  probably implies a  legislative jud gment  tha t  a  ch i ld ’s
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153. The iss ue  cha ng es  if the legis lat ur e ma kes a doption b y th e non par ent  freely
available. See infra note 173.
154. 472 N. W.2 d 1 75 (M in n.  Ct . App . 19 91).
155. Id . at 180.
156. 533 N. W.2 d 4 19 (W is.  199 5).
re la t ionsh ip wit h  the n onpa ren t  in  th is  se t t in g does  not  en joy
an  a ffi rmat ive  socia l i nt e res t .153
In  Kulla v. McNulty,154 t he  cour t  in terp re t ed  a  st a tu tory
scheme th at  allowed visit ing r ight s to non pa ren ts  as  ap plicable
to a m other ’s est ra nged sa me-sex par tn er . The court  noted,
howeve r, t ha t  un der t he st at ut e th e par tn er  faced a  subs tan t ia l
burden . Sh e was r equir ed  to pr ove n ot  onl y t he exis t en ce of a n
emot iona l, child-pa ren t bon d wit h t he ch ild and th at t he child’s
best in ter es t s w ould  be  se rved  by v is it a t ion , bu t  tha t  vis it a t ion
“would  not  i nt e r fe re with  the re la t ionsh ip  be tween  the  cus tod ia l
paren t  an d th e ch i ld.” Her cla im foun der ed on t his  cru cial
element  of the t es t  wh ich , a s t he cou r t  recogn ized,  refle ct s a
“pu blic poli cy in  favor  of foster ing th e developmen t a nd
harmony of a fam ily un it,” and  there fore just ifies imp osing t his
“s t r ingen t  burden” on  nonpare n t  th i rd  par t ie s bu t  not  on
divorced or separa ted parent s.155
Unlike the  op in ion  in  Kulla , most  judicia l decisions  on th is
issue,  whatever their outcome, tend to overlook the impor t a n ce
of th e social int erest . When a  cour t vent ur es to ma ke n ew law
in  th is ar ea, th at  failure u nder mines  its a na lysis. A recent ,
il lustr a t ive case is Holtzman v. Knott.156 Two women  in a
domes tic pa r tner sh ip  agreed  tha t on e of them  (Knott ) would
become pregnan t  th rough  a r t ifi cia l insemina t ion ,  and  tha t  they
would  r a ise the  ch i ld  together .  A son  was born  and , un t i l he
was five year s old, bot h  women  pla yed a  pa ren ta l role in  his
life. Holt zma n p rovided  th e pr ima ry fina ncia l s u ppor t  for  the
th ree of t hem.
The re la t ionsh ip between the two women then deteriorated.
Knot t  told Holtzman t hat  the relationship was over.  She soon
moved out  of the  house  they shared, taking her son with  he r.
Some months lat er , she r efu se d H olt zm an any fu r ther  contact
with  h im. H oltzm an ’s pet itions  in t he cir cuit  court  seek ing
custody or visitation were dismissed. The Suprem e Cour t  of
Wisconsin , gra nt ing a  pet ition t o bypas s t he cour t of app eals ,
reversed.
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157. WIS . STATS. AN N . § 767 .24 5(1) (W es t 1 993 ).
158. Holtzman , 533 N.W.2d at 426.
159. S ee id . at 423-24.
160. The court overru led In  re Z. J .H ., 471 N.W.2d 202 (Wis. 1991), which denied
the visita tion  pet ition  of a mot her ’s fema le form er p ar tn er. S ee H oltzman , 533 N.W.2d
a t  434.
161. S ee Holtzman , 533 N.W .2d at  430-34. Th e cour t did  say, h owever , th at  th e
l eg is la tu re had preempted th e field insofar as cus tod y claims  a r e  co n cern ed. See id.
a t  431.
Holtzman  is inter est ing be cause  the s t a te s upr em e cou r t
first  defer re d t o th e legisla tu re  in a n en tir ely conven tion al w ay,
th en  nea tly avoided th e implications of its own an alys is. J us tice
Abrahamson’s opinion for th e court deserves a t t en t ion  both  for
wh at  it s ays  an d for wh at  it d oes n ot sa y.
A Wis consin  st a tu te gr an ts s t a te cou r t s  t he power  to gr an t
“r eas ona ble  visi t at ion r ight s ” t o “a  g r a n dp a r en t ,
g rea tgrandpa ren t , stepp ar ent , or person who has  main ta ined  a
re la t ionsh ip similar t o a par en t -ch i ld  rela t ionsh ip  with  the
child.”157 On  it s face, th e re feren ce to per sons  with  relationships
sim ilar  t o t ha t  of ch ild and pa re nt  ap pea re d pr omisin g to
Holt z m a n’s pet ition. Bu t t he cour t in ter pr ete d it  as  ap plying
only “wit hin  th e cont ext  of a diss olving m ar ria ge.”158 The
sta tu te,  th erefore, did nothin g to remove t he high barriers of
the unfit nes s s t anda rd t o Holt zm an’s cla im  for  visitin g
rights.159
The court  did not stop th ere, h owever. Over ru ling one of its
1991 decisions,160 i t  found  tha t th e legislatur e ha d not in ten ded
to preclude t he court s from exercising an  inher ent , equita ble
ju r isdict ion  over adult s’ relat ionships wit h children  in dispu tes
betw een nonmarital part ners.161 On  the basi s of tha t
ju r isdict ion , th e cour t a ssu me d a ut hor ity t o per mit  Holt zma n t o
con t inue a r elat ionsh ip wit h  th e ch i ld  over  h is  mothe r ’s
object ion .
The court ’s conclusion  t h a t t he legislatu re h ad n ot deprived
it  of t he  author i ty  it  claimed was  str ongly contest ed by thr ee
dissent ing justices. More pert inent  to th e subject of th is ar ticle,
however, is th e basis for th e cour t’s tes t for deciding when  a
cour t  shou ld en tert ain  th e visitat ion petition of a nonpa ren t
such  as  Hol tzman .
The cour t’s an alysis res ts on t he pr emise, rep eat ed
throughout  th e opinion, th at  only two interes ts u nder lie the
D :\ 1 9 9 8- 3\ F I N A L \ A N D -F I N . W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
935] CHILDREN, PARENTS, AND  NONP ARENTS 995
162. S ee id. at 429-30, 435-36 (“[The court ’s] exercise of equitabl e  power  pro t ec t s
paren ta l autonomy and constitut ional rights . . . .  It a lso protects a child’s best
in te re st s.”).
163. S ee id . at 435-36.
164. S ee d is cuss ion  supra  Par t III.B.
165. S ee Holtzman , 533 N.W.2d at 436.
ma tt er  of cour t -order ed child visitat ion: the par ent ’s
cons t itu t iona l ly protect ed in te res t  in  ch i ld  rea r ing and  the
child’s interests.162 Nowhere d oes the court  expressly consider
the social int er est  in t he r elat ionsh ips be tw een  th e boy an d h is
mothe r , an d t he b oy and  Holt zman.  Nor  does the court  ask
whet her  Hol t zman  had  a  per sona l,  prot ect ed int erest  in her
relationship with the child.
Nevertheless, the court ’s analysis and decision suggest a
great  dea l abou t t he s ocial i n terest in the relationships of
Hol tzman , Knot t ,  and the  la t t e r’s son . This  is m ost evid ent  in
the court ’s use of t he b est -int ere st s st an da rd  for deciding
whet her  t o honor  the  nonpa ren t ’s  cl a im.163 For  the  reasons
discussed  in  connect ion  wit h  cust ody con te st s  be tween  pa ren t s ,
doing so su ggest s t ha t ea ch a du lt’s claim  h a s  eq u a l stat us as a
ma tt er  of public policy.164 On it s face, t he cour t’s a na lysis
appea r s t o imply e ithe r  t h a t  Hol tzman  or  society  had a  s t rong
interest in the child-nonparent r elationship.
Notwiths tand ing i t s use of the best -in teres t s s t andard,  the
cour t ’s decision  does s ugges t t ha t H oltzm an ’s or s ociety’s
interest  in t ha t r elat ionsh ip wa s lim ited  in two ways. First,
un like  t h e cl a im of a  pa ren t  in  a  d ivorce  or  s epa ra t ion
pr oceeding,  the  nonparen t ’s r igh t s a re limit ed  to vis it a t ion .
Custody is  una vaila ble un der  th e court ’s gen era l equit y
ju r isdict ion . Second , the  cour t  dev ised a  th reshold test  to be
me t by a  nonpa ren t  se ek in g vis it a t ion  with  a  chi ld : a
“sign ificant  tr igger ing eve nt ” mu st  occur . That  “event” requir es
the nonparen t t o ha ve cohabit ed wit h a nd  su ppor ted  th e child
with  th e par ent ’s consen t, after  which th e par ent  denies  t he
nonparen t  access to the  ch i ld , and the  la t ter  seeks judicial relief
with in  a r easona ble time. 165 The test’s evident pur pose is to
provide an  a n a logue  to the  r equ ir emen t  under  t he  st a tu t e  on
nonpar e n t vis it a t ion  (foun d inapp lica ble  by t he cou r t ) tha t
th ere be a n a ction affecting t he m ar riage of a par ent .
On exa min a t ion , n eit her  of these poin t s assures  tha t  the
cour t  seriously int ended t o privilege th e child-parent
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166. S ee id . at 431.
re la t ionsh ip in the  mar i ta l  family over alt ern at ive domes tic
ar ra ngem e n ts. Lim it in g t he n onpa ren t ’s r em ed y t o vis it a t ion
may reflect n ot jud icial re sp ect  for a par ent’s versus a
nonparen t ’s rela t ion sh ip  wit h  a  child , bu t  simply a  recogn it ion
tha t  the legislature ha d preempt ed th e custody field by
leg is la t ion .166 The cour t ’s  t h reshold t e st  does  p reven t  a  casua l
acqua inta nce, su ch  as a  da y-ca re p rovid er  or  family  fr ien d,  from
preva il ing in a  visit at ion a ction. Bu t b y usin g its  equ ita ble
ju r isdict ion  to equa te  a nonmar ital  domest i c a r r angemen t  w ith
the ma rita l family requ ired by th e st at ut e, th en  ap plyin g th e
bes t -in te res t s t e st  t o t he  nonpa ren t ’s cla im , t he cou r t
necessarily  gives equal res pect to tr adit ional families an d
nonmarita l domestic arrangements.
If th e child-parent  relat ionship in t he m ar it a l fam ily enjoys
a  unique social interest,  th e correct st a n d a rd  in  nonmar i t a l
families is fa r t h er toward t he unfitness end of the spectrum . It
would  at least  r e quir e some  sh owing of detr imen t t o th e child
from the  den ia l of vis it a t ion . Th e cou r t  pur ports  to be concern ed
solely with the child’s a nd pa ren t’s in ter est s, bu t it  imp licitly
finds  an  affir mat ive  socia l in ter es t  or  pe rson a l in ter es t  of th e
nonparen t  in  tha t  r e la t ionsh ip  with t he ch ild . Th e cou r t ’s
failu r e t o acknowledge or  d iscuss  tha t  cruci a l poin t i s
r e m ark able  aga in st  the ba ckd rop of a n  other wis e ca refu lly
crafted analysis.
The Holtzman  cour t  shou ld have considered the  socia l
interest  not  on ly in  the re la t ionsh ip  be tween  a  ch i ld an d her
pa ren t ’s nonmar it a l pa r tner  gene ra lly, but  in a  domes tic
a r rangement in w hich  both  pa re nt  figur es a re  of the  sa me  sex.
As a gen er al m at te r, u nconnected  with  the  fact s  of a  pa r t icu la r
case, how should th e law va lue s uch  ar ra ngem ent s for child-
rea r ing purposes? At least two is su es  are r a ised : the s t abil it y of
the adults’ r ela t ion sh ip, an d t he im port an ce to a ch ild in b eing
raised by parents of different genders.
Empir ica l da ta  on th e st abilit y of int ima t e, sam e-sex
part nerships  must  be interpr eted with  car e. Th e r eleva nt
re la t ionsh ips a r e  n ot  casu a l sexu a l lia isons,  bu t  those  in  wh ich
a  coha bitin g coup le consider  th ems elves t o be in a  commit ted,
long-ter m re la t ionsh ip . One would want t o s tudy , i n pa r t icu l ar ,
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167. The median du rat ion of male homosexua l  r el a t ionsh ips  has  been  found to
be abou t t hr ee yea rs. S ee Joseph  Ha rr y, M arri age A m ong G ay M ales : Th e S epar ati on
of In tim acy a nd  S ex, in  TH E  SOCIOLOGICAL P ERS PE CTIVE  330 , 334  (Scot t G . McN a ll
ed.,  4 th  ed. 1977) (report ing t ha t t he r esu lts of th e au th or’s st udy a re consis ten t wit h
those of other r esea rche rs). A sur vey of 7500 homosexu als by Ove rlooked Opinions,
Inc.,  “a  marke t  research  and opin ion  po ll ing  fi rm specia lizing in  the  gay , l esb ian ,  and
bisexua l ma rk et,” showed t ha t t he m edian  year s in t he r ela t ionship for women is 3.5,
and for me n is 3 .7. TH E  GAY ALMAN AC  100 -01 (1996). That  sur vey does n ot hold it self
out  as s at isfying t he r igors of aca dem ic empir ical re sea rch . Co m pa r e  t h e da ta  on
mar ried, heterosexual couples. See supra  notes 145-148.
168. S ee Ha rr y, supra  note 167, a t 339 (“[E]ven when both  par t ies  to a  mar i ta l
rela tions hip  were  agr eed on t he de sira bility of fidelity a m ajor ity wer e un faith ful.
This  seem s to m ean  th at  ind i vi d u a ls we re  inca pa ble of a da pt ing  th eir  own  beh avi ors
to eit he r t he ir  own  de sir es  or  th ose  of th eir  ma ri ta l pa rt ne r. ”).
169.
Our cultu re h as de fined  fai th fu lness in couples alwa ys to include or be
synonymous with sexua l fidelity, so it is little wonder tha t rel at ionsh ips begin
wi t h t h a t  assu mp tion . It  is on ly t hr ough  tim e t ha t t he  sym bolic n at ur e of
sexua l excl us ivit y t ra ns la te s in to t he  re al  iss ue s of fa it hfu lness .  When  tha t
happens,  t he s u bsta nt ive, emot ional de pend ability of th e par tn er, n ot sex,
becomes  the real measu re of faithfulness.
DAVID P . MCWHIRTER & ANDREW M. MATTISON, TH E  MA LE  CO U PL E : H O W
RE L AT I ON S H I P S DEVELOP  252  (198 4).
170. S ee Ha rr y, supra  no t e 167 , a t  338 . The  in s t abilit y of homosexua l
relationships ha s been  at tr ibut ed to su ch factors  as a  gener al lack  of social a ppr ova l
and pos it ive  ro le m ode ls,  th e p re se nce  of wh i ch  h elp c rea t e  s t anda rds and
expecta t ions for het erose xua l couples. S ee, e.g., id .  a t  330; M ILTON C. REG AN , J R .,
F AMILY LA W  AN D  T H E  P U R S U IT  O F  INT IMA CY 121 (1993 ). Th at  conclusion is spe culat ive
a t  best . Ther e is no evide nt  rea son t o believe th at , if same -sex r elationships b ec am e
par t of the social m ain str eam , th e str ong pr opensit y towar d infidelit y a nd short -lived
relationships would be reversed.
the st abil it y of such  rela t ion sh ips in  wh ich  a  child of one  of th e
pa r tner s is a  mem ber  of the h ouseh old. No such  da ta  involving
the presen ce of children in the household have been located.
But  th e dat a on sa me-sex relat ionships in  which both pa rt ner s
consider  themselves commi t ted to one  anothe r  sugges t  t ha t , on
average, these unions last only a few years. 167
A cont r ibu t ing factor  to the  ins tabi li ty of pa r t icu lar l y m a le
h om osexu al  re lat ionsh ips is  per vas ive sexu al in fidelit y. Sexu al
encoun te r s with out siders  a re com monplace a mong m em bers of
male couples, in cludin g a m ajorit y of th ose in wh ich infide lity is
mutua l ly re gar ded  a s improper .168 Apolog is t s  have  a rgued tha t
sexua l fideli t y a n d emotional commitm ent can and sh ould be
sepa ra ted  in  such  relationships.169 Empirical research suggests,
however, th at  even when  both pa rt ner s agr ee t h a t  sexua l
infidelit y is  pe rmissible , t he fa ct of infidelity weakens the
r elationship.170 The dest ru ction of a r elationsh ip between
D :\ 1 9 9 8- 3\ F I N A L \ A N D -F I N . W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
998 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1998
171. S ee Lynn  D. War dle, T he P oten tia l Im pa ct of H om osexual P aren tin g on
Ch ild ren , 1997 U. ILL . L. RE V. 833, 855-56 & nn.115-16.
172. The f ac t s o f t he  case  sugges t  t ha t Ho lt zman  and Knot t  wou ld have m arr ied
one  an oth er h ad t hey b een  per mit ted  to do so. F our  year s before  th e child’s birt h, a nd
after  living together  for a year  in a jointly purchased h ouse, the t wo women
“solemnized th eir  comm it me nt  to e ach  oth er , exch an gin g vows  and  r ings in  a  pr iva t e
cerem ony.” Ho lt zm an  v. K no tt , 53 3 N .W.2 d 4 19,  421  (Wis . 19 95).
173. A policy recognizing the import ance to the child of a legal commitm ent
between  pa ren t s i s i nconsi st en t  wi th  making adopt ion of a child by a parent ’s
nonmar ita l part ner freely  a va i la ble. If such an  adoption occurs, of course, th e part ner
becom es a  pa rent  and  d rops ou t of  th e non par ent  categor y th at  is th e sub ject of this
art icle. Such adoptions a r e  s om e t imes approved by a state court construing a statut e
whose dr aft er s di d n ot a nt icipa te  its  ap plica tion  in  tha t  ci r cums tance . Tha t  was  done
by the New York  Court  of Appea ls in In re J acob , 660  N.E .2d 3 97 (N .Y. 199 5); accord
In  re M.M.D., 662 A.2d 837 (D.C. 1995);  Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass.
199 3); In re Adoption of Two Children by  H.N.R., 66 6 A.2d 535 (N.J . Supe r. App. Div.
199 5).  But see, Adop ti on  of T.K .J ., 9 31 P .2d  488  (Colo.  Ct . App . 19 96);  In re Angel
Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678 (Wis. 1994). From th e per s p e ct i ve  t a ken  in  th is a rt icle,  su ch
a  mov e is  qu est iona ble n ot on ly a s a n e xer cise  of jud icia l powe r, b ut  als o on
subs ta nt ive policy ground s. The  ma jority opin ion in J acob  expr es sed  it s  “p r imary
loyalty” to th e best  int ere sts  of the ch ild. S ee J acob , 660 N.E.2d at 39 9. While
recogn izing the importance of the child’s interest,  the dissent emph as ized  the
importa nce, under t he legislative scheme, of the ma rital bond between the child’s
parents:
The majority minim izes the a t-will relationsh ips of the . . . couples who
would  be combined biological-adoptive paren ts . . . , but the si gn ifica n t
s t a tu tory and legally central r elevancy is inescapable.
 .  .  . The sta t u te  demons t ra tes  tha t  the  Legis la tu re,  by  express wil l and
words, concluded tha t househ olds that lack legally recognized bonds suffer
a  relatively grea t e r  risk to the st ability needed for adopted children and
families, beca us e in divi du als  can  wa lk ou t of t hese r e la t ionsh ips  wi th
impun i ty and unk nown legal consequences.
J acob , 660 N.E.2d at  406, 408.
If a  s t ate legislature deliberately approves such adoptions, as has occurred in
Vermont , its action , while doubtless legitimate politically, fails to appreciate the risks
paren t s because of sexual unfaithfulness seems to be
pa r t icu lar ly ha rmfu l  to ch i ld ren .171 The same har ms m a y  be
suffered by the childr en in t he h ousehold of sam e-sex p a r tne rs
wh ose r ela tion sh ips foun der  on t he  rocks  of infidelit y.
Some same-sex couples  would mar ry if t hey could.172
Perha ps some such  re la t ionships would be m ore st able  if
mar r iage wer e per mit ted , alt hou gh t ha t fa ct is p res ent ly
un kn owable. Bu t  eve n  if even t s in  Hawa ii or  e ls e wh ere  lead to
the ap pr oval of such m ar ria ges in  th at  st at e, it seems unlik ely
tha t  s ame-sex  mar r iage will become th e na tion al n orm  in t he
near fu tu re . The social policy favoring a  legal bond between
pa ren t s in child-adult  relat ionships is sim ply not ava ilable to
same-sex couples.173
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and the messa ge inherent t o deliberately creating a second c h il d -p a rent  rela tions hip
in  a n onm ar ita l hom e. S ee VT . STAT . AN N . tit . 15A, § 1-102(b) (1997) (“If a family un it
consists of a parent  and the par ent’s partner , and adoption is in the best int er est  of
the chi ld,  th e p ar tn er  of a p ar en t m ay  ad opt  a ch ild  of th e p ar en t. ”).
174. S ee Ha fen, supra  note 12, at  491-547.
175. S ee REG AN , supra  not e 170, a t 2. Alth ou gh I join Professor Regan’s criticism
of tha t view, he an d I do not fully agree on t he m oral content  of family law.
The rest riction of ma rr iage to persons  of th e opposite sex
ra ises th e second issu e: should  th e sta te conclude  tha t  be ing
ra ised by parents of differ en t  genders  i s of pa r t icu la r
impor tance to a  child? Is t he  gend er  re qu ire me nt  for ma rr iage
related to the social interest in child-adult relationship?
The social int ere st s in  rela t ionships bet ween sa me-sex
pa r tner s an d th e child of one of th em  i s pa r t  of a  la rge r ,
vigorously  deba ted  political qu est ion : whether society has a
s take in th e intim at e relat ionships bet ween  consen t ing
adult s—heterosexua l or homosexual—and if so what  that  s take
is. I t  helps  to s t ep  back  a  pace and put  th e ma tt er in a  broader
pers pective.
By h i stor ica l  st andards,  our  cult u re emph asizes  pe rson a l
au ton omy an d individua l right s to an  extra ordina ry degree.
What tha t  emp ha sis m ean s for fam ily law is  hot ly deba ted . It is
widely accept ed t ha t fa mily a nd  other  in t imate,  pe rsona l
relationships fall wit hin  th e am bit t hat  most  of us belie ve
should be shielded from u nbr idled s ta te scru t iny and
int ervent ion . On e expla na t ion  for  tha t  pr otect ionSSan
expl a n at ion  cons is tent  with  the  pe rspect ive  t aken  in  thi s
a r t icl eSSis th at  not a ll inter ests  in int imat e relat ionships, but
specifically mar ital and par ental interests,  ar e protected by  the
law, wit h  exce pt ion s m ade  pr im ar ily  to pr eve nt  in equit y or
ha rm.174 Some, however ,  would d raw a  much  d iffe ren t
conclu sion: th at  sexua l moralit y and  intim at e relationships
between  consen tin g ad ult s sh ould be e nt irely p r iva t ized  and
protected  from s ta te  regu la t ion .  Milt on  C. Regan , J r. a pt ly
chara cterizes tha t per spective as follows:
[T]h e  vess el of fam ily shouldn ’t  be f i l led with  subs ta nt ive
m o r a l con t e n t, b u t  sh ou ld  be  left  em pt y so  th a t in div idu a ls ca n
use  i t  for  the ir  own p ur poses .  On  th is  view,  family la w ,  like
ot h e r m o d e r n  li be r a l  in s t i t ut ion s , s h ou l d r e m a in  n e u t r a l
a m o n g visi on s of t h e good  life, in t e rven ing  on ly  when
necessa ry  to  p reven t  one  ind iv idua l  f rom h a rm ing  ano th e r .175
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176. The failur e to see family law as an instrument  for reaching the necessary
accommoda t ions between social and personal interests leads to polar ized  po li t ics and
a  scorched-earth, winner-tak e-all approach to law and s ocial policy. The problem  is
outlined n icely in  MARY AN N  GLENDON , RI G H T S  TALK: TH E  IMPOVERISHMEN T OF
P OLIT ICAL  DI S C O U R S E  (199 1).
177. Not all same-sex couples seeking to rear children will be homosexua ls, of
course, although it  is probably safe to assume th at m ost will be.
178. An  excellent  overview of th e ar guments  i s foun d in C oolidge, supra  note 151,
a t  29, 46-50, 84-88.
What ever one’s views may be about t he sta t e ’s int ere st  in
the intimate relationships of adults as between themselves,
su rely  th e calculus chan ges when  a child ent ers t he pictu re.
The  pu blic int ere st  in child  rea rin g is vita l.
As a  societ y we  can  have fe w gr ea ter  concer ns t han  how the
ne xt  gener at ion is r ais ed. Ou r ch ildr en’s psychological a nd
mora l developm ent  will, per ha ps m ore t ha n a nyt hin g else,
quick ly a ffect  t he qu alit y of our  cult ur al a nd  economic life. A
child’s home en vironmen t is n ot th e only deter m i na n t  of tha t
de velopm en t , bu t  it  is  su rely  one of t he m ost  im por tan t .
The presen ce of a social int erest  does not mea n t ha t  t he
pr iva te in ter es t s of child a nd  ad ult  in a  pa r t icu la r  se t t ing  count
for  noth ing.  It  mea ns  only t ha t t he se im port an t, a nd
interconnected, interest s  m u st  r each  an  accommoda t ion  with
the gen er a lized  socia l inter est wh en t hey compet e, as t hey
inevit ably  will from t ime to t ime . Ea ch is en tit led t o weight  in
the crea t ion  and  appl ica t ion  of legal s ta nd ar ds gover nin g th e
upbr inging of children. 176
Acknowledgin g th e exist ence a nd  rele van ce of a s ocial
interest  in  relat ionships bet ween children  and  nonpa ren t  adu lt s
does not  re solve t he  difficult q ue st ions; it  only br ings  them in to
sha rper  focus . In the sett ing considered here, the question is:
Does society h a ve a ba sis for pr eferr ing a nd  pr ivileging child
rearing by opposite-sex, versus sam e-sex couples?
I believe tra dit iona l fam ily law h as  it r ight  in pr eferr ing
tha t  children be r aised by a m other  an d a fat her , rat her  th an  by
two persons  of the  same sex. Th a t  conclu sion  is  not  ba se d on
fears  abou t  t he  be h a vior of homosexual adults,177 such  as  tha t
th ey are likely to abu se or mist rea t  children. It  rest s on a belief
tha t  men  and w omen  are n ot  fungib le i n  rela t ion  to ch ild
rea r ing . They ha ve distinct contr ibutions t o make.  Argumen t s
and evidence for th at  view come from a var iety of sources.178
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179. F o r exa mp le: “[T]he  ins tit ut ion of m ar ri age , as  th e u nion  of one  m a n  a n d
one  woman, mu st be preser ved, protect ed, an d prom oted in  both p riva te a nd pu blic
realms. . . . [T]he prin cipled defens e of mar ria ge is a n  u r g en t  n ecessity for t he we ll-
be ing of ch ild re n a nd  fam ilies, a nd  for t he  comm on good  an d soci et y.”  Na tion al
Confere n ce of Cat holic Bish ops (Un ited  Sta tes ), St atement  on Sa me-Sex M arriage, in
CAT HOLIC  ALMAN AC  51, 51 (Fe lican A. F oy & Rose M. Avat o eds., 199 7).  “[M]arr iage
between  a man  and a  w om a n  i s  or d a ined  of  God .  . .  . Marr iage  between  man and
w om a n  is  essen tia l to His e ter na l plan . Childr en a re en tit led to bir th  with in  t he
bonds o f ma t r imony , and  to be  r ea red  by  a  fa the r  and a moth er wh o honor  mar ita l
vows with complete fidelity.” The Firs t Pr esidency and Council of the Twelve Apos tles
of t he Ch ur ch of  J esu s Ch rist  of Latt er-da y Sain ts, The Family: A Proclamation to
the World , in  TH E  E N S I GN  O F  T H E  CH U R C H  O F J E S U S  CH R I S T O F  LAT T E R-DAY SAINTS ,
Nov. 1995, at  102, 102. “This Confer ence . . . up holds fait hfuln ess in  ma r r i a ge
between  a m an  an d a  wom an  in a  lifelon g u nion  . . . [a nd ] can not  ad vise  the
l eg it imis ing [sic] or  b le s si n g of sam e-sex u nion s.”  Text of  Lambeth Conference [of the
Anglican Communi on ] Resolution on Sexuality, TH E  LA MB E T H  DAILY, Aug. 6, 1998 , at
3, 3. Some argue, of course ,  t h at religiously-based or motivated views are per se
i ll eg it ima te as grounds for p ub lic poli cy. F or a n in sigh tfu l re spon se t o th at  posi tion ,
see Robert  P. Ge orge, Pu blic R eason  an d P olit ical C onf lict : Abort ion  an d
Homosexuality, 106 YALE L.J . 2475, 250 3-04 (1997). 
180. S ee DAVID P OPENOE , LI F E  WITHOUT F ATHER 139 (1996). S ee also DAVID
BLANKENHORN , F A T H E R L E S S  AMERICA: CONFRONTING OUR MOST URGENT SOCIAL
P R O B LE M  (199 5).
181. S ee P OPENOE , supra  not e 180, a t 139 -40. See also David G ut ma nn , The
Fat her  and th e Masculine Life Cycle, An Institute for Am erican V alu es W ork in g Pa per
for th e S ym posi um  on F at her hood  in  Am erica , Pu blica tion  No. W.P . 13 (Nov . 1991)
(“[T]he  forms of pater nity an d mat ernity a re not express ions of power politics between
the sexes but ar e evolved adapt ations to th e special requiremen ts  of the wea k  and
needy hu ma n ch ild .”).
Un su rp ris ingly i t  is  common  am ong ma ny for wh om r eligion is
an  impor tan t  source of values.179 O thers  a rgue  for  the
d is t inctive  con t r ibu t ions  of mothers and  fa the rs from a  secu la r
poin t of view. David Popenoe, for  exa mple, r ely in g h ea vily on
evidence from t he social sciences,180 a rgues  tha t
b eyon d  bein g m er ely a  secon d a du lt or  th ird  p a r t y ,
fa t h e r sSSm e nSSb r in g a n  a r r a y  o f p o s it i v e i n p u t s  t o  a  ch i l d ,
u n iq u e an d ir re pla cea ble  qu al itie s t h at  wom en  do n ot
o rd in a r i ly  b r in g. Desp i t e  t he i r  m any  s im i l a r i t i e s , ma les  and
fe m a les  ar e  different  to  th e core .  They t hin k differen t ly  a n d
a ct  d i ff e ren t ly .  D if fe rences  ha ve  un ive r s ally  bee n fou nd  in
ag gr es sion  a n d  ge n er a l a ctiv ity  leve l, cogn itiv e sk ills, s en sor y
s e n s it iv it y , and  sexua l  an d  r ep r oduc t ive  behav io r .  By  eve ry
in dica tion  th e e xp r es sion  of t h ose d iffer en ces is  im por ta n t for
ch i ld  deve lopmen t . 181
This  ph ilosophy m a y  h elp expla in t he la w in t he
Scandinav ian  coun t r ies , wh ich  have gone t he fa r thes t  of an y
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182. See sour ces cited  in Wa rdle , supra  note 171,  at 842 & n n.298-301.
183. Much  of the data su pporting that proposit ion is s usp ect. S ee id . at 844-52.
184. As David  Popen oe ha s pu t it , 
[a]  genera tion of social scientists h as ar gued tha t father hood is merely a
“socially constr ucted ” phenom enon , a “gender  role,” someth ing devi s e d  a nd
taugh t  by each society. The implication is tha t, because it  is devised by
society, it can be changed or even dropped altogether. Th is argum ent is often
extended to most ma le an d fema le differen ces. Such  differences  ar e th ought
to be cu ltu ra lly d et er mi ne d, e ven  ar bit ra ri ly so.
P OPENOE , supra  note  180, at  164. Popen oe finds t his view in compat ible w it h  “our
cu r ren t  unde rstandi ng of h uman  bi ology a nd e volu t ion .” Id .
185. S ee generally F INE MAN , supra  note 18.
Wester n  cult ur e towa rd s legit imizin g homose xua l rela tion sh ips.
They have made an  impor tan t  d is t inct ion  where  pa ren ting is
concern ed. Legisl a tion in  Den ma rk , Nor wa y, Swed en , an d
Icelan d precludes adopt ion  by s ame-s ex cou ples . Some of t hose
coun t r ie s als o prohib it t he cr eat ion of par ent -child relationships
in s uch  un ions b y me an s of rep rodu ctive t echn ology.182
These ar gum en ts  ar e cont est ed, of cour se. Some believe that
paren thood re ally ca n be , an d ough t t o be, a n d r ogynous , or  a t
least tha t  ther e is  no evid en ce of h arm t o ch ildren  from being
ra ised by a couple of the sa me  sex who sha re an  in t ima te
re la t ionsh ip wit h  one a n othe r .183 Some ar gue th at  gender -
di ffe r en t i a ted roles in parenting are socially constructed and
can  be socially a ltered  or eliminated.184 One schola r  has
recen tly  a rgued  tha t th e pa ren ta l role is  properly gender ed, but
tha t  a s a m at ter  of policy the  ma ter na l role entirely eclipses the
impor tance of th e pa te rn al. Th e ke y defin ition  of fam ily,
therefore, is mother a nd child.185
Ques t ions of th is  sor t  a r e  impor t an t  not  ju s t  t o t he  pr iva t e
pa r t icipan t s i n t r ad it i ona l and  non t r ad it i ona l fami li es , bu t  t o
the communit ies  in  wh ich  they l ive , a nd t o the well-bein g of the
na t ion’s cultur e generally. Har d data a lone cannot supply
sa t is factory an swer s t o th ose que st ions. On e mu st  inevit ably
r esor t  to non emp irica l judgm ent s a bout  th e effect of fam ily
form on  ch i ld ren  andSSultim at elySSto value judgments.
J udges  as ked  to r esolve disp ut es lik e th at  in Holtzm an
shou ld re cognize not  only t ha t t he  social in te re st  is r eleva nt ,
bu t th at  cour ts s hould n ot be th e prim ar y source of th e cont ent
of tha t  in teres t . The cor rectness  of the conclusion  tha t  “children
gener ally develop best, and d evelop most  complet ely, when
ra ised by b oth  a  m oth er a nd  a fa th er a nd  exper ience r egula r
D :\ 1 9 9 8- 3\ F I N A L \ A N D -F I N . W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
935] CHILDREN, PARENTS, AND  NONP ARENTS 1003
186. S ee War dle, supra  note 171, at  860.
187. CA S S R. SUNSTE IN , LEG AL REASONING AND P OLITICAL CONFLICT  7 (19 96).
fam ily int era ction wit h bot h gen der s’ pa ren tin g skil ls”186 is
precisely th e k ind  of quest ion best  an swer ed by polit ically
accoun ta ble legislatur es ra th er t han  court s. As Ca ss S un st ein
has  wr i t t en , “the rea l for um of high  pr in cip le i s p olit ics , n ot  the
jud ici a rySSand th e most fun dam ent al pr inciples are developed
dem ocrat ically, n ot in  court rooms .”187
V.  CO N C L U S I O N
Con test s bet ween  ad ult s over t heir  legal r elat ionsh ips wit h
children  ar e  a source of both anguish for th e persons involved,
and il lumina t ion  of t he  in t e res t s  tha t  d r ive th is  a r ea  of fami ly
law. Th e ca se s r evi ewed  in  th is  a r t icle  refle ct  the im por tance
we pr operly a tt ach  not  only to t he in dividu al i n te r ests of
children  and adu lts, but alsoSSan d less  obviouslySSto the
in ter es t  of societ y in  family  form.
There i s no ques t ion  t h a t  th e law ha s tr aditionally shown a
s t rong p reference for t he child-par ent  relat ionship over
compet ing  ch i ld -n on p a r en t  r e la t i on sh i ps . T h e cu l tu r a l
p refe rence for  p a r en t s i s p a r t  of a  la rger  context  in  wh ich  the
mar i t a l fami ly  is  the p refe r red  set t ing for  rea r ing children. Th e
fe a t u res of th e family of par ticular  value t o children  ar e t he
lega l bond  bet ween  pa re nt s, wit h it s t en den cy t o e n h ance t heir
em ot ion a l and  othe r  commi tmen t s t o one  another , and  the
distin ctive, gen de r -sp ecifi c cont r ibu t ion  made b y  mothers and
fa thers.  The  capa city of exten ded fa mily m emb ers , especia lly
grandpar ents, to en r ich  and  suppor t  th i s fami ly  st ructu re  a re
valued  as well. Oth er a rr an gement s, such a s foster  an d
pr ea dopt ive homes, a re m ore or less favored in rela tion to th eir
capaci ty to su ppor t, a ppr oximat e, rep licat e, or  r epa i r  the
mar it a l fami ly .
A socia l i nt e res t  an ch or ed  in  the m ar it a l fa mily  doe s n ot
mea n  th at  th e out come of any pa rt icular  disp ut e is
predetermined. The cu l tu ra l pr eferen ce for t he m ar ita l fam ily is
not  itself a legal standa rd, but an int erest in fl u en cing the
crea t ion  of st a ndar ds. The social inter est is n ot inconsistent
with  a recognition t ha t, inevitably, man y two-paren t ,  mar it a l
families would do mu ch wors e for childr en t ha n wou ld sin gle
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188. See Ha fen, supra  note 12, at  545-47, 561-62.
nonparen t s in u n conventional domestic settings. But it  also
accept s the  va lue of the m a r i t al  fami ly  as  a  genera l ma t t e r .
Tha t valu e is r eflected  in s ta nd ar ds t ha t give a  non conclusive
advan tage  to tha t  fami ly  form.
The social in te re st  pr eferr ing t he  t r ad it i ona l,  mar it a l fami ly
sha pes the legal standa rds a pplied in  mos t  ca ses . Cour t s
app ly ing those  s tandards  usually do so withou t  focus ing
explicitly on t he  social in te re st . As long a s  t ha t  in t e res t ,
convent iona lly un der st ood, is  wide ly a ccep ted , a n  uncr it ica l
ap plicat ion of exi st ing s tandards  flows  smooth ly.  In  recen t
years, howe ver, tr adit ional legal sta nda rds  ha ve been
challenged, usually in the form of a deman d that  the “child’s
best int ere st s” should  be t he p rim ar y, if n ot t he sole,
det e rminan t . The judicial proponent s of such pr oposed
stan dards  often  overlook, or a t le as t d ecline t o discus s, t he
social int ere st . A cha nge in  th e legal standa rd, however , ca nnot
leave th e social int erest  un touched.
Changes in legal standa rds governing parent-nonpar en t
disput esSSindeed  sta nda rds  govern ing family law issu es
genera llySSshou ld not  be  made  wit hout  t akin g a ccount  of su ch
implications. If, as  is n ow eviden t, t he  tr ad ition al le gal
stan dards  based on t he conven tion al social interes t a re t o be
called int o quest ion, th e un der lying social in ter est  its elf shou ld
be considered carefully. It s h ould  not  simply be  wr it t en  out  of
th e equa tion, as if it ha d no indepen dent  force.
The social int erest  in family form , as r eflected  in lega l
stan dards,  genu inely a ffects  ind ividua l mem bers  of societ y as  a
pu blic affirm a tion  of valu es. It  ma y not a ffect a  per son m uch  if
a  neighbor chooses to live in  an  un convent iona l domes tic
a r r angemen t . But  one  is affected if the law affirms, r a the r  than
mer ely perm its or t olerates , tha t a rr an gement . The difference
between  affirmat ion and tolera t ion  is  r ea l  and  impor t an t .188
This  is especially tru e in th e family law ar ena , whereSSunl ike
the commercia l sphe reSSjudicial decis ion s a ffect  our  se nse  of
in tima te commu nit y, our collective self-definition. Tha t
definit ion  can  and,  one h ope s,  a lways  wil l in clu de  a  se nse  of
toler a t ion  for  t he  nonconformist .  B u t  it  need  not  be an
affirmat ive embrace of the nonconformist’s ideals.
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